Internal Pressures Are Pushing Tehran Onstage Again

The release of American hostage David P. Jacobsen and the purported visit to Tehran by Robert C. McFarlane, former national-security adviser, raise important questions about events in Iran and U.S.-Iranian relations. Are moderates in the ascendant in Iran? Has the United States changed its policy toward the Islamic republic?

Most important are Iran’s internal power struggle and economic stress during the past year. The Islamic regime is deeply divided along ideological lines. The hard-line left-leaning elements want a totally state-controlled economy and closer links with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. They advocate an aggressive policy of exporting revolution, including subversion and terrorism.

By contrast, more moderate elements support a larger role for the private sector. They are anti-communist and favor a more flexible and open diplomacy, both in the region and toward the West.

The regime’s ideological divisions are further complicated by personality clashes and ambitions of key figures who look to the post-Khomeini era. The ayatollah’s periodic interventions have not resolved these conflicts, nor has he clearly favored any one faction. Instead, he maintains a delicate balance, supporting different groups depending on the circumstances.

The power struggle has become particularly acute because of economic problems. Saudi Arabia’s price-war strategy has cut into Iran’s oil revenues. Iraq’s successful bombing of Iranian oil terminals has at times cut exports to a trickle.

In recent months the Iranian government has had to cut imports to the bone. The lack of raw materials is threatening many industries with closure and thus unemployment above today’s 40%. Food and fuel are in short supply and prices are soaring--along with a rise in popular discontent, anti-regime sentiments and even agitation. Iran’s war efforts have also been hampered: The “final offensive” against Iraq has been postponed indefinitely.

The Iranian government has adopted a policy of extreme austerity. It has also shown considerable flexibility and pragmatism in its foreign relations, trying to gain economic advantages. The first targets were the Soviet Union and France. Iran has agreed to resume natural-gas exports to the Soviet Union. In return, the Soviets have agreed to resume sending technical experts to work the steel mills and power stations in Iran. The technicians were withdrawn in 1983 because of the strain in Soviet-Iranian relations and the Iraqi bombings. Franco-Iranian rapprochement has led to the settling of a long-running disagreement over a $1-billion loan made to France under the shah. In the Persian Gulf, a bargain seems to be shaping up between Iran and Arab states, including Saudi Arabia: Iran will moderate its regional behavior in exchange for the gulf states’ cooperation on raising oil prices.

In the context of these developments, Iran’s new interest in the United States is predictable. Iran is desperate for U.S.-made spare parts, both military and civilian, and is eager to revive commercial relations. It also wants the United States to revert to neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. Thus Tehran would assist Washington in the issue of Americans taken hostage in Lebanon if, as a start, Washington would allow third-country exports of spare parts and permit U.S. firms and their foreign subsidiaries to deal with Iran.

In the Islamic regime, however, dealing with the United States is still qualitatively different from dealing with any other country. Radical factions are merciless in exploiting any sign of flexibility toward America on the part of their rivals. Indeed, the statement by the speaker of the parliament that the U.S. envoy to Tehran was detained in his hotel for five days and then expelled may have been a defensive measure against accusations by the radicals of collusion with the United States.

Even when Iran began negotiating with France last summer to recover its loan, the radicals argued against the sacrifice of revolutionary principle for political or economic expediency. Clearly the dynamics of this power struggle could abort the first serious dialogue between the United States and Iran. Anti-American statements designed for domestic consumption or revelations that might be embarrassing to the U.S. Administration could lead to similar American responses and another cycle of acrimony. Indeed, there is danger that the latest U.S.-Iranian contacts will generate a radical backlash as did the Algiers meeting in 1979 between Mehdi Bazargan and the national-security adviser at that time, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Yet the current situation is different, because Iran is in deep economic straits and the regime’s survival is threatened by war conditions. For the fledgling dialogue not to falter, the U.S. government must exercise great restraint in responding to Iranian statements likely to be provocative.

More important, the United States must not revert to a policy of ignoring Iran. The strategic and political value of Iranian moderation and, in due course, normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations is too great to risk being jeopardized by overreaction.