The President Has a Responsibility to Adapt, Too

The excellent report of the Tower Commission has provided us with an exceptionally clear, sophisticated and frank analysis of how the National Security Council system of decision-making broke down under the Reagan Administration to produce the Iran- contra affair.

For a presidentially commissioned study, it is quite unsparing in its criticism of both the processes and the performance of principal participants, including the President himself. Still, it does not quite confront the heart of the problem, which lies in the President’s approach to decision-making and management. The Iran-contra affair was not an aberration but a disaster waiting to happen.

The NSC is advisory to the President, who retains primary responsibility for the making and execution of national-security policy. The NSC must therefore be adapted to the President’s management philosophy and work style. President Reagan’s style is only briefly described in the report, but a close reading of it suggests the following characteristics:

The President does not just delegate, he surrenders, much authority to his subordinates. He is inattentive not only to detail but often also to the essence of policy issues. He does not address issues primarily through written documents and reports, but through oral presentations. He lacks interest in many of the larger questions of foreign policy--such as the requirements for developing a more constructive relationship with Iran--and instead focuses single-mindedly on questions of great personal interest, such as the hostage issue.

When the NSC system has been adapted to the personal styles of other Presidents, it has been able to build on certain presidential strengths. It is obvious that Reagan’s disengaged, informal and personal approach has more potential pitfalls than strengths.

The only systematic initial effort to adapt the NSC to Reagan’s style was Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s abortive attempt to make himself the President’s vicar for foreign policy. The real adaptation to the President’s style during the first Reagan term took place primarily outside the NSC system. The President was protected against gross error by the White House triumvirate of Edwin Meese III, Michael Deaver and--especially--James A. Baker III. They generally ensured that ill-advised proposals were killed or shunted aside.

When that triumvirate left the White House, a protective shield was removed. Donald T. Regan, who resigned Friday as chief of staff and was replaced by former Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., was less concerned with orderly NSC processes or with protecting the President against himself than with ensuring that the President’s wishes are carried out. The national-security adviser and NSC staff also provided no protection in the Iran-contra affair because they were thoroughly committed to existing policies by the nature of their role in implementing them. Although Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger opposed the Iran initiative, they were, according to the commission, more interested in “protecting the record of their own positions” than in protecting the President.

Under these circumstances, policy processes reflected all of the worst characteristics of the President’s style. Policy-making on Iran was casual, lacking in careful preparation and record-keeping. Policy contradictions were not confronted. Cabinet officers left meetings unsure of what had been decided, and Robert C. McFarlane went off to Tehran without thorough advance preparation. The program of private and international aid to the contras was run out of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North’s hip pocket with no interdepartmental or significant NSC staff review.

On other national-security policy issues in which the President has had less interest, the process apparently has worked more normally. But we know that where there are major interdepartmental differences, as on arms control and strategic trade with the Soviet Bloc, there has been policy deadlock either because of the President’s inattention or because of his inability to resolve disputes.

As the commission says, the President’s style places heavy responsibilities on subordinates, and they did not perform those responsibilities well. It would be a mistake, however, to put the primary blame for failure on those subordinates. If the NSC system must be adapted to the personal style of Presidents, they also have a responsibility to adapt their own methods to the minimum requirements of an orderly and responsible policy process. It is obvious from the Tower report that the President did not discharge that responsibility.