Reagan Aides at Odds Over Vital Arms Control Issues

As the U.S. government prepares for the final and most critical phase of negotiations with the Soviet Union to eliminate short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, it appears more divided than ever on a wide range of crucial arms control issues.

The disarray threatens to become a substantial handicap for the United States in dealing with the newly flexible and inventive Kremlin leadership.

On the eve of the decisive round of talks, the secretary of state is angrily at odds with the just-retired NATO supreme commander for implying that the Reagan Administration is rushing to get an arms deal for domestic political reasons.

On-Site Inspections

Meanwhile, some Administration officials are demanding on-site inspections to verify Soviet compliance with any new European missile agreement--but at the same time the CIA and FBI are balking at giving the Soviets a reciprocal privilege.

And the Administration’s two chief arms advisers are offering diametrically opposed advice on separate anti-missile negotiations.

The disarray, according to several senior U.S. officials, is normal in an “end game” situation. Adding to the confusion, the Soviets have taken some of the sticks with which the United States has long been beating them--elimination of missiles, on-site inspection of defense installations--and are now clubbing the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with them.

The risk is that Washington will be unable to present a coherent position as Secretary of State George P. Shultz prepares to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze next month to clear the hurdles to an accord that could be put into final form at the ongoing arms control talks in Geneva.

Fresh Ammunition

The Soviets might exploit the differences among Administration officials to win final concessions at the bargaining table. Congressional critics could get fresh ammunition with which to oppose ratification of an arms accord.

U.S. confusion could also provide fertile new ground for yet another new arms offer from Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, possibly to eliminate more nuclear weapons or radically cut troop levels. A new offer, which Gorbachev might make now that a crucial Communist Party Central Committee meeting in Moscow has ended by strengthening his hold on the Kremlin leadership, could sow further discord in NATO and deepen the gap between the United States and Western Europe on arms issues.

“None of this is irretrievable,” one senior U.S. official said, “but I’m concerned that if it gets any worse, this Administration could in fact get desperate and lunge toward an unwise arms agreement in order to get a summit meeting.

“And the Soviets, watching all this from Moscow, could conclude wrongly that the President badly wants a deal. Or, just the opposite direction, conclude that he intends to make such extravagant demands--to show his right wing that he has not gone soft--that agreement will be impossible.”

Shultz-Rogers Clash

The most blatant display of divisions among U.S. officials was the recent vituperative public exchange between Shultz and the retiring military commander of NATO, U.S. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers. At issue was the U.S. effort to persuade the European allies to go along with an accord that would eliminate the short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe.

Rogers accused the Administration of making a selfish “rush” toward an agreement despite the allies’ military and political doubts.

In several interviews, Rogers called for analyzing the long-term impact of the expected agreement, “not just what the short-term advantages for governments and their credibility are.” He implied that Reagan wants to sign an arms agreement at a summit with Gorbachev this fall to help repair his leadership image, which has been battered by the Iran- contras scandal.

In a heated response, Shultz angrily accused Rogers of being “way out of line” in commenting on the U.S. political scene from a military post abroad, where he had served for eight years. He also denied any “arm-twisting” of alliance members.

“Gen. Rogers can put that in his pipe and smoke it,” Shultz told reporters.

Another Fault Line

Verifying Soviet compliance with an accord on intermediate-range missiles has created a separate fault line within the Administration.

Richard N. Perle, the recently retired assistant defense secretary who is still an arms control consultant to Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, is prepared to oppose the agreement if it does not guarantee that the United States can verify that the Soviets are abiding by its terms.

The United States, in its current offer on intermediate-range nuclear arms, has proposed that both sides be entitled to short-notice, unrestricted, on-site inspections of the other’s suspected nuclear weapons facilities. But Perle’s former associates say other provisions of the accord will probably fall short of his standards for a cheat-resistant treaty.

Particularly troublesome to Perle is the agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev to allow each side to retain 100 nuclear warheads on medium-range missiles--with ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 miles--outside Europe.

In Perle’s view, if the 100 warheads remain, the United States will be “nine-tenths of the way toward an unverifiable agreement.”

The Soviets, he has said, would be allowed to continue producing and storing some of the medium-range missiles and to train with them. And that, according to Pentagon verification specialists close to Perle, would give Moscow an easy opportunity to cheat by clandestinely producing and hiding more weapons than permitted.

But any treaty that guarantees the United States an adequate opportunity to verify Soviet compliance would also give the Soviets new opportunities to inspect U.S. nuclear weapons facilities. And that is arousing opposition elsewhere in the Administration.

Exemptions Sought

Earlier this month, the CIA and FBI opposed unrestricted inspections and urged that the Administration allow each side to exempt some facilities from inspection. They fear that the Soviets can learn more about U.S. military secrets and U.S. methods of gathering information than U.S. inspectors can learn about Soviet secrets.

The State Department agrees with the intelligence community, although for different reasons. It fears that NATO allies, bitter over U.S. pressure to accept the elimination of all medium-range missiles, will object to Soviet inspectors’ visiting their territory to ensure that U.S. missiles now based there have been withdrawn, officials said.

The Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency still favor unrestricted inspections. But in the absence of Perle, officials said, their position is not being effectively argued at White House meetings run by Reagan’s national security adviser, Frank C. Carlucci.

ABM Experiments

A final dispute within the Administration, separate from the proposed accord on intermediate-range missiles, involves the White House’s flat refusal to discuss with Moscow which kinds of experiments are permitted and which are barred under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

A senior Administration official with frequent access to the President said Reagan opposes talks on “the esoterica of testing” because they can only result in restraints on his anti-missile Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as “Star Wars.”

The Soviets, however, have said they will not reduce intercontinental nuclear weapons unless the United States agrees to limit work on SDI.

The Administration’s chief arms adviser, Paul H. Nitze, reportedly with Shultz’s backing, has proposed talking with the Soviets about more precise definitions within the ABM treaty.

Nitze argues that the 1972 ABM Treaty contained ambiguous language because neither side knew enough to define what the components of an exotic anti-missile weapon system like SDI might be.

Clarify Types

Today, he says, further talks could clarify which types of ABM systems could legally be developed and tested in space.

But, as if to punctuate the Administration’s divisions, its other senior arms control adviser, Edward L. Rowny, opposes Nitze’s approach. Any talks on what the ABM treaty permits and prohibits, he said, would be a “slippery slope” that can only result in limits on the SDI program.