Concerns Voiced Over Political, Military Impact : Soviet Missile Offer: Are Skeptics Looking a Gift Horse in Mouth?

In wrestling with whether to accept the latest Soviet offer to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the United States and its NATO allies appear to be looking a gift horse in the mouth.

The Soviets would give up 1,335 longer-range warheads, while the United States would yield only 216. The Soviets would eliminate at least 152 shorter-range warheads, while the United States has none to give up. The United States would still have about 4,500 nuclear weapons in Europe to reassure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that it was not deserting the defense of the Continent.

Moreover, ridding Europe of intermediate-range weapons was originally an American idea. Balking now, complained Spurgeon Keeny, director of the Arms Control Assn., a private group, is “refusing to take yes for an answer. It’s a better outcome than anyone could have imagined” when the issue first emerged in 1979.

Concerns Over Impact

Yet skeptics abound. An impressive group of national security experts, led by former President Richard M. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, the authors of the key strategic arms agreements that ushered in detente with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, has now publicly voiced concerns over the military and political impact of accepting the Soviet offer.

“An . . . agreement has both opportunities and dangers that are not widely recognized,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Congress’ most influential member on arms control, said Friday. “We’re entering a period of tremendous flux” in NATO doctrine for deterring Soviet attack.

The Soviets have offered to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles--those with ranges of 300 to 3,000 miles--from Europe. Arguments focus on at least four consequences that could flow from accepting the offer:

--Although these missiles are an insignificant proportion of the total number of nuclear weapons available in Europe, they have unique qualities. Without them, the United States would have no missiles in Europe to strike the Soviet Union and virtually none to hit Eastern Europe.

--In the absence of any intermediate-range missiles, the Soviets would still have 1,000 tactical missiles with ranges of less than 300 miles. The United States and NATO, by contrast, would have only 273. West Germany would be the prime target of Soviet missiles--and for U.S. missiles as well in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

West German Split

Instead, the West German Defense Ministry wants some intermediate-range missiles to remain in other European countries. But for political reasons, the West German Foreign Ministry supports the Soviets’ offer. If the United States accepted the offer, that could push Germany to acquire nuclear weapons of its own or declare itself a de-nuclearized zone.

--U.S. and NATO military leaders will demand controversial and costly new nuclear weapons to strike the Soviet and Eastern European bases now targeted by intermediate-range missiles. One proposal is to build a new Army tactical missile with a 120-mile range. Another is to design a new cruise missile, with radar-masking “stealth” features, a 450-mile range and very great accuracy, to be carried by NATO aircraft.

Anti-nuclear protesters in Europe could take to the streets to block such missiles, as they did in 1983 in a futile effort to keep intermediate-range missiles out.

--In the longer run, the most significant impact of a deal on intermediate-range missiles would probably be on European political perceptions. Europe now fears such a deal would be the first step toward removing all U.S. nuclear weapons, and the promise of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, from the Continent. Without U.S. nuclear weapons, Europe would feel naked to the threat of the Soviets’ superior conventional forces.

Europe’s fear is “more psychological than logical,” said Paul C. Warnke, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter Administration.

U.S. Commitment to Europe

The present director, Kenneth L. Adelman, who usually is on the opposite side from Warnke, agrees on this issue.

“American commitment to European security is shown in the 300,000 American troops there, not in a few missiles,” he said.

But European anxiety is particularly acute in the wake of last year’s Iceland summit meeting, where President Reagan became the first U.S. President to seriously consider scrapping all nuclear weapons.

“This issue has much more to do with the politics and perceptions of the U.S. commitment to European defense than to the potential military impact of the weapons themselves,” Edward L. Warner III of the Rand Corp. said. “The fear is that withdrawal of the (intermediate-range) systems will undermine the nuclear dimension of NATO’s ‘flexible response’ strategy.”

The controversy surrounding the intermediate-range missiles is rooted in events that go back a quarter of a century, when the Soviets had a force of about 700 such missiles targeted on Europe. The United States had deployed a smaller force of missiles in several NATO nations.

1963 Missile Withdrawal

But the United States withdrew its medium-range missiles by 1963. Europe was reassured that the Kremlin would not attack because of the overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority in intercontinental missiles and bombers.

As this U.S. superiority waned, however, Europeans increasingly questioned whether, in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with ground troops, the United States would initiate an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union, which would inevitably devastate the American homeland.

That concern, coupled with the proliferation of smaller nuclear weapons, led to the NATO doctrine of “flexible response.” Broadly put, it holds that for each possible Soviet attack up the ladder of escalation, NATO should have appropriate weapons of response at each “rung,” rising in range and firepower.

