Pilot, Commander’s Errors Blamed for Super Stallion Crash

Pilot error caused the January crash of a CH-53E Super Stallion in the California desert that killed five Tustin-based Marines, according to a preliminary report obtained by The Times.

But the report also is extremely critical of the former squadron commander for allowing the aircraft to attempt the night landing in the remote area near the Salton Sea.

Lt. Col. Sam J. Ware, the commanding officer of the Heavy Marine Helicopter Squadron 465 at the Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, was relieved of his command shortly after the crash. High-ranking Marine officers would say only that they had lost confidence in Ware, who was transferred to the East Coast.

The preliminary accident report has not been seen by all commands involved, and it could be changed during that review.

Picking Up Troops

The accident occurred about 8:30 p.m. Jan. 8 at an abandoned military test range in Imperial County, seven miles south of Salton City. Four CH-53E Super Stallions were accompanying eight CH-46 helicopters on the mission. The Super Stallions were to pick up any Marines, supplies and trash that the other helicopters could not haul.

The helicopters had flown from Tustin to Camp Pendelton and then on to the Salton Sea to pick up troops. The helicopter force, with the CH-46s flying in the lead and the Super Stallions behind, were scheduled to return the Marines to Camp Pendleton that night.

Witnesses said three Super Stallions approached a lighted landing area near the Salton Sea, and one set down. As the lead aircraft, hovering at about 20 feet, began to land, the pilot became disoriented because of the blowing sand and climbed back to about 75 feet to clear the dust cloud. Descending again, the pilot saw another helicopter, which had been hovering, fly by in an unusual “nose down attitude.”

The 120-page report said that the unusually long hover of the first helicopter blew too much dust. When the pilot of the ill-fated helicopter signaled a “wave off”--The preliminary accident report has not been seen by all commands involved, and it could be changed. . . .

that he would go around and try again--he may have thought he was climbing because the helicopter he passed in the dust was descending, the report said.

The Super Stallion flew into the ground at a 45-degree angle, witnesses said, at about 60 knots.

All five Marines on board died of burns in the crash. They were Maj. David J. Brandenburg, pilot, 1st Lt. Michael T. Reilly, the co-pilot, and crew members Lance Cpl. Thomas H. Baddeley and Cpl. Mark Burris. Also killed was passenger Lance Cpl. Gregory L. Michaels, a helicopter mechanic.

Accident investigators could not determine whether Brandenburg or Reilly was flying the helicopter, but speculated that it was Bradenburg, who was sitting in the pilot’s seat.

“Pilot error assigned to the pilot at the controls at the time of the mishap for not establishing a positive rate of climb during the wave off,” the report said.

Beside blaming the crash on error by the pilot, investigators determined that the lighting at the landing zone was inadequate for multiple aircraft landings and contributed to the accident.

The accident report also said the squadron had violated standard operating procedures by landing in an area with such “unstabilized soil” that it obscured the ground. The landing area, according to the report, was satisfactory for the smaller CH-46s, but not for the Super Stallions whose big rotor blades create winds up to 100 m.p.h.

Ware, the report said, had “incorrectly evaluated the risk” of the night landing. The report said that the landing zone should have been checked in the previous week, not just hours before the mission began.

In a statement to accident investigators, Ware said he had briefed the pilots in the mission to fly in a loose tactical formation because they had only an administrative role in the mission. “I briefed the pilots not to make a simultaneous landing at the LZ (landing zone),” he told investigators.

The report criticized Ware and the squadron for lack of coordination in selecting a landing zone site in the desert. Although the CH-53E squadron commander and the division leader landed at the site a few hours before the accident, the report said, “that was the inappropriate time for landing zone evaluation.” The orders for the mission had been received on Dec. 29, 1986, the report said.

Ware was relieved of his command by Maj. Gen. John I. Hudson, commander of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing which has units at El Toro, Tustin, Yuma and Camp Pendleton.

Changes Recommended

The report prepared for the Department of the Navy’s Office of the Judge Advocate General recommended, among other things, that selection of night landing zones should be evaluated by all aircraft before the day of the mission and called for new procedures in “wave offs” at night or in dusty landing areas.

The day after the crash, Imperial County Deputy Coroner Donald H. Cole told reporters that mechanical failure appeared to have caused the crash because impressions in the soft sand indicated the craft dropped straight down.

That triggered comments from Rep. Robert T. Badham (R-Newport Beach), who said early reports indicated that the accident was caused by pilot error.

That brought an outcry from the parents and widows of those killed in the accident.