Siding With South Africa at the United Nations

The Reagan Administration violated another U.S. law the other day. But, preoccupied as most people were with the Iran- contra affair and the President’s ability to remain above the argument, hardly anyone seemed to notice.

The unlikely scene of the crime this time was the United Nations Security Council, where U.S. Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, along with his colleague from Great Britain, vetoed an African-sponsored resolution that would have imposed selective but mandatory international economic sanctions against South Africa, along the lines of those enacted by Congress a few months ago.

It is not exactly unusual for this Administration to vote South Africa’s way at the United Nations; the United States has carried out a policy of “constructive engagement” with the white-minority regime in Pretoria for the past six years. On occasion, America has even stood alone there in defense of Pieter W. Botha’s National Party government.

But this vote was special; it went directly against a clause in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, passed over President Reagan’s veto last fall by overwhelming margins in both houses of Congress.

Section 401(e) in Title IV (Multilateral Measures to Undermine Apartheid) of that law reads as follows:

“It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to propose that the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, impose measures against South Africa of the same type as are imposed by this Act.”

In other words, the Reagan Administration was not just to be discouraged from voting against such measures at the United Nations, but was actually mandated to lead the way. It was to internationalize the steps being taken by the United States against South Africa, including a prohibition on the import of gold coins, iron and steel, uranium and coal; an end to landing rights for South African Airways; a ban on computer exports to South Africa and a ban on bank loans to its government.

The thinking behind the clause was that if the separate actions against Pretoria by the United States, the European Economic Community and other nations or groups of nations could be coordinated and extended, they might be more likely to have a serious impact on South Africa’s economy, on its rigid system of racial separation and on the South African government’s willingness to negotiate with black opposition leaders.

An unwritten hope lay behind the clause in the bill passed by Congress: that for once the United States might find itself in a position of leadership, rather than on the defensive, in an issue of great importance to the Third World.

International coordination and American support were exactly what the African “front-line” states--black-ruled countries in the southern African region--had in mind when they introduced their resolution at the Security Council last month. The time seemed particularly ripe because Zambia, a neighbor of South Africa that serves as the exile headquarters of the African National Congress and its guerrillas, was taking its turn in the rotating council presidency during February. The front-line states were congratulated by many observers for what seemed to be a rare display of realistic moderation: Rather than play to the galleries at home by urging much more extreme measures, the Africans limited themselves to proposing sanctions that had already been approved by the U. S. Congress. They knew about section 401(e) and hoped for support from the White House.

They did not get it. Instead, the Administration trotted out the same arguments that had failed in Congress--that sanctions would make change more difficult to achieve in South Africa and would hurt black residents of that country and neighboring African states more than the ruling white minority.

The difference at the United Nations is that a veto by the United States (or by Britain or any other permanent member of the Security Council) is enough to kill a pending resolution. Unlike a presidential veto, it cannot be overridden by a two-thirds vote.

While the Administration had its way on this matter at the United Nations, it has little cause for much self-satisfaction. The 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, like it or not, is the law of this land, and however unenthusiastic the executive branch may be about a measure passed over a presidential veto, it is obligated by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution (celebrating its 200th birthday this year) to enforce it.

Because of the wording of Section 401(e) of the U.S. sanctions bill--expressing only the “sense” of Congress--White House interpreters could argue that the letter of the law has not really been violated in this case; but certainly the spirit of the law required American endorsement, if not co-sponsorship, of the U.N. African resolution.

One distinction between the U.S. sanctions and the proposed international measures may be acknowledged:

As Walters pointed out in the Security Council debate, the U.N. resolution, as it was cast, could have tied Western hands for the future; even if there were a dramatic improvement in the situation inside South Africa at some later date, any other permanent member of the Security Council--for example, the Soviet Union--could, for its own reasons, veto the lifting of sanctions.

But that defect could have been remedied by instituting the international sanctions for a year at a time and requiring an annual review of the situation in South Africa, much like the monitoring by Congress now in process. Other nations might willingly have accepted such an amendment as the price of American support for the resolution.

At the very least, the Administration could have played better politics and left the vetoing chores this time around to Britain (where Margaret Thatcher’s government is not thus far bound by Parliament or public opinion to support sanctions).

Then the United States could have voted for the African resolution, along with Argentina, Congo, Ghana, the United Arab Emirates, Zambia, the Soviet Union, China, Venezuela, Italy and Bulgaria. (West Germany cast a third negative vote, and France and Japan--always pragmatic on South African issues--abstained.)

There is plenty of room for debate about the extent and the effectiveness of sanctions as one part of the effort to bring about change in South Africa, but Congress and the American public have spoken clearly on this matter. There is no need to look for extra opportunities--and quasi-legal ones at that--to stand up and be counted on the side of the South African government.