Gorbachev Seen Testing Reagan : Arms Likely to Dominate in Iceland Talks

Whether the White House likes it or not, arms control appears certain to dominate next weekend’s Iceland summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

And U.S. officials say that odds for significant progress are probably greater than the White House acknowledges as it tries to prevent exaggerated expectations from creating pressure for U.S. concessions.

By all accounts, the best prospects are for limits on intermediate-range missiles--U.S. missiles in Europe and Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. Beyond that, a potpourri of other arms issues, from “Star Wars” missile defenses in space to “risk reduction centers” on Earth, are certain to be discussed.

‘Conditions Are Ripe’

Among the dark-horse possibilities, according to some congressional Democrats, is a reconstituted SALT II accord, limiting long-range nuclear weapons. In the view of these sources, the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1979 could be revamped in a way that the Reagan Administration could accept, although the name would have to be changed because President Reagan announced five months ago that he intended to abandon the pact.

“Conditions are ripe across the board,” said Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

On the Soviet side, Adelman said in an interview, Gorbachev has taken full control after seven years of ailing Soviet leaders, who were in no condition to achieve arms control breakthroughs, and he has accepted the principle of deep reductions in nuclear weapons.

Position of Strength

And on this side of the Atlantic, he said, the Administration’s military buildup has permitted the United States to negotiate from strength. If Reagan negotiates an arms accord, he added, his high personal popularity increases the likelihood of Senate ratification.

If Reagan can achieve progress toward arms control in Iceland, he can probably translate it into rewards from Congress in the form of more money for the defense budget, especially for his Strategic Defense Initiative, as “Star Wars” is formally known. Beyond that, such progress would not hurt Republican candidates, moderates in particular, in the congressional elections that are just a month away.

At their first summit in Geneva last November, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to speed up negotiations on long-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on missile defenses. They called for “early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground.”

Unacceptable Terms

At that point, arms negotiations between the superpowers had been proceeding for almost a year. Each side had offered a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, although under terms that the other had found unacceptable.

Since then, both sides have proposed shallower, and more realistic, reductions in offensive arms. But the Soviets continue to insist that they will not cut their offensive weapons unless the United States accepts limits, which it has so far found unacceptable, on “Star Wars.” The impasse is too deep and the issues too complicated to expect great advances at the Iceland summit, according to senior U.S. officials.

Medium-range missiles appear to provide the best hope for an accord, they say. The issues are relatively simple, and the Soviets have made important concessions in the past year. But obstacles remain that can be overcome only with high-level political compromises.

The SS-20 Missile

The medium-range Soviet weapon is the mobile SS-20 ballistic missile, each of which carries three warheads. Since 1977, Moscow has deployed 270 of these weapons in the European Soviet Union, aimed at Western Europe, and another 171 beyond the Ural Mountains in Asia.

The U.S. medium-range missile force totals 236 missiles, each with only one warhead, that it has deployed in Europe since late 1983. Of these, 108 are Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and the other 128 are ground-launched, low-flying cruise missiles.

Reagan proposed eliminating this category of weapon globally; in response, the Soviets offered eliminating it in Europe. Both nations now seem to be agreed on a first-step reduction to 100 warheads on each side in Europe.

But five substantive differences remain, chief among them the Soviet SS-20 force in Asia. Moscow has offered to add no more missiles, but the United States, pressed by Japan and to some extent by China, wants reductions in Asia “proportionate and concurrent” to those in Europe. To match the 100 SS-20 warheads in Asia, Washington would keep 100 missiles in storage in the continental United States.

‘Didn’t Say No’

Gorbachev, in his latest letter to Reagan, “didn’t say no, but he didn’t say yes” to this offer, a senior Administration official said. In Iceland, the two leaders could reach an agreement in principle that could be fleshed out later by their arms control specialists. But these other nettlesome issues on intermediate-range missiles would remain to be hammered out. They are:

--Verification. With Defense Department officials at the forefront, the United States wants tough inspection provisions, including evidence that withdrawn missiles are destroyed rather than just stored. The right to inspect Soviet facilities on demand is also a Defense Department condition.

--Short-range nuclear missiles. In response to U.S. deployments of Pershing 2s and cruise missiles in 1983, the Soviets moved additional short-range missiles into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Under pressure from Western European nations, the United States wants to roll back the Soviet force to pre-1983 levels or, at worst, freeze it at its current level.

--The mix of Pershing 2s and cruise missiles. If each side accepts a 100-missile limit in Europe, the Soviets want the entire U.S. force to consist of slow-flying, winged cruise missiles rather than faster Pershing 2 ballistic missiles. The United States wants a roughly equal mix.

--Timing. If an agreement on the 100-missile limit is reached, negotiations would begin immediately toward eliminating all medium-range missiles. The Soviets want to set a deadline, perhaps five years, for achieving an agreement to eliminate all such weapons. The United States wants no such deadline for fear that if negotiators failed to meet it, the Soviets could build their missile force back up but the United States, for political reasons, probably could not.

