Let’s Not Rush Peace Talks in the Mideast

The momentum is building to convene an international conference on the Middle East. But there is still time to pull back. And there is good reason to think we may want to.

The principal proponent of the conference is Jordan’s King Hussein, who sees it as providing him a safe cover for regaining part of the West Bank. Egypt also is interested, as a conference would provide an easy means of rejoining the Arab fold.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has a stake in portraying himself as the politician of peace--in stark contrast to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. If differences over a conference bring down Israel’s unwieldy ruling coalition, so much the better for Peres.

The Soviets also are in favor. Ever since Anwar Sadat showed them the door 15 years ago, they have been looking for a way back. Moscow has eased emigration restraints on Jews and indicated a readiness to resume consular contacts with Israel as a possible prelude to diplomatic ties. The Soviets also may have pressured Syrian President Hafez Assad to agree to attend a conference.

Not everyone is on board, however. Shamir is adamant in his opposition to anything less than direct negotiations between his country and its Arab neighbors, of which the Palestine Liberation Organization is not counted. He fears that any conference whose participants include the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and the key Arab states would have a built-in majority against Israel. And, not a little ironically, the PLO appears to have some qualms, too. The PLO, ostensibly reunified under Yasser Arafat after last month’s Algiers gathering, opposes a conference at which it would be represented (by Jordan) but not included.

The traditional U.S. posture has been one of strong skepticism. Washington argued that it was not in the U.S. interest to invite the Soviets back into the Middle East after they had been effectively excluded. It was also believed that a conference, with all its attendant publicity, would be an unlikely forum in which to achieve what years of private diplomacy could not.

Now, however, the Reagan Administration is anxious to soothe “moderate” Arabs--especially Hussein--whose feathers were ruffled by disclosures of American arms sales to Iran. The Administration is also anxious to demonstrate that it is still capable of new initiatives. And there exists the phenomenon of bureaucratic restlessness; the inhabitants of Foggy Bottom abhor what they perceive to be a vacuum. A conference would be something to do.

But they are wrong. A gathering at which states would convene in some showcase plenary to provide cover for Israel and Jordan (with the PLO’s blessing) to go off and negotiate the future of the West Bank and Gaza (not to mention the Golan Heights) is a pipe dream.

A more realistic scenario would be one in which the Soviets stand firm and help engineer a breakdown, owing to alleged U.S.-Israel intransigence and collusion. The Syrians could be expected to join this effort. Meanwhile Hussein, who could attend only with the sanction of the PLO, would not have much room to bargain.

That would leave the U.S. delegation in the unenviable position of having to choose between distancing itself from Israel in order to curry favor with the other participants, or siding with Israel and accepting the opprobrium of the world.

Others argue this scenario is too pessimistic--that in any case the United States would be better off if it tried and failed than to be seen as the obstacle to the convening of a conference. The corollary to this perspective is that a policy vacuum exists, one that only fans the forces of radicalism and the drift to war.

None of these arguments holds up to scrutiny. Radicalism is part of the political culture of the Middle East, but history shows it more likely to surface when the momentum toward peace grows. The PLO can be expected to use violence to torpedo any progress toward a political compromise that would grant it less than it seeks. And an unsuccessful conference--the likely outcome, given that the most Israel could be expected to cede in the way of territory would fall far short of what the Arabs would be willing to accept politically--could trigger violence in the despair certain to greet any failure.

More important, a policy vacuum does not exist. Both the Camp David accords and President Reagan’s September, 1982, initiative establish a framework for bringing about Palestinian autonomy. Efforts to nurture a moderate Palestinian leadership and economic ties among Israel, Jordan and the West Bank should be given time. Hussein, Shamir and others have more than enough to work with if they are prepared to act as statesmen; a venue is not what is missing.

But to rush now to a conference would only reinforce Israeli stubbornness while strengthening the illusion in the Arab world that the key to peace is U.S. willingness to pressure Israel, rather than Arab willingness to compromise.