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West Germany Says Yes

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Thanks to West Germany’s decision to go along with the removal from Europe of all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges greater than 300 miles, the biggest single hurdle to a major arms-control agreement has been overcome. Some important differences remain to be negotiated, however, and it is still possible that the prospective Euromissile pact will come unstuck.

Washington and Moscow have been tantalizingly close to an agreement ever since Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev essentially accepted President Reagan’s “zero-zero” proposal to eliminate all medium-range missiles--those with ranges from 600 to 3,000 miles--from Europe. The European allies were willing to endorse such an agreement, though reluctantly in some cases. The real trouble came over Gorbachev’s follow-up proposal that shorter-range missiles, with a range of 300 to 600 miles, also be removed from Europe.

The Soviet leader’s “double zero” proposal is deeply appealing to the Reagan Administration--and not just because of the boost that such an agreement, signed at a glittering summit, would give to the beleaguered President’s image. There is also the fact that the Soviets would have to give up several times as many nuclear warheads as the United States would.

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Gorbachev’s proposal also had an instant appeal to the average European. But defense officials all over Western Europe feared that such a drastic nuclear build-down would upset the military balance in Europe by giving extra weight to the Soviet superiority in conventional, non-nuclear forces. They also worried, despite U.S. reassurance, that the “double zero” package might mark the beginning of the withdrawal of the overall U.S. nuclear umbrella from European defense.

However, European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization swallowed their nervousness and agreed, with reservations, to endorse the removal of both medium- and short-range missiles. The big exception was Bonn, which until this week held out because of the obvious fact that the small battlefield nukes that would remain in place could be used only in East or West Germany. To quote a moderate spokesman for Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrats, “The shorter the range, the deader the Germans.”

Under pressure from inside as well as outside West Germany, however, Kohl gave in this week and conditionally agreed to the “double zero” package. Members of the alliance now are expected to formally give their collective approval next week.

Some problems remain, however. West Germany’s remaining insistence on keeping its 72 short-range missiles, the warheads of which are under U.S. control, must be dealt with. So must the Soviet demand that the 100 warheads allowed on U.S. medium-range missiles outside Europe not be deployed in Alaska. Most important of all is the question of verification.

Acceptable terms for checking on removal of the medium-range missiles probably can be worked out. But the short-range missiles are small and more easily hidden. Truly obtrusive means of verification will be necessary to ensure against cheating--and it is still not clear that Moscow is willing to accept them.

Still, Reagan badly needs an agreement--and Gorbachev probably needs one even more. In arms-control negotiations as in other endeavors, where there is a will there is a way. Or so the world wants to believe.

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