Panel Says NSC Produced a Dozen Varying Accounts

In an apparent cover-up attempt led by Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter and Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, National Security Council officials produced at least a dozen varying accounts of the U.S. arms sales to Iran for 15 days after the transactions were disclosed, the Tower Commission said in its official report Thursday.

The commission members stressed that their report avoided using the term cover-up, but it cited several instances in which the accounts were often conflicting and occasionally far from what actually occurred.

Former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, a major source of the commission’s documentation of the apparent cover-up attempt, admitted that he tried to “overly gild the President’s motives” in the Iran initiative and described his efforts as “misleading at least, and wrong at worst.”

Although the commission “is convinced that the President does indeed want the full story to be told,” NSC officials who prepared the documentation “did not appear, at least initially, to share in the President’s ultimate wishes,” the report said.

The report did not give a specific number of officials who participated in the apparent cover-up attempt but said that those known to be involved in the preparation of the arms sales chronology were two of North’s deputies, Marine Lt. Col. Robert Earl and Navy Cmdr. Craig Coy.

In addition to attempting to distance President Reagan from responsibility for the arms dealings, NSC officials were found to have operated in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy that led them to create cover stories, mislead the House Intelligence Committee and even hide facts from Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

In June, 1986, North wrote a note to Poindexter on soliciting support for the Nicaraguan rebels from other countries, saying: “I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn’t know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the (two countries deleted) aid that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Did RCM (McFarlane) ever tell Shultz?”

Poindexter responded, according to the report: “To my knowledge Secretary Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way.”

Becoming ‘Too Public’

A month earlier, Poindexter had cautioned North that his far-flung operations were becoming “too public.”

“From now on, I don’t want you to talk to anybody else, including (CIA Director William J.) Casey, except me about any of your operational roles. In fact, you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have insisted that you stop.”

The cover story apparently was so convincing that, in recent interviews, former NSC staff members have told of Poindexter’s unhappiness with some of North’s activities and steps he took to rein him in.

Last Aug. 6, after North provided less than candid information to the House Intelligence Committee on the limits of his contacts with Nicaraguan rebel groups and operatives, Poindexter hailed his performance with a two-word message: “Well done.”

Walsh Inquiry

The Tower Commission members emphasized at a press briefing that their task was not to establish criminal culpability, but some information contained in their report would appear to be grist for independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh’s investigators, who are looking for evidence of obstruction of justice.

For example, in citing “many inaccuracies” in chronologies of the Iran affair that North produced, the commission said: “These inaccuracies lend some evidence to the proposition that Lt. Col. North, either on his own or at the behest of others, actively sought to conceal important information.”

Casey and Poindexter relied on the inaccurate chronologies in briefing congressional intelligence committees last Nov. 21.

“It appears from the copy of the DCI’s (Casey’s) testimony and notes of Vice Adm. Poindexter’s meetings that they did not fully relate the nature of events as they had occurred,” the report said. “The result is an understandable perception that they were not forthcoming.”

No Notes Found

The commission said it was concerned about “various notes that appear to be missing. . . . Poindexter was the official note taker in some key meetings, yet no notes for the meetings can be found.

“The reason for the lack of such notes remains unknown to the Board. If they were written, they may contain very important information,” the commission said.

Poindexter and North have refused to testify about the Iran- contra affair, invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, they declined to provide information to the Tower Commission, and Reagan rejected a commission request that he order them to respond.

Dramatic Session

McFarlane, whose account was quoted extensively by the commission, told of a dramatic session he had on Nov. 21 with Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III, who had been asked by Reagan to compile an accurate report of what had taken place.

McFarlane said that, as Meese ended an hourlong interview with him, he recalled pulling the attorney general aside for a few last comments. “I’m talking to the chief law enforcement officer of the country,” he said. “It is essential that there not be any ambiguity in what he is telling the President about the truth of the actions here.”

He said he told Meese: “ ‘Ed, the President was four-square behind it, that he never had any reservations about approving anything that the Israelis wanted to do here.’ Ed said, ‘Bud, I know that, and I can understand why. And, as a practical matter, I’m glad you told me this because his legal position is far better the earlier that he made the decision.’ ”

However, Justice Department spokesman Patrick S. Korten said Meese’s remark did not mean that the attorney general had accepted McFarlane’s version that the 1985 arms sale had presidential approval, which contradicts testimony by Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan.