Imperfect Deal Lies Ahead, but Reagan Made His Point

Give President Reagan his due. Six years ago his zero-option proposal to keep Europe free from intermediate-range nuclear missiles was met with an almost universal skepticism in the arms-control community. Countless opinion articles explained that it was a charade. The Soviets, we were told, would never dismantle all of their SS-20 missiles. Today zero option is about to become the blueprint for an arms deal with Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

And the time could not be more opportune for the President. Ironically, it was the “evil empire’s” leader who brought the first piece of good news to the embattled Ronald Reagan. New excitement over arms control is likely to divert attention from the Iran -contra affair and to contribute to the President’s personal standing.

In a way, Reagan got lucky again. Zero option was far too sweeping to be acceptable to Leonid I. Brezhnev. And when the American proposal was made in 1981, no one could anticipate that Gorbachev was destined to take over the Kremlin. Nor could anybody predict that the new Soviet leader would act with decisiveness and creativity unparalleled in Soviet history.

Similarly, there was no way to know six years ago, at the beginning of Reagan’s term, that one reason Moscow would opt to embrace the zero option would be a desire to conclude an arms-control agreement before he leaves the White House.

Nevertheless, in the relationship with the Soviet Union luck favors the brave and the persistent. Despite numerous pressures, both in the United States and in Western Europe, the President has stuck with the zero option until Gorbachev has finally said yes. And the perseverance has served the Administration well. Initially the dramatic appeal of the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles helped to deflect the nuclear-freeze movement. In Western Europe the simplicity and radicalism of the zero option contributed to U.S. credibility on arms control. And that credibility in turn was instrumental in ensuring the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles once negotiations with the Kremlin failed to bear fruit.

Too bad that what seems to be in the making is at best a wrong agreement at the right time. Politics is about to prevail over strategy.

It is not necessarily all that terrible. First, arms control is at least as much about politics--both at home and abroad--as it is about real weapons cuts. Second, intermediate-range systems are marginal to the central strategic balance between the superpowers. The rationale for their deployment has more to do with the need to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies regarding the firmness of the U.S. commitment to their defense than with narrowly defined military requirements. If the loss of U.S. missiles in Europe improved trans-atlantic ties, the zero option would serve Western interests well.

Unfortunately, the reaction in Europe is mixed. Bonn has quarreled with the zero option but would rather have it than no agreement. London and Paris are unenthusiastic. The allies are concerned that the removal of the intermediate-range missiles would leave them exposed to superior Soviet short-range nuclear systems and conventional forces.

Also, 1987 is quite different politically from 1981. Zero option in 1981 meant that Moscow would have to dismantle all of its SS-20s, eliminating the need for the politically agonizing deployment of American missiles. But the deployment has already gone on for 3 1/2 years. And the controversy in Europe has died down. After paying a considerable price for getting Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, a number of NATO allies do not believe that the elimination of militarily largely redundant SS-20s is enough to justify their destruction.

Still, it is important to put things into perspective. The position of Western Europe--in the shadow of one superpower while being dependent for security on another--virtually ensures that no matter what America does vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the allies would find something to complain about. The allies’ nervousness over decisions affecting their destiny, but made by others, is understandable and inevitable. And the nervousness over the Euromissiles deal is limited primarily to the national-security elites that are strongly committed to NATO cohesion. Accordingly, an agreement based on a zero option, particularly if it includes some constraints on short-range missiles, will not trigger a serious dispute inside NATO.

The elimination of all intermediate-range systems in Europe is not an ideal solution. But it is available today after being initiated by the United States and again endorsed in Reykjavik. To back out now would incur considerable political cost.

But the Administration would make a major mistake if it let Gorbachev resurrect other elements of the Reykjavik package. Reaching an intermediate-range weapons agreement would be like conquering Grenada--breathtaking, yet risk-free. Casual meddling with a crucial and delicate central strategic balance, on the other hand, may be a prescription for trouble.