Linkage Imperils Soviet Arms Talks : Achievable Treaty Is Better Than a Failed Bid for Perfection

“A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” goes the old saying, and surely this bit of wisdom applies to arms control. If there is a chance for a good agreement, but we then try to stretch it to solve all of our problems in one package, we may wind up with no agreement at all.

Unfortunately, this is precisely the danger we face today. The United States and the Soviet Union are close to a landmark agreement eliminating nearly all intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from both sides’ arsenals. It has taken six years to get to this point. But now that we are in the final phase of negotiations, voices are suddenly raised demanding that we add new “linkages” and other last-minute conditions. What is going on?

Of all international negotiations, arms control is among the most difficult. We and the Soviets have pursued limitations on nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, with only a handful of agreements to show for it. Progress depends on many political and military factors on both sides, and usually comes painfully slowly. The SALT II treaty, for example, was pursued over seven years and three presidential administrations, only to languish unratified and finally be rejected last year by President Reagan.

Today we risk an even worse outcome with INF. Three years ago, the issue was completely frozen. The Soviets angrily rejected Reagan’s so-called “zero option” banning all intermediate-range missiles from Europe, and even some of our own officials judged the U.S. position to be so one-sided that progress was impossible. Then in 1986, under the new Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the ice began to melt as the Soviets made a series of arms-control concessions.

By the eve of last October’s summit in Iceland, most experts were predicting an INF breakthrough. And that breakthrough came with a new U.S.-Soviet framework for agreement. The Soviets basically conceded to Reagan’s original proposal for zero INF in Europe, and Reagan agreed to allow ach side a residual force of 100 warheads to be based in Soviet Asia and the United States.

The final major obstacle was removed when Gorbachev agreed in February to “de-link” INF from the issues of strategic and space weapons. Later, when the Soviets further agreed to limits on shorter-range missiles, and accepted our demands for stringent verification procedures, an INF agreement seemed almost at hand.

Then quite unexpectedly, over the past month, a host of new objections have been raised on this side. First former President Richard M. Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger wrote that an INF agreement should be linked to the balance of conventional forces in Europe. Meanwhile, some Pentagon officials said that instead of banning shorter-range missiles, we should build some of our own. Then former arms negotiator Edward Rowny said that INF should be linked to regional issues such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Cambodia.

Most recently, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger took the position that, contrary to Reagan’s agreement, the remaining 100 INF warheads on each side should also be banned--placing himself directly at odds with the White House.

With the clamor for new demands and additional linkages, we are once again subordinating an arms-control success to the search for a treaty that does everything. Moreover, we are losing sight of the fact that the basic outline of an INF agreement endorsed by both Reagan and Gorbachev will make a very real contribution to Western security by eliminating an imbalance in missiles that greatly favors the Soviets. No, it will not solve all of our problems. But if we capitalize on the momentum it generates, we can build on this treaty with further agreements on conventional, strategic and other weapons.

The present situation is replete with ironies. One is that Assistant Defense Secretary Richard N. Perle, considered by many to be hostile to all arms agreements, has spoken out in favor of this one. Another is that after years of accusing the Soviets of bargaining in bad faith and reneging on previous offers, we may be on the verge of doing that ourselves.

The Reagan Administration has long held that one of the biggest problems with arms control is that we tend to negotiate and argue among ourselves more than we do with the Soviets. With the Pentagon divided and Weinberger at odds with the President, we are now doing exactly that.

So far, President Reagan has stood by the proposals he offered in Reykjavik and the draft treaty we proposed in Geneva. For this he should be applauded. Now is no time to start demanding the “perfect” agreement.

In the words of another old saying, “The best is the enemy of the good.” Let us choose the good now, and go on with the search for the better, and the best, once we have something in hand.