Support for Insurgencies Often Backfires

The Reagan policy of supporting opposition forces fighting weak Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World may be dangerously self-defeating.

In places such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and Kampuchea, the “Reagan Doctrine” aims to help anti-Soviet insurgents oust Marxist regimes in favor of more pro-Western governments. Even if this policy does not achieve their overthrow, the doctrine’s apologists argue, it has the benefit of forcing the Soviet Bloc to pour resources into no-win conflicts.

This policy sounds good. But does it work in all cases? The American-backed challenge--real or rhetorical--forces Marxist regimes to seek aid from the Soviet Union and other established socialist states. The military aid is accompanied by military advisers, growing penetration of the country’s political, military, security and economic institutions, and the propaganda victory of helping a friend in need against “imperialist intervention.” Soon a Third World government, whose predilection for Cold War geopolitics may have been lukewarm at best, finds itself inexorably tied to the Soviet bloc.

As a result, the continuation of a half-baked insurgency against a Third World Marxist government provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity to strengthen its control over the regime. If a rebel group has no chance of coming to power, then, is it really in American interests to support it if this only leads to a stronger Soviet hold over the country?

The Reagan Doctrine makes sense if the Marxist regime has no independence at all--as in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, occupied by Soviet and Vietnamese troops, respectively. These regimes have no ability to turn to the West and away from the East even if they wanted to.

But where the Marxist regime does have some independence the situation is different. Consider Mozambique: South Africa, but not the United States, is aiding the insurgency there. But the Soviet Union and Cuba have not given much assistance to the Marxist government, either. This has led the Mozambique government to seek assistance from Portugal and Britain and even the United States. Although outwardly Marxist, the regime has moved a considerable distance away from Moscow and can be described as nonaligned.

Could other Third World Marxist regimes, such as Nicaragua’s, be wooed away from Moscow, too? The Nicaraguan economy is desperately poor. Nicaragua needs the economic assistance that the West, not the East, can provide. But because of American support to the contras, the Sandinistas have moved ever closer to Moscow and Havana.

Sending $100 million in American military and other assistance to the contras will compel the Sandinistas to seek increased Soviet and Cuban military aid. Yet it is highly doubtful that the ineffective contras will be able to use this aid to oust the Sandinistas.

There is no guarantee that without American aid to anti-Soviet opposition groups, Nicaragua and other Third World Marxist regimes would abandon the East and embrace the West. On the other hand, Moscow’s previous relations with other Marxist and radical regimes not facing serious insurgencies have shown that the Soviets often alienate such governments through their efforts to control them.

From the Soviet point of view, the possible defeat of insurgencies against relatively independent Marxist regimes is threatening. While these regimes might remain ideologically pro-Soviet for a long time, they would not--without a clear enemy--have an incentive to allow the Soviet Union and its allies to strengthen their presence in the country. But without such a strong presence, the regime could more easily distance itself from Moscow or expel the Soviets completely.

Unless the Administration and Congress are prepared to give opposition movements enough support to actually overthrow these Marxist regimes, then American foreign policy interests may be better served by giving them nothing and attempting to foster differences between Moscow and these regimes when possible.