U.S. Sees Drawbacks to Slashing A-Arms

The Administration, fearing an anti-nuclear backlash in Western Europe and Japan, is launching a campaign to convince U.S. allies that President Reagan did not squander an opportunity to slash the numbers of nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia by refusing to compromise on his “Star Wars” strategic defense plan.

As one element of the post-Iceland consultation, Administration officials will be pointing out to the Europeans and Japanese that there are serious drawbacks to any plan that would virtually eliminate nuclear weapons.

“The sober, hardball facts are that it may not be in Europe’s interest to have zero intermediate-range missiles,” one Administration official said. “The rhetoric is highly desirable--who can object to a nuclear-free world. But the reality may be different.”

A senior official put it even more starkly: “You get a chill in your spine when you think of a world without nuclear weapons.”

The deal that Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev almost made in Reykjavik appeared to be far more favorable to Europe and Asia than it was to either the United States or the Soviet Union. It was the sort of pact the Europeans and Japanese have been asking for but never quite dared hope they would get.

Down to 100 Warheads

The plan would have totally removed both Soviet and American mid-range nuclear missiles from Europe and would have reduced by 80%--down to 100 warheads--the number of Soviet missiles in Asia.

But the deal fell through when Reagan balked at Gorbachev’s demand for a 10-year moratorium on development and testing of the U.S. “Star Wars” strategic defense plan. As viewed from Europe and Japan, the President lost a very favorable arms reduction deal to protect an anti-missile arms project about which most Europeans and Japanese are skeptical or, at best, ambivalent.

The Iceland results could reopen the debate in Europe over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s program of deploying U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in West Germany, Italy, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands.

In response to public opinion, the European nations agreed to accept the U.S. missiles only after Washington promised to do its best to reach an arms control agreement with Moscow that would eliminate the missiles on both sides. U.S. officials are concerned that Europeans will conclude that the United States failed to keep its end of the bargain.

Capitalizing Politically

Also worrisome is the prospect that opposition parties, like the Labor Party in Britain, may capitalize politically on the nuclear issue against pro-American governments that might have been embarrassed by the outcome of the summit.

“There is a realistic concern,” one U.S. official said. “I wouldn’t characterize it as a panic.”

In response to that concern, the Administration will send a number of high-level officials to Europe and Asia to explain the U.S. position. High priority will be given to trying to convince European and Japanese public opinion that an abrupt elimination of nuclear forces could be a mistake in the face of the Soviets’ superiority in conventional forces.

A senior Administration official said that the Europeans, at least, may already appreciate the value of nuclear weapons but are reluctant to say so because of the pressure of anti-nuclear public opinion.

“We may see some trepidations, qualms from our allies about giving up all nuclear warheads,” the official said.