Tower Report Blames Reagan, Aides : Says They Made Serious Mistakes in Iran Arms Deal : Contends President Didn’t Intend to Mislead Public

The Tower Commission, in a searing indictment of President Reagan’s conduct of national security affairs, castigated the President and some of his top aides Thursday for making serious mistakes in selling arms to Iran.

The commission, which Reagan himself appointed last November, concentrated its fire on the President’s top aides, accusing several of them of concealing evidence from investigators.

The 290-page report faulted Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and former CIA Director William J. Casey for failing to keep Reagan fully informed of the potential consequences of his controversial policy of selling arms to Iran.

It also blamed Casey, former National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and his aide, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, for not informing Reagan about the diversion of profits from the arms sales to the Nicaraguan rebels.

‘Poorly Served’

“I believe that the President was poorly advised and poorly served,” former Sen. John Tower, the commission’s chairman, told a press conference after delivering the report to Reagan.

But Tower, a Republican, did not exonerate the President. “I think that he should have followed up more and monitored this operation more closely,” he said. “I think he was not aware of a lot of the things that were going on and the way the operation was structured and who was involved in it. He very clearly didn’t understand all that.”

Reagan himself, the commission concluded, “did not intend to mislead the American public or cover up unlawful conduct,” although he made a number of inaccurate public statements about the scandal.

Despite the President’s insistence that the Iran arms sales were designed to gain favor with moderate Iranian political leaders, the commission declared that the real purpose was to buy freedom for American hostages held by Iran-backed terrorists in Lebanon.

The President refrained from issuing any immediate comment on the report.

Appearing ill-at-ease and stumbling over the words he read in a statement at the start of the news conference held by the three commission members, Reagan said:

“I want to make it clear that I consider their work far too important for instant analysis. I intend to read and digest it first, think carefully about its findings and promptly act on its recommendations.”

Reagan was given the report in a meeting with the three commission members: Tower; Edmund S. Muskie, a former Democratic senator from Maine and secretary of state during the final year of the Jimmy Carter Administration, and retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, President Gerald R. Ford’s assistant for national security affairs.

Although the commission made no startling new disclosures, it added rich detail to what was already known about the Reagan Administration’s most serious crisis:

--The President himself, the commission revealed, actively aided the effort to raise money for the contras when Congress had barred military aid.

--The point man for that effort, North, who was fired from the White House National Security Council staff last November, directed a worldwide cloak-and-dagger network that consumed millions of dollars and was dependent on “individuals with questionable credentials and potentially large personal financial interests in the transactions” that the network handled.

--When the Iran arms sales became public last November, North and Poindexter stage-managed an effort to cover up what had occurred.

Bush Not Blamed

Although Tower told reporters that the episode was woefully short of heroes, the commission found no cause to blame Vice President George Bush. And it said Chief of Staff Regan remained largely ignorant of many of the operations conducted by North.

The arms sales to Iran began in August, 1985, the commission found, when Israel shipped a modest amount of U.S.-made TOW anti-tank missiles with the understanding that the United States would replenish Israel’s missile stock.

The commission could not determine whether Israel or the United States initiated that deal, but it held that Israel, which supported Iran in its war with neighboring Iraq, at least acted as a “catalyst.” When U.S. officials expressed doubts about their new opening to Iran, the report said, “an Israeli emissary would arrive with encouragement.”

On the crucial question of whether Reagan orally approved the first shipment of arms to Iran by Israel, the commission said that on balance, “it is plausible to believe that he did approve them in advance.”

The issue is important because it involves possible illegalities and conflicting statements to the commission by the President. The President first told the commission he had approved the shipment but later, after conferring with Regan, concluded he had not.

‘I Don’t Remember’

As recently as Feb. 20, the report disclosed, Reagan wrote a poignant letter to the commission saying he had let himself “be influenced by others’ recollections, not my own,” and “the simple truth is, I don’t remember--period.”

Reagan’s aides have disagreed about whether Reagan approved the sale in advance. Robert C. McFarlane, who was Reagan’s national security adviser at the time, told the commission that Reagan did. But Chief of Staff Regan testified that he had not.

Even if the President orally approved the sale, the commission reported, “a serious question of law remains” because several statutes require written approval.

In disputing the President’s contentions that he was seeking to establish relations with moderates in Iran, the commission cited evidence that Reagan was obsessed with the plight of the hostages and asked aides daily about any developments on their status.

Regan, the report said, told the commission that at one point “the President noted that it would be another Christmas with hostages still in Beirut, and that he (the President) was looking powerless and inept because he was unable to do anything to get the hostages out.”

McFarlane, interviewed for the third time on Feb. 21 at Bethesda Naval Medical Center, where he was recovering from an overdose of Valium taken in an apparent suicide attempt, told the commission that Reagan’s main concern was the release of the hostages.

