Strong Roles of Poindexter and McFarlane Told

Even though Lt. Col. Oliver L. North is frequently portrayed as the central figure in the Iran- contra affair, evidence gathered by congressional investigators indicates that North acted with strong approval and assistance from President Reagan’s two former national security advisers, John M. Poindexter and Robert C. McFarlane.

Both McFarlane, who resigned as White House national security adviser in December, 1985, and his successor, Poindexter, who stepped down when the Iran-contra affair became public knowledge last November, were deeply involved in promoting the sale of arms to Iran, according to a 65-page summary of the Senate Intelligence Committee released last week.

The committee report recounts several instances in which the two men misled other Reagan Administration officials in an effort to protect the Iranian arms initiative. Even as the scheme was unraveling last November, Poindexter staunchly resisted advice from both CIA Director William J. Casey and Secretary of State George P. Shultz that he avoid embarrassing news leaks by asking the President to make it public.

And while there is no firm evidence to support North’s claim that Poindexter approved the diversion of Iranian arms sale profits to the Nicaraguan rebels, it is clear from the testimony received by the Senate committee that neither Poindexter nor McFarlane did anything to disrupt the scheme once they learned about it.

In fact, Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III, who conducted a preliminary investigation of the contra connection last November, told the Senate committee that North had confided to him that only three Americans had known about the diversion of funds: North, Poindexter and McFarlane.

As a result, the Senate report undermines an earlier view of the Iran-contra scandal, put forth primarily by White House officials, that North was simply a “loose cannon” within the Reagan Administration who acted without clear approval from his superiors. The apparent complicity of McFarlane and Poindexter, who met daily with President Reagan when each served as his chief foreign policy adviser, brings the controversy one step closer to the door of the Oval Office.

‘An Approved Matter’

There is no evidence that the President was aware of the diversion of Iranian arms sale profits to the contras, however. Both Poindexter and McFarlane have said that they never told anyone--not even the President--about it, according to the committee.

McFarlane testified that he learned about the diversion from North during a trip the two men made together to Tehran last May. According to the committee report, McFarlane was told by North it was “an approved matter,” but he never bothered to inquire at the White House whether it had been authorized by Reagan.

According to the report, Poindexter told Meese that North had given “enough hints” for him to conclude that the contras were getting some of the money, but that he too had not inquired further about it. It is not known when Poindexter first learned of it, although the report said North told McFarlane he had outlined the scheme for Poindexter in a memo. The memo, a copy of which was obtained by the committee, is believed to have been written last April 4.

Refused to Testify

North, who along with Poindexter refused to testify before the committee, told Meese he had no idea whether information on the diversion of funds to the contras had been passed up the chain of command by Poindexter.

When Poindexter was asked by White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan last November why he allowed the diversion of funds to the contras, according to the report, he replied that he “felt sorry” for the rebels after their U.S. military funding was cut off by Congress.

Even in November, 1985, shortly before McFarlane left the White House, the committee’s evidence shows that North had already informed Poindexter, then McFarlane’s deputy, that he was involved in an enterprise based in Switzerland known as Lake Resources Inc. that was prepared to ship arms to Nicaragua. It was Lake Resources that later provided a bridge between the Iranian arms sales and the contra funding effort.

On Dec. 4, 1985, seven days before McFarlane resigned, North told Poindexter that he was working with a code for Iranian matters similar to the one he was using to oversee the delivery of goods to the contras, according to the report.

Role of Advisers

The committee also uncovered new evidence of the extent of the role that McFarlane and Poindexter played in the Administration’s arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, and also in efforts to persuade third countries--such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Brunei--to contribute money and weapons to the contras.

Poindexter, who was presiding over the White House foreign policy apparatus at the time the Iran-contra scheme was disclosed last November, clearly tried to keep the details of the matter secret as long as possible.

When Shultz recommended that the President make a public statement, according to the report, Poindexter replied in a cable to Shultz that he had consulted with Casey, Vice President George Bush and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger. He said all three agreed the Administration should be “absolutely closed-mouthed while stressing that basic policy toward Iran, the gulf war and dealing with terrorists had not changed.”

‘Dribs and Drabs’

Poindexter appeared to be misrepresenting Casey’s views on the matter, however, because evidence gathered by the committee shows that the CIA director had met with Poindexter on Oct. 15 and also recommended public disclosure of the initiative by the President in order to keep it from leaking to the news media “in dribs and drabs.” Casey made the recommendation after learning that money was being diverted to the contras, according to the committee.

It was apparently not the first time that Poindexter had misled another official in the Administration about aspects of the Iran-contra affair.

In April, the report said, Poindexter told an unnamed U.S. ambassador that there was “only a small shred of truth” to a report that the White House had approved arms shipments to Iran--even though the President himself had approved the operation in writing. At the same time, the committee said, Poindexter also told Shultz that the arms shipments to Iran had been stopped, even though they were continuing.

Likewise, the report cited a number of instances in which McFarlane has provided differing versions of events relating to the arms-for-hostages deal. Both Shultz and Regan have disputed McFarlane’s account of events in August, 1985, in which he claimed that the President orally approved Israeli arms shipments to Iran.

‘Oral Finding’

Meese told the committee that when he interviewed McFarlane last November, the former White House national security adviser made no mention of an “oral finding,” as it has since been described by McFarlane. On the contrary, according to Meese, McFarlane indicated at that time that the President was disturbed by the Israeli shipments.

The Senate Intelligence Committee said it was also told by McFarlane that the President informed Shultz, Weinberger and Casey of his decision to permit Israeli shipments in August, 1985. But McFarlane has since testified publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he himself informed Shultz, Weinberger and Casey. Shultz, on the other hand, contends that he was never informed of the decision by anyone.

McFarlane testified privately that he was unaware of Israeli shipments to Iran before August, 1985, according to the report, even though he stated in a cable obtained by the committee that he knew of some. Likewise, the committee said, McFarlane testified that he approved a visit by NSC consultant Michael A. Ledeen to Israel to open discussions of the Iran arms deal, but wrote in a memo dated June 7, 1985, that Ledeen acted “on his own hook.”

According to the committee report, Poindexter played a key role in the White House effort to obtain third-country support for the Nicaraguan rebels. He not only attended top-level meetings in which the matter was discussed but wrote a memo to North last September approving an Israeli shipment of Soviet-made weapons to the contras.

McFarlane also may have been involved in this effort to find additional contra aid, although his role is still unclear. The committee learned that McFarlane telephoned Shultz last June to tell him that a third country--presumably Saudi Arabia--had contributed about $30 million to the contras. The report does not explain how McFarlane, who at the time was a private citizen, knew of the contribution.