Breaking the Faith : The Kadafi Plot Dishonored Our Reputation, Not His

In reviewing troops before battle, the Duke of Wellington exclaimed: “I don’t know what effect these men will have upon the enemy but, by God, they terrify me.” America’s friends abroad must be thinking the same thing, after learning of a campaign by the Reagan Administration to try to destabilize the Libyan regime of Col. Moammar Kadafi.

Revelations of the plan, which included deception of the media, help to explain the flurry of anti-Kadafi activity this past August. In the midst of summer doldrums, word got around that U.S. intelligence agencies had evidence that Libya was preparing to resume terrorist attacks. A third aircraft carrier task group joined the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. F-111 fighter-bombers were sent to England on “routine exercises”--this explained with a wink. And, just as he had before the April air raids on Libya, our ambassador to the United Nations, Gen. Vernon Walters, flew off to talk with the European allies.

Clearly, the basis was being laid for something; just what was anyone’s guess. The most popular guess, not disputed by Administration spokesmen, was that the United States was ready, willing and able to counter impending Libyan terrorism with renewed military action. The shoe dropped at Karachi, Pakistan, when terrorists seized a Pan Am jet and killed 18 passengers. But--no Kadafi.

We now learn that it was all a hoax, save for the real-life deaths in Karachi. In a fashion that we thought Washington had outgrown, the denials have been flying thick and fast. President Reagan got angry at the suggestion that the Administration was engaged in dirty tricks. Memos in black-and-white, including one written by the national security adviser, are said to have no status, and middle-level officials are said to have acted on their own. Yet the FBI, in the modern equivalent of “shooting the messenger,” has been called in to investigate the leaks.

For the media, this has become a melange of Watergate, Vietnam, morality play and assault on the First Amendment. Added piquancy came from the timing. The Administration’s plan, either to provoke Kadafi into a rash act or to give heart to his opponents, was revealed only days after a successful defense of media integrity: the release of an American journalist held hostage by the Soviet Union.

Only Secretary of State George P. Shultz has come close to coming clean. He justified the thought of “a little psychological warfare” by arguing that the United States was “pretty darn close” to being at war with Libya.

The image is revealing, because the United States is precisely not close to being at war with Libya. If it were, then the complex standards would come into play by which we make moral judgments about the role of “information” at times of national trial. The Allies’ conduct of World War II was replete with deception, often fostered knowingly by a willing press corps. Only in Vietnam did journalists part company, when the link was not clear between national purpose and military action.

In the tussle over ends and means, it is important to make fine judgments. There is no doubt that Kadafi deserves whatever punishment he gets, nor that the world would be better off without him and his ilk. The American people are not likely to cavil at some bending of the rules if it hastens Kadafi’s departure.

But there are costs. At a practical level, the United States now looks foolish to its West European allies. For some, like the French--at least in their bravado--the problem is that the Reagan Administration did not finish the job. The scene was set but the action did not follow, and Kadafi remains in power.

For most Europeans, however, the campaign of deception meant a rerun of many of the doubts and uncertainties that attended the April raid on Libya. Walters came and went, and European leaders were puzzled not to receive the data on Libyan depredations that they had been led to expect. Opponents of U.S. unilateralism received new evidence for their fears. And now, with reports of what really happened, a bit of the luster is taken off European anticipation of next weekend’s summit.

The use of deception points to a deeper dilemma. The United States is not close to war with Libya, in part because Kadafi is only one agent of terrorism, in part because “war” is an excessive response. Terrorism against Americans is important, but few Americans are victims--only eight have died this year--and no U.S. government could provide security for all Americans abroad.

The deficiency that leads to deception is the unwillingness of the Administration to put the terrorism problem in perspective. Failing that, it will forever be held to account and found lacking. It will forever be stymied by Kadafi or--if he goes--by others like him.

For terrorists who are also revolutionaries, the greatest goal is to get free societies to injure themselves. In war, truth may sometimes have to be sacrificed, for a time, to a greater goal of national survival. Trying to trammel Libya--without results--is no matter to justify a government’s breaking faith with the media and thus with the people. Unfortunately, Kadafi is the winner of this round.