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Latin America Walks a Tightrope in Transition to Democracy

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<i> Richard E. Neff, a Washington lawyer, was an election observer in Uruguay. </i>

History’s most widespread shift toward democratic governance has taken place since 1979 in Latin America, where military regimes have ceded power to democratic civilian rule in 10 nations. Because many of these military governments were guilty of varying degrees of human-rights abuses, the transition to democracy often has been accompanied by national debates over holding the former rulers accountable for their crimes.

Among the new democracies, two--Argentina and Uruguay--have followed widely divergent paths on the accountability issue, with differing results. These results demonstrate that the government that is quick to act on abuses of the former regime is in a better position to move forward with its democratic agenda.

The Argentine regime of Raul Alfonsin is the shining example of a civilian government that has taken its brutal predecessors to task for their excesses. During the “dirty war” of the late 1970s, security forces kidnaped and killed at least 9,000 citizens. A year ago, after a long and wrenching trial, six civilian judges sitting as a court-martial sentenced a former president, Lt. Gen. Jorge R. Videla, and a former navy chief, Adm. Emilio E. Massera, to life in prison for their roles in the dirty war. Three other junta leaders received shorter sentences, and three were acquitted.

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Last Tuesday the same court convicted and sentenced two more generals and three provincial police officials to prison terms, extending culpability to the lower ranks. Approximately 1,700 cases against junior officers are moving slowly through military tribunals at present.

While the trial of the junta leaders did not still the debate in Argentina, widespread support for the result indicated that the Alfonsin government had struck a popular balance between retribution and social peace. Many Argentines regarded it as a vindication of the judicial system, and Alfonsin has been able to move forward with his reformist program.

In Uruguay, by contrast, President Julio Maria Sanguinetti has refused to take action against the former strongmen, and the ensuing debate has all but paralyzed the government.

Although there were many fewer disappearances and deaths than in Argentina, Uruguay in the mid-1970s had the highest number of political prisoners per capita in the world, and torture was rampant. During the 1984 election campaign the issue of accountability was treated gingerly by the candidates because of continued fear of a still potent military. Once Sanguinetti was elected, the issue emerged with fury, with the opposition parties screaming for prosecution. Now the government’s caution is producing a constitutional showdown. Several dozen human-rights cases have been filed in civilian courts against individual officers, but the military has thus far refused to permit any officers to stand trial.

Because the Uruguayan military stepped down in a position of relative strength, the government’s room for maneuvering may be narrowly circumscribed. By contrast, the Argentine military’s stature had been seriously undermined by the 1982 Falklands debacle, making prosecution more viable.

On the negative side, the Argentine trial reportedly hardened the resolve of Chile’s Gen. Augusto Pinochet to stay in office and led him to further consolidate control over the military. Chilean human-rights groups have mentioned the bittersweet aspect of a trial that proffered justice and hope to Argentines while reducing chances for a democratic transition in Chile. The Argentine example may prompt military governments to demand absolution in advance as a condition for any democratic transition.

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Democratic governments should try to hold their military predecessors accountable for human-rights abuses. But where there is limited room for maneuvering, pressing too hard on accountability might backfire by producing a coup. The more humbled the departing military people have been by external circumstances, the easier it is to hold them accountable.

If possible, the accountability should begin at the highest levels, for both its deterrent effect and its cathartic value. At the very least, individual trials should be permitted to go forward, to release some pent-up anger and redress particular injustices.

Abuses by military governments not only rend the fabric of society and cause unfathomable suffering, but they also have the ironic effect of destabilizing successor democratic governments by causing a paralyzing debate over accountability. Argentina, which so far has walked the tightrope between societal catharsis and military wrath, seems most able to face the future successfully.

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