U.S. Memo Envisioned Possible Libyan Coup, Assassination Attempt

A State Department working paper used last August in drawing up the Reagan Administration’s plan of deception and disinformation against Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi advocated a strategy that could lead to “a oup or assassination attempt” against Kadafi by his own military or other opponents.

The memo, circulated by the State Department on Aug. 6 in advance of a White House meeting of officials at the assistant secretary level, said: “The goal of our near-term strategy should be to continue Kadafi’s paranoia so that he remains preoccupied, off-balance . . . (and) believes that the army and other elements in Libya are plotting against him--possibly with Soviet help. Believing that, he may increase the pressure on the (Libyan) army, which in turn may prompt a coup or assassination attempt.”

The final directive approved by President Reagan in mid-August did not mention assassination. Instead, it ordered covert, diplomatic and economic steps designed to deter Libyan-sponsored terrorism and bring about a change of leadership in Libya.

Assassination Forbidden

Administration officials have said explicitly that the overall Administration policy does not directly seek assassination of Kadafi. A 1981 executive order signed by Reagan directs that “no person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”

An Administration official Saturday issued the following White House response: “The document in question is a working paper with no standing as Administration policy. Moreover, any inference in the document that a policy option was ever considered to promote the assassination of Kadafi is wrong. Support for assassination in any form has never been and is not now a part of Administration policy.”

The statement added, “Advocating change in a governmental regime is not the same as advocating assassination. To associate the two is irresponsible.”

Several senior Administration officials privately criticized the ambiguity of overall policy toward Kadafi, which they see as aimed at removing him without directly employing necessary or likely means for doing so.

Reacted to Report on Kadafi

Similarly, some sources said Administration officials failed to realize that spreading disinformation to deceive Kadafi also would mislead the American news media and public. They also said that the policy of deception and disinformation grew out of an overreaction by Administration officials to an intelligence report on Kadafi’s state of mind.

The intelligence report, delivered in July to Secretary of State George P. Shultz and CIA Director William J. Casey, said that Kadafi had acted so bizarrely in a meeting with Yemeni officials that he seemed to be going out of control. Some Administration officals saw in this an opportunity to increase psychological pressure on Kadafi.

Subsequent, more reliable intelligence indicated that the initial report was exaggerated. Kadafi actually sat through the meeting with the Yemenis in silence, apparently sulking in a corner, according to sources. Such behavior is not unusual for the mercurial Libyan leader, according to government specialists, but by the time the Kadafi behavior was understood, a crucial interagency review was under way.