At the July 2, 1985, burial services for the Navy diver killed in the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, McFarlane said, the President remained at Arlington National Cemetery for an extra half hour or so to greet relatives of hostages. “It was a very moving moment,” McFarlane said, “and it had an impact on him.”

Israeli Proposal

A day or so later, McFarlane said, he brought to Reagan’s attention the original proposal put forward by the Israelis to use arms shipments to Iran to secure Iranian help in freeing hostages held in Lebanon.

The President’s reaction was “quite enthusiastic and somewhat perhaps excessively enthusiastic, given the many uncertainties involved,” McFarlane said. The President, McFarlane said, “had no hesitancy about it at all, nor did he when he called me about it last week here in the hospital.”

Reagan and his advisers had hoped that the commission’s report would help him put the Iran-contra affair behind him so that he could concentrate on other issues during his final two years in office. But the report is likely to have the opposite effect.

Unanswered Questions

It leaves many unanswered questions about covert White House operations: the diversion of about $23 million in profits from arms sales intended for the contras and other efforts to supply aid to the contras, possibly in violation of a congressional mandate. Those questions will provide grist for continuing investigations by an independent counsel and two special congressional committees.

“This will give you guys something to chew over for weeks,” one of the commission members told a reporter before the report was released.

In their report and later at their press conference, the commission members emphasized that their mandate was to review the operations of the National Security Council, whose staff members directed the Iran arms sales and diversion of profits to the contras, and not to establish criminal culpability.

However, they cited several laws that could apply to the affair and evidence that former National Security Advisers McFarlane and Poindexter, as well as former NSC aide North, concealed facts about the operation from Reagan and the public.

No Intent to Mislead

Evidence shows that immediately following disclosure of the Iranian initiative early last November, the President “wanted to avoid providing too much specificity or detail out of concern for the hostages held in Lebanon and those Iranians who had supported the initiative,” the board said. “In so doing, he did not, we believe, intend to mislead the American public or cover up unlawful conduct.”

On Nov. 20, the commission said, the President asked Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III to look into the implementation of the program.

“From the President’s request to Mr. Meese . . . to his appointment of this board, to his request for an independent counsel, to his willingness to discuss this matter fully and to review his personal notes with us, the board is convinced that the President does indeed want the full story to be told,” the report continued.

Erroneous Information

Reagan did provide the public with erroneous information, however, both because he was uninformed on some of the details of the initiative and because he was purposefully misinformed on others, the commission concluded.

McFarlane told the commission that he helped the NSC staff create a chronology of the Iranian initiative that “obscured essential facts” and was “misleading, at least, and wrong, at worst.” The chronology was used by the President in his public explanations of the initiative last November.

The commission also found “considerble reason” to question North’s actions in the aftermath of the disclosure of the initiative. But it said it had no evidence either to confirm or to refute allegations that North destroyed documents related to the program.

‘Many Inaccuracies’

The commission said North, as the primary official involved in details of the operation, produced the chronology that was supposed to be the “full story” of the Iranian initiative and that it contained “many inaccuracies.”

“These inaccuracies lend some evidence to the proposition that Lt. Col. North, either on his own or at the behest of others, actively sought to conceal important information,” the report said.

The commission, which accused Casey and Poindexter of not being “forthcoming” when they briefed congressional intelligence committees on Nov. 21, said it also was concerned “about various notes that appear to be missing.”

Poindexter was the official note taker in some key meetings, but no notes of the meetings have been found. The notes could contain “very important information,” the commission said, but it has no way of knowing if they exist.

Refuse to Testify

Both Poindexter and North, invoking their Fifth Amendment right against possible self-incrimination, have refused to testify to the commission and congressional committees.

In assessing blame for the diversion of funds to the contras, the commission harshly criticized Poindexter, who resigned as national security adviser on the same day that North was fired and Meese disclosed the diversion.

Poindexter knew the diversion had occurred but “failed grievously” in his responsibility, either ignoring or failing to appreciate the serious legal and political risks the diversion involved, according to the report.

“His clear obligation was either to investigate the matter or take it to the President--or both,” the report continued. “He did neither.

Casey Faulted

“Director Casey shared a similar responsibility. Evidence suggests that he received information about the possible diversion of funds to the contras almost a month before the story broke. He too did not move promptly to raise the matter with the President.”

The commission faulted Shultz and Weinberger for distancing themselves from “the march of events.”

“Secretary Shultz specifically requested to be informed only as necessary to perform his job,” the report continued. “Secretary Weinberger had access through intelligence to details about the operation. Their obligation was to give the President their full support and continued advice with respect to the program or, if they could not in conscience do that, to so inform the President.”