Panel Blames Reagan, Staff : Rejects His Arms Deal Story, Assails Regan, Casey, North : President Didn’t Seem ‘Aware’: Tower Group

President Reagan “did not seem to be aware” of the full consequences of his arms-to-Iran policy or of the unprofessional way it was implemented by the National Security Council staff, the Tower Commission said today. Its report faulted the President and his closest aides.

The President’s handpicked investigators bluntly challenged Reagan’s oft-stated explanation for his policy, saying the Iran initiative became almost from the outset “a series of arms-for-hostages deals.”

As such, “they could not help but create an incentive for further hostage-taking,” threatened to upset the military balance of the Iran-Iraq war and “rewarded a regime that clearly supported terrorism and hostage taking.”

An hour after receiving the report, the President announced that he will make a nationally televised speech next week. “I will do whatever is necessary to enact the proper reforms and to meet the challenges ahead,” Reagan said.

The President refused to answer reporters’ questions about the future of embattled White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, who came in for harsh criticism from the Tower panel for not exercising his own control over the NSC.

Former Sen. John Tower, the commission chairman, told a news conference, “The President made mistakes.” But he added that the President was “poorly advised and poorly served” by many of his aides.

No Accountability

Reagan was portrayed in the report as being unaware of the way in which his policy was carried out, and “at no time did he insist upon accountability and performance review.”

“The President did not seem to be aware of the way in which the operation was implemented and the full consequences of U.S. participation,” the report said.

Among the major details of the report:

--Reagan was driven by concern for the American captives in Lebanon and, according to Regan, in December, 1985, with some top aides urging the Iran arms pipeline be shut down, the President expressed frustration that “he is looking powerless and inept . . . because he’s unable to do anything to get the hostages out.”

--Fired NSC aide Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, who had a major role in conducting the covert policy, laid out a detailed accounting in December, 1985, of how arms shipments would buy freedom for American captives in Lebanon. He presented a 24-hour scenario under which planeloads of weapons would arrive at specific intervals, followed by the release of one or two “AMCITs”--American citizens.

--Reacting to the disclosure of the arms deals in early November, 1986, White House aides constructed a chronology designed to “give the impression that Israel had” made the first sale to Iran in August, 1985, on its own, former NSC chief Robert C. McFarlane told the panel.

--On whether the President approved the first sales of U.S. arms by Israel to Iran before the delivery, the board said it was “unable to reach a conclusive judgment,” in part because Reagan gave the board conflicting accounts, then said he simply could not remember. In the end, the report said, “It is plausible to conclude that he did approve them in advance.”

‘Question of Law Remains’

Regardless of whether Reagan approved the arms sales in advance or after the fact, and whether he did so orally or in writing, the board said, “a serious question of law remains. It is not clear that the form of approval was sufficient for either the Arms Export Control Act” or the law requiring Congress be notified of covert activities.

The commission said it was unable to draw firm conclusions about whether money from the Iran arms sales were diverted to the contra rebels fighting Nicaragua’s leftist government. It said the task was complicated by a lack of cooperation from Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, North and Israeli authorities.

The panel said answers about the contra connection will have to come from other investigators--two special congressional committees and a federal special prosecutor expected to conclude their probes later in the year.

Regan ‘Shares’ Responsibility

On Reagan’s key aides, the report said:

--Regan: “shares” in the responsibility for the runaway policies of the NSC, the report said. “He, as much as anyone, should have insisted that an orderly process be observed,” the report said. “He must bear primary responsibility for the chaos that descended upon the White House when such disclosure did occur.”

--North: “The board has no evidence to either confirm or refute that Lt. Col. North destroyed documents on the initiative in an effort to conceal facts from threatened investigations. The board found indications that Lt. Col. North was involved in an effort, over time, to conceal or withhold important information,” the report said.

--Former CIA Director William J. Casey: “Evidence suggests that he received information about the possible diversion of funds to the contras almost a month before the story broke. He too (along with Poindexter) did not move promptly to raise the matter with the President. His responsibility to do so was clear.”

--Poindexter: When it came to uncovering the diversion of funds to the contras, Poindexter “also failed grievously.” “Evidence indicates that Poindexter knew that a diversion occurred, yet he did not take the steps that were required given the gravity of that prospect,” the report said.

Shultz, Weinberger Faulted

The report faults Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for closing their eyes to the Iran arms affair once they lost their bitter battle with other NSC members to scuttle the program.

“Secretary Shultz specifically requested to be informed only as necessary to perform his job,” the report said, and Weinberger had access to intelligence details about the operation but took no action.

“Their obligation was to give the President their full support and continued advice with respect to the program,” the report said. “Instead they simply distanced themselves from the program. They protected the record as to their own positions. They were not energetic in attempting to protect the President from the consequences of his personal commitment to freeing the hostages.”

‘Outside Orderly Process’

The report, addressing the way the arms-sale policy evolved, said:

“The arms transfers to Iran and the activities of the NSC staff in support of the contras are case studies in the perils of policy pursued outside the constraints of orderly process.”

In concluding that Reagan was too far out of touch with the activities of the NSC, the commission said that “a President must at the outset provide guidelines to the members of the NSC, his national security adviser and the NSC staff.