Let Reagan Prove His Peacemaking Motive

The arms deal with Iran, though ill-conceived and poorly implemented, was in a sense at least a break from the passive posture that the Reagan Administration has adopted for four years with regard to the three major trouble spots in the Middle East--the Iran-Iraq war, the Lebanon conflict and the Palestinian problem. Now that the Administration has spoken of its wish to help settle the first of these, one hopes to see a regional strategic policy emerge that may also address the second and third problems.

No doubt, the United States should not ignore an important country like Iran; there is a definite need for an initiative toward the moderate elements in Tehran. But in the absence of a larger strategic concept the initiative that was taken, the arms deal, was more damaging than useful.

First, it underlined the credibility gap that U.S. policy has been suffering in the Middle East. Not only did it embarrass America’s Arab friends in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, but it also confirmed their worst fears that the United States is following Israeli strategy in the region. Indeed, the detail of how the arms sale proceeded has blurred the distinction, at least in Arab minds, between the Israeli and American agendas. Political opposition forces within the moderate Arab regimes may now argue that the United States has sold out its Arab friends. They may see the Administration’s attempt to consolidate support of potentially friendly factions in Iran as having the effect of consolidating Iranian elements that may threaten others in the region.

Then, while the arms deal itself may not radically alter the balance of power between Iraq and Iran, it gives a signal to other countries to pursue arms sales. The United States’ ability to control and constrain arms flows to Iran, from official and unofficial and even black-market sources, has been severely curtailed. That will lead to both escalation and prolongation of the war--a dim scenario for the entire Persian Gulf region, inevitably damaging if not disastrous to Western interests.

A continuous American tilt toward Iran would be fatal to Iraq, which is one-third the geographic and population size of Iran. Iraqi officials are not willing to escalate the tension with the Reagan Administration, yet they cannot ignore the serious ramification that its latest step may have for their embattled country. More important than the damage to the military balance of power, Iraqi officials are concerned about the political balance of power. The arms deal has given a moral boost to the Iranian regime.

There exists a positive side to this episode: It can be an opportunity for rethinking the United States’ strategic posture in the Middle East and the prospects for a regional order. There is a fear that this episode will lead the Administration to distance itself from Middle East issues, that the domestic debate might absorb the energy of the Administration and weaken its focus on foreign policy. Yet the recent U.S. policy of standing on the sidelines has not paid off. In fact, the United States cannot expect a de-escalation of the threat to its interests unless there is a major initiative that would create a momentum toward the settlement of the long-raging conflicts in the region.

If the Reagan Administration makes a sincere follow-through on its wish to help end the Iran-Iraq war, other countries--including the Soviet Union--might join. This would transfer the conflict from the realm of superpower competition to one of cooperation. An arms embargo and humanitarian assistance for the rebuilding of the two devastated countries can be on the top of the list of incentives offered by the world community and sponsored by the United States and its allies.

Then the stage would be set to widen this initiative to include the settlement of the Lebanese and Palestinian stalemates. The Western countries and Japan, which have benefited in the last two years from the decline of oil prices, should be able to contribute a level of assistance--political and economic--that would heighten stability and lessen violence, including terrorism.

It may seem inopportune to suggest a major U.S. initiative at this time. But, after all, it was the Administration’s stated purpose in making the overture to Iran. A bold, statesmanlike posture by President Reagan, rising above the debate in Washington, would do much to put an end to the recriminations there, and it would do much to channel the energy of frustrated forces in the vast Middle East toward a more useful goal.