Soviet Beam Devices to Aim at Mars Moon : Nitze Cites Relevance to ‘Star Wars’ Tests, Indicates Possible Arms Treaty Violation

Soviet scientists intend to use two exotic beam devices, a laser and a particle beam accelerator, to knock pieces off the surface of one of Mars’ moons in an experiment to determine the surface’s characteristics, Paul H. Nitze, chief U.S. arms control adviser, said Wednesday.

The Soviet experiment also could demonstrate progress toward developing a space-based anti-missile system similar to President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, Nitze said. The Soviet Union insists that it has no SDI program of its own and is not using its Mars experiment as a weapons test, but it does not deny that it is conducting research on beam devices.

The Defense Department, in its 1987 edition of “Soviet Military Power,” maintains that the Soviets have a test range with “several lasers for air defense and two lasers probably capable of damaging some components of satellites in orbit.” It asserts that the Soviets have been “exploring the feasibility of using particle beams for a space-based weapon system” since the late 1960s.

The consensus of experts is that while the Soviets may lead in particle beams and perhaps laser work, they lag badly in the computers, sensors, trackers and other ancillary equipment vital to producing an effective space-based beam weapon system.

May Violate Treaty

Nitze indicated that the Soviet Mars experiment could be judged to violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Under its narrow interpretation, the treaty bans tests in space of weapons or weapon components that are based on beam or other non-conventional technology.

That interpretation could also ban testing in space of SDI, or “Star Wars,” as it is known. By contrast, the Reagan Administration favors a broader interpretation, under which SDI tests in space would be permitted.

Nitze, who disclosed the planned Soviet Mars experiment during a speech at the Johns Hopkins University School for International Studies, said that the Soviet scientists who told Americans of their planned space probe provided no timetable.

In his speech, Nitze sought to justify the Administration’s broad interpretation of the ABM treaty. He, virtually alone among top negotiators of the 1972 treaty, supports the Administration’s view, although he acknowledged that he accepted the narrow interpretation until two years ago.

Nitze argued that the record of ABM treaty negotiations shows that the United States attempted repeatedly to persuade the Soviets to accept what is now called the narrow interpretation, which would ban tests of mobile weapons based on physical principles not then established. But the Soviets refused, Nitze said, on the grounds that it was “impossible” to ban the unknown.

What Congress Was Told

Nitze admitted, on the other hand, that treaty interpretations must be based on more than negotiating records. Also important are the record of what the Administration of that time told Congress during the ratification process and the record of subsequent practice by both sides. The Administration is currently examining these two bodies of evidence, he said.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a highly influential defense expert in Congress, has examined all three sets of records. He concluded two weeks ago, in a series of well-publicized speeches, that despite some ambiguities, all three support the narrow interpretation.

Nitze, in his speech, said: “Soviet scientists tell us they are planning a space probe which will have on board both a laser of some power and a particle beam device. They propose to test these devices against one of the moons of Mars, called Phobos,” with the aim of knocking pieces off the surface for analysis.

Presumably the particle beam device, which accelerates sub-atomic particles to great speeds, would blast the surface rock or dust of Phobos, creating a small cloud that the laser beam would irradiate. Atoms and molecules of the cloud would be energized by the laser and emit light waves characteristic of their composition.

“It would be difficult to prove that the power, brightness and tracking and aiming characteristics of these devices” were not sufficient to constitute components of a weapon system and therefore violate the ABM treaty as narrowly interpreted, Nitze said.