Missile Gamesmanship?

Someone leaked the story a few days ago that the Soviets had informally proposed a compromise that would remove some major barriers to an agreement banning medium-range missiles in Europe. Washington had responded favorably, U.S. officials said, and were waiting for Moscow to put the offer formally on the table.

Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind), back from conversations with U.S. negotiators in Europe, essentially confirmed the story. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, however, quickly denied that any such deal was in the works, and in fact suggested that the talks had bogged down. It is unclear where the precise truth lies, but we know one thing: If a sensible proposal of the sort attributed to the Soviets isn’t under serious discussion, it should be.

According to the U.S. version of events, the potential compromise was outlined by a high-ranking military member of the Soviet delegation in a conversation with Maynard W. Glitman, the chief U.S. negotiator on medium-range missiles.

The Soviet officer is said to have suggested a deal under which Moscow would accept American proposals that both sides destroy all medium-range and shorter-range missiles--not just those that are based in Europe. In return, Washington would agree not to convert Europe-based cruise missiles into sea-based weapons, or to convert its Pershing 2 ballistic missiles into shorter-range Pershing 1Bs.

Such a trade-off would be an enormous improvement over the proposed Euromissile deal that has been approved in principle by President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. As it now stands, the prospective agreement would allow the Soviets to keep 33 triple-warhead SS-20 missiles in Soviet Asia, and the United States to base missiles bearing an equal number of warheads on American territory. In addition, the Soviets have proposed the removal of shorter-range missiles from Europe, but have avoided the issue of whether they could be stationed elsewhere.

China and Japan would like to see the ban on both types of missiles apply to Asia as well as to Europe. So would the Europeans, because the missiles are mobile and could be moved back within range of Europe in a time of crisis.

The Reagan Administration is reluctantly willing to accept the Soviet insistence on the deployment of 100 medium-range warheads in Asia. But it makes the point that a global ban would vastly simplify verification of compliance; with destruction of all such missiles, it would not be necessary to provide for on-site inspections of missile plants, supply depots and the like.

The Soviets have professed a willingness to accept intrusive on-site inspections--something that the U.S. military itself does not welcome--but Moscow is said in fact to resist any American right to inspect “suspect” missile sites as well as so-called “declared sites.”

It is true, as noted by John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, that too many people use verification problems as an excuse for opposing arms-control agreements. But verification is genuinely important nonetheless, and it cannot be taken for granted that the U.S. Senate would ratify a treaty that leaves too much room for evasion.

The obvious way out is a compromise of precisely the sort supposedly suggested by the Soviet general. For Moscow, such a deal would not only prevent the conversion of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe into other weapons pointed at the Soviet Union but would also remove Soviet concern over the U.S. plan to deploy its allowable 100 medium-range warheads in Alaska, within range of Soviet territory.

Let’s hope that the Soviet denials are just part of the diplomatic gamesmanship that always seems to precede real progress on arms control.