The Text of Rep. Badham’s Letter

The following is the text of Rep. Robert Badham’s letter to Navy Secretary John Lehman:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I recognize that one of the enduring mysteries of aviation is that accidents seem to come in spates. And, I can appreciate how these events might defy analysis for a common thread when they occur. Nevertheless Mr. Secretary, you have a serious problem.

As you know, the H-53E Super Stallion has experienced a puzzling string of mishaps (at least 39) and has become the subject of scores (at least 56) of hazard reports since its inception. Included are seven Class A mishaps and 20 deaths since 1984. During this experience, Department officials would assure me that you had found the problem and that the fix was in hand. Then another mishap would occur. It comes as no surprise to me that this aircraft has gained a reputation as a dangerous machine to operate.

Mr. Secretary, when you get a serial problem such as this, you start to work. But I saw no evidence that the Department had undertaken or was contemplating a comprehensive and systematic examination of the H-53E problem. Out of concern, I requested an Armed Services Committee Staff inquiry. Their efforts have turned up information that now leads me to believe that you haven’t even found the problem much less fixed it; and that the aircraft may have an inherent design deficiency that has contributed to a rather checkered safety record.

Specifically, the problem appears to be that the H-53E external load/airframe/main top rotor interaction is not fully understood. Continuing structural and dynamic component anomalies appear to be related to excitation of fuselage bending modes. Definitive data from which to perform root cause analysis and derive solutions does not exist because tests to develop the data have never been done.

What I find particularly aggravating is that the Department of the Navy was informed of possible structural and dynamic component problems as early as 1976. And that in 1981, when the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey expressed the need for full technical testing of the H-53 prior to fleet use, the approval for service use came six days later!

It seems that the only real progress by the Department toward resolving this issue began when I initiated the Committee Staff inquiry. The Navy immediately intensified its efforts; however, I understand that your plan of action would not even complete the evaluation and tests necessary to understand the problem until sometime in 1989 and that appropriate fixes to the aircraft would not begin before 1991. Moreover, funds are not requested for either the discovery or corrective efforts in the current budget.

I don’t question that your planned approach could solve the hardware problem if adequately funded. But what about the safety of our aircrews, passengers and citizens in the interim? Isn’t that what this is all about? Mr. Secretary, I am calling on you to ground the H-53E fleet until you effect a root cause correction of the problem or can show, within the limits of the data you now hold, that operational parameters have been established that are both safe for those involved and adequate to perform the heavy lift mission for which it was designed. Further, I will ask that Congress suspend obligation of funds for the H-53E program that are not related to safety or reliability improvements.

Finally, I have asked that the Committee address itself to the H-53E situation in a hearing to understand how we got into this situation in the first place so as to avoid similar occurrences in other programs in the future.

ROBERT E. BADHAM

Member of Congress