THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT : Bush Largely Spared From Blame; Regan Story Is Buttressed

The Tower Commission report largely spares Vice President George Bush from blame for the Iran- contra scandal and buttresses White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan’s claim that Regan had no knowledge of the diversion of Iranian arms sale proceeds to the Nicaraguan rebels.

But other officials, including former National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and his predecessor, Robert C. McFarlane, are shown to have received regular, detailed reports from former National Security Council aide Oliver L. North about contra supply efforts--indicating that they were even more deeply involved in the affair than previously was known.

Poindexter, in particular, is quoted repeatedly as encouraging questionable activities, while McFarlane is shown to have lied to congressional investigators about the role of the NSC in the contra operation.

Bush Virtually Unscathed

Bush, by contrast, emerges virtually unscathed--although not exonerated. The report rarely mentions him, and the majority of these references mainly involve whether he attended various White House meetings.

In one of the most damaging references, however, the report quotes Secretary of State George P. Shultz as saying that Bush apparently supported a convoluted plan calling for Israel to free 20 Hezbollah prisoners and to sell five TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran in exchange for U.S. hostages. According to the report, only Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger opposed the plan, which was discussed at a Jan. 7, 1986, White House meeting at which Bush was present.

Focus on 1985 Meeting

In its inquiries, the commission was unable to determine whether Bush was present at the August, 1985, meeting at which President Reagan was said to have authorized Israeli arms shipments to Iran. Bush said he could not remember; neither could McFarlane, who has acknowledged attending the meeting.

At the commission’s news conference Thursday, former Sen. Edmund S. Muskie said Bush, as a National Security Council member, had some responsibility for advising the President on the arms sales. But, Muskie added: “There were too few meetings at which Vice President Bush and the other members of that council were given an opportunity or had an opportunity to influence the results.”

Similarly, although Regan is sharply criticized for failing overall in his duties to the President, the report indicates that the chief of staff knew little about North’s covert operations, at least in the spring of 1986.

Poindexter is portrayed throughout the report as a man obsessed with secrecy who repeatedly warns North to keep his operations quiet. In a May 15, 1986, message, the report says, Poindexter told North to exclude everyone but himself from information about North’s covert activities.

The report further shows that North apprised Poindexter of efforts to arm the contras and, at times, of contra military plans. In fact, the reports says, Poindexter agreed with North in a February, 1985, memorandum advising McFarlane to share an intelligence report with the contras.

But on Aug. 6, 1986, the report says, North told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that he knew of no specific contra military operations. Notes describing this testimony were given to Poindexter, who shortly afterward praised him for his inaccurate testimony.

The report also says that Poindexter may have “actively misled” Shultz on the Iranian arms operation.

Poindexter “failed grievously” by taking no action to stop the diversion of funds to the contras, the report says, declaring: “He apparently failed to appreciate or ignored the serious legal and political risks presented.”

McFarlane also is shown to have had intimate knowledge of North’s efforts to supply the contras. Like Poindexter, McFarlane received regular reports from North.

On March 5, 1985, North told McFarlane of plans to ship arms to the contras via an unnamed third country, according to a memorandum obtained by the commission. The memo stressed the need to provide increased aid to the country to compensate it for helping the contras.

One month later, on April 11, 1985, North gave McFarlane a balance sheet showing how much money the contras had received and how they had spent it. North also described two sea lifts and two airlifts to the contras.

McFarlane’s Denials to Congress

Yet when Congress demanded to know whether members of the NSC were involved in the contra operation, McFarlane repeatedly assured it they were not.

The Tower Commission report also raises questions about the testimony of Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs. Abrams, the Reagan Administration’s point man on Central America, will be responsible in the coming months for promoting Reagan’s Central America policies in Congress.

Abrams told the panel that he remembers North’s “pushing for the contras to grab a piece of Nicaraguan territory and proclaim independence.”

Abrams described the idea as “totally implausible and not doable,” the report says. However, he admitted to the commission that “he might have indicated to Lt. Col. North his support for the plan,” the report says.

The report also discloses contradictions between North memoranda that the panel uncovered and Abrams’ testimony.

For example, North told Poindexter that the Israelis offered to provide military advisers to the contras. “Abrams likes the idea,” North wrote. But Abrams told the panel he could not recall ever discussing any such offer with North.