Has Damascus Gone Off Its Rocker?

The Reagan Administration’s decision to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus was the least it could do in the circumstances.

Having repeatedly, and sometimes petulantly, called on our European allies to show solidarity with us in our confrontation with Libya’s Moammar Kadafi, and having exposed British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to much criticism for allowing us to use aircraft based in her country to attack Tripoli, we could hardly refuse to show solidarity with her when Britain broke relations with Syria. This was particularly so because there was clear and direct evidence of official Syrian involvement with Nezar Hindawi, the would-be bomber of an El Al airliner.

The move was taken reluctantly, nevertheless, because Syria is one of the principal players in the Middle East and because ultimately, we must rely on its good offices if our hostages seized in Lebanon are ever to be released. Withdrawal of our ambassador will inevitably make our modest dialogue with Syria more difficult and will lessen our ability to make progress on the hostage issue. This is not to mention the complications such a withdrawal may pose for the Middle East “peace process,” but since that is not going anywhere, this does not make all that much difference.

The current situation also forces us to face up, however reluctantly, to the long record of successive Syrian governments that have resorted to violence for political ends. That violence has usually been directed against other Arabs, principally in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Syria’s record in the latter country is impressive. The number of Lebanese, prominent and otherwise, who have been liquidated by the Syrian security apparatus over the past 10 years is certainly in the hundreds, and if it is true, as alleged, that the Syrians were behind the bombings of our Beirut embassy and the Marine quarters in 1983, they have many American deaths to answer for as well. In neither of the latter two events has Syrian responsibility been established in a court of law, however, there are plenty of other people in Lebanon who had the means and the motives to have perpetrated those two bombings and there is a wide choice of suspects across the political spectrum.

In spite of its record in the region, Syria has publicly condemned terrorism and has been careful about involvement in political violence outside the Middle East. President Hafez Assad projects the image of a shrewd and careful man who has long been one of the cooler heads in Syria. It has been difficult, even for the Israelis, to accept the view that he would willingly engage in dangerous adventures in Europe that would expose Syria to such opprobrium and to possible retaliation. The Israelis were particularly puzzled by the attempted El Al bombing, asking themselves what Assad thought would have happened if the bomb had gone off and all those on board had been killed. Did he not realize that the least the Israelis would have to do would be to mount a major retaliation against someone, and that Syria ran the risk of being the No. 1 target?

So strong is Assad’s image of prudence that there has been much speculation that his intelligence services are out of control and that he was not aware of what was going on. If it is true, as seems to be the case, that the Syrian ambassador himself was directly involved in the attempt to blow up the El Al jet, this implies a high degree of administrative anarchy or, alternatively, imprudence. As the ambassador himself argued to the press, no government in its right mind would involve its ambassador in such a plot. Does that mean that Damascus has gone off its rocker?

The reported remarks last week of a well-known Palestine Liberation Organization moderate--to the effect that there was no longer a place for moderates in the PLO hierarchy because everyone was tired of moderation--offer a clue to the way tempers are running in the Arab world today. As it has become clear that the indirect negotiations between Jordan’s King Hussein and former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres have gone nowhere, attitudes have hardened and we’ll see more, not less violence. It seems that this outlook has also affected Damascus and that the proclivity for violence that affects some of Assad’s associates has gotten out of control.

The question for Americans is how our government should deal with this problem. There is no easy answer and there are no easy remedies. Standing tall will not do it. Having no aid program and little trade, and offering little of substance in the peace line, we have few levers with which to influence Syria. It is not a relatively defenseless rogue state like Libya, which we can attack easily. We are reduced to the sweaty agony of diplomacy, which holds out little hope of success unless we can do something serious about the basic problems of the area, the first of which is the absence of peace.