On the first rung, nuclear mines--as small as back packs but with the power of 100 tons of TNT--would impede Soviet troops coming through mountain passes. Next are 155-millimeter and then 203-millimeter nuclear artillery shells, followed by short-range missiles and nuclear bombs on fighter-bombers, and finally intermediate-range missiles, all intended to prevent an all-out intercontinental nuclear exchange.

Soviet Missiles Replaced

In 1977, the Soviets decided to replace their aging medium-range missiles with mobile SS-20 missiles, which were more accurate, could be fired more quickly and carried three warheads. That threatened to give the Soviets a potential for nuclear blackmail in the absence of comparable U.S. missiles in Europe.

NATO decided in 1979 that visible, land-based missiles of comparable range were required to reassure Western Europe. It agreed, however, that the United States would offer to forgo the deployment of the new missiles--Pershing 2s and cruise missiles--or negotiate their withdrawal if the Soviets eliminated their SS-20s.

After six years of talks, the two sides have now accepted this step. Over four or five years, they will withdraw all their longer-range missiles--those with ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 miles--from Europe. Each will retain 100 warheads in this category, however, with Soviet weapons restricted to Asia and U.S. weapons on American soil.

Earlier this month in Moscow, the Soviets offered to take another step down the ladder. They proposed to eliminate from Europe shorter-range missiles--with ranges of 300 to 1,000 miles--over a one-year period. The Soviets now have 92 such missiles in Europe to none for the United States. Outside Europe, the Soviets offered equal global ceilings on these weapons.

A Key Issue

The number of missiles to be retained outside Europe has developed into a key issue. The United States appears willing to settle for 100 warheads of the 1,000-to-3,000-mile range but will demand elimination of all missiles in the 300-to-1,000-mile range, Adelman said, because their mobility is far greater.

“These weapons could be loaded on aircraft and flown from Asia to Europe in hours,” he said.

But Europe should not be alarmed, Adelman said, if the United States withdraws its longer-range missiles from Europe. The United States now has no shorter-range missiles in this category, he pointed out, even though the Soviets have hundreds.

‘None and None’ Is Better

“West Europe is unlikely to let us deploy any in this category,” Adelman said. “So is it better to have the empty right to match the Soviets at some level above zero, or to have the Soviets join us at zero? I’d rather have none and none, rather than lots for the Soviets and none for us.”

Sen. Nunn withheld judgment on the Soviet offer to eliminate the shorter-range missiles but made clear that steps must be taken the “minimize the dangers” inherent in the agreement before it will win his support.

“If we accept zero-zero,” he said, “Europeans will have an obligation to assure the United States they vigorously support modernization” of weapons with ranges of less than 300 miles. Nunn also wants the Europeans’ assurance that they would reject what may be the next Soviet offer, to eliminate all of the other nuclear missiles and weapons in Europe.

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE LAND-BASED MISSILES INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) Long-range INF Missiles (1,000-3,000 miles)

Nation Type Number Warheads Remarks USSR SS-20 270 810 171 mobile missiles in Asia; 3 warheads per missile. SS-4 112 112 Being phased out. U.S. Pershing-2 108 108 Introduced 1983 Cruise missiles 208 208 France S-3 18 18 Excluded from US-Soviet talks.

Short-range INF Missiles (300-1,000 miles)

Nation Type Number Warheads Remarks USSR SS-12A/B 80 80 60 highly mobile missiles in Asia. SS-23 12 12 Each of 12 launchers can be refired up to 10 times. U.S. NONE 108 Pershing-1s retired 1983. W.Germ Pershing-1 72 72 Excluded from U.S.-Soviet talks.

BATTLEFIELD OR TACTICAL MISSILE LAUNCHERS (Range: up to 300 miles)

Nation Type Number Warheads Remarks USSR Scud-B 500 500 200 highly mobile launchers in Asia; being replaced by SS-23s. SS-21/Frog 500 500 400 highly mobile launchers in Asia. U.S. Lance 36 108 3 missiles per launcher; refiring could allow launch of 320 warheads in all. NATO Lance 55 165 U.S. warhead control; 3 missiles per launcher; capability of 380 warheads. France Pluton 44 44

NUCLEAR ARTILLERY (Range: up to 18 miles)

Nation Number Remarks USSR 3,600 Howitzers and mortars U.S. 1,000 Howitzers NATO 570 Howitzers among 6 allies.

MINES (Atomic Demolition Munitions)

Nation Number Remarks USSR unknown U.S. 374 Being phased out.

SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic Studies; U.S. Defense Department; Brookings Institution; U.S. officials.