Long-Range Complexity

Far more complex are the negotiations on long-range nuclear weapons, which come in greater variety and are more vital to each nation’s defense. And, if Reagan’s “Star Wars” defensive system works, it would be able to protect against long-range Soviet missiles.

Both sides have 10,000 to 11,000 “nuclear charges,”--bombs and missile warheads mounted on intercontinental carriers that can travel 3,000 miles or more. The superpowers have narrowed their negotiating differences after several years of maneuvering, but the remaining issues resist compromise.

In gross numbers, the proposals of the two sides are rather close. Both have offered ceilings of 1,600 strategic launchers. Both call for about a 30% cut in nuclear charges on these carriers.

But those positions mask deep differences. Each side is seeking to keep most of the weapons it relies on most heavily and to cut those that the other side prefers. Specifically, the United States wants the deepest cuts in land-based ballistic missiles, while the Soviet proposal concentrates on reductions in air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

Different Ceilings Sought

The United States would limit land-based ballistic missile warheads to 3,300, compared to the 4,800 ceiling proposed by the Soviets. A Soviet force of 4,800 could cover every U.S. fixed military target and command center with at least two warheads, enough to feed U.S. fears of a Soviet surprise attack. At 3,300, the Soviets could not threaten such a “decapitating strike.”

As launchers, the Soviets would count land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and--in contrast to the U.S. position--submarines capable of launching cruise missiles. They would ban long-range cruise missiles on surface ships. The U.S. plan excludes sea-launched cruise missiles.

But most important, the Soviet proposal to cut long-range nuclear weapons is directly tied to limits on Reagan’s “Star Wars” program.

Gorbachev told Reagan, according to another senior U.S. official, that no offensive reductions are possible unless the Unites States extends from six months to “up to 15 years” the escape clause in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That clause states that either side may deploy missile defenses after giving six months’ notice.

Constitutional Consideration

Aside from whether Reagan would accept such restraint, it may be unconstitutional for any President to bind his successors in that fashion, several officials noted.

Reagan has offered to forgo deploying missile defenses for five years, a hollow offer since, according to the chief of the “Star Wars” program, such defenses are at least 10 years away. After five years, either side could deploy missile defenses if it negotiated for up to two years on how to prevent such deployment from upsetting the present nuclear balance and then gave the other side six months’ notice, according to the plan.

Gorbachev has written to Reagan that such a scheme is not acceptable. Thus the superpowers appear hopelessly split on missile defenses as well as on the link between such defenses and offensive weapon cuts. The possibility of a grand compromise on offensive and defensive weapons seems far away.

Several other arms issues are on the table, with some showing promise to earlier resolution than others.

--Revival of SALT II. Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), an influential arms control activist in Congress, said in an interview that this outcome has a chance, albeit slim, of emerging from the Iceland summit.

Reagan’s May Announcement

In May, Reagan announced that he would end U.S. compliance with the 1979 arms treaty because he said the Soviets were violating its terms, continuing their military buildup and not seriously pursuing real arms-reduction agreements. Gore said that Reagan now could argue that the Soviets have met the final two objections and need only to halt their treaty violations.

Accepting some of the restraints in the treaty “would build substantial momentum toward a new arms agreement,” Gore said.

--Nuclear testing. Moscow is continuing its unilateral 18-month moratorium on tests--it is now scheduled to expire at the end of the year--and presidential arms control adviser Edward L. Rowny predicted that “the Soviets are sure to make a great deal of propaganda out of the issue at the summit and elsewhere.”

Much of the world equates testing with the arms race, and the Soviets are gaining a great deal of mileage on the issue, particularly in Europe. Moscow has proposed a total ban on tests underground to complement longstanding prohibitions on tests in the air, space and seas.

Two-Treaty Offer

Reagan has refused, arguing that the United States needs to test to ensure the reliability of its nuclear weapons. He has offered, however, to submit two treaties negotiated a decade ago for ratification if the Soviets permit on-site monitoring of explosions to ensure that their yield (or power) is less than the 150-kiloton (150,000 tons of TNT equivalent) limit set by those treaties. So far, the Soviets have refused.

--Risk reduction centers. These would be set up in Moscow and Washington for regular discussions and exchange of technical information. They also would permit round-the-clock vigils during any crises that have the potential to escalate into nuclear exchanges.

Negotiations have progressed well, and Reagan and Gorbachev probably could sign an agreement in Iceland establishing the centers. But as one U.S. official complained, it is an idea in search of a mission. In a real crisis between the superpowers, the top leaders would communicate directly via the existing hot line between the White House and the Kremlin.

--Conventional force reductions in Europe. The recent East-West agreement in Stockholm to reduce the risk of war in Europe is likely to give new impetus to the moribund 13-year-old negotiations in Vienna to cut European troop strengths. Gorbachev has proposed a grand cut of 25% of all North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact forces, rather than the token cuts of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops offered by the West.

Moscow has been hinting that it would like to combine the Vienna negotiations with a new conference to succeed the Stockholm meeting. But the United States and other NATO nations appear opposed to such a forum, because it would draw neutral nations into what has been a negotiation between East and West.