Israel Is In a Position to Deal Now : Past Military Successes Give It Upper Hand to Pursue Peace

This month marks 20 years since Gamal Abdul Nasser mobilized his army in the Sinai and initiated the process leading to the Six Day War. Who could have imagined then that two decades later Israel and Egypt would be at peace and that civilian airliners would fly daily from Tel Aviv to Cairo over that same battle-scarred Sinai? And who could have envisioned an Israeli premier trying to scuttle a Mideast peace conference while his foreign minister struggled for it?

“The key function of a prime minister is the fixing of priorities,” said Israel’s founding father, David Ben-Gurion, and nothing could be truer in the current clash between Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of the rightist Likud Bloc and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of the left-leaning Labor Party.

Israel is now faced with a choice: a foreign policy of options championed by Peres and embodied in his effort to convene an international conference as an umbrella for direct Arab-Israeli talks, or what we might call the “politics of no,” represented by Shamir’s opposition to such an initiative. Jerusalem has, according to Peres, an opportunity unlike any other “since the creation of the state of Israel.” If so, only ideological blinders could dissuade leaders of a country at war for four decades from its pursuit.

The moment is propitious for Israel because the Jewish state is in a strategically advantageous position. Its army is strong and the country is at peace with Egypt, whose population comprises half the Arab world. Jordan wants no war. Syria remains a serious threat, but the Damascus regime is beset by domestic problems and is significantly dependent on a Soviet Union seeking its own new role in the Middle East, a role that will require rethinking its relationship with Israel.

The United States, which would like to see a peace process under way, is immersed in the Iran- contra scandal and pre-election warm-ups; these factors will restrain American pressures on Jerusalem. Iraq and Iran are preoccupied with each other. Finally, at the recent meeting of the Palestinian National Council, the PLO opted for its own “politics of no,” by choosing reunification with extremists rather than a peace policy.

Consequently, there is a historical juncture at hand in which Israeli political flexibility could turn the fruits of past military prowess into diplomatic strength.

To do so will require significant Israeli concessions during the bargaining process, particularly on the question of the Palestinians. But there will have to be compromise on both sides; should talks fail because the Arabs are not forthcoming, Israeli moderates may be undermined, if not crippled. Insecurity is a leitmotif of Israeli foreign policy and one need only reread Nasser’s speeches in May, 1967, or listen to PLO double-talk now to know why. On the other hand, it is ludicrous to imagine that Labor leaders such as Peres, Yitzhak Rabin or Ezer Weizman--all three of whom spent their adult lives as architect’s of Israeli military power--would be careless of Israel’s true security needs in negotiations.

More important is this question: Is it to a country’s advantage to launch initiatives and seek compromises from a position of strength or weakness? To say that strength should lead Israel to sit tight can only lead to one of two conclusions: Israel should make concessions when it is weak, or Israel should not make concessions at all.

The first option is absurd; the second is precisely the view of Shamir--who opposed the Camp David accords--and his right-wing supporters. They argue that only direct bilateral negotiations will be productive because an international meeting would be hostage to the Soviets or to Arab extremists. Not only is this disingenuous--Peres’ proposal is for an international forum as an umbrella for direct talks--it is a smoke screen for a politically obtuse nationalism that opposes trading any territory for peace. It also is blind to the negative impact that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has had on Israel, a nation-state born of the desperate need to save a persecuted people, not dominate another. Indeed, if Shamir is opposed to any real concessions, what use are bilateral talks?

And if an international parley convenes and fails? Then at least Israel will have made an effort in full faith, can gain a propaganda victory in the world arena, and Israelis can be reassured that their government is doing all it can to exploit circumstances for Israel’s own good.

After the 1967 war Israeli leaders rightly declared that theirs was a struggle for self-defense and a policy of options; possibilities could be explored and territory could be traded for peace. The Arab League replied that autumn: “no peace, no negotiations, no recognition.” Ironically, the closest parallels to this “politics of no” comes today from the Likud and the PLO. There can be but one conclusion: Give Peres’ initiative a chance.