Excerpts: The (Iranian) Economy Is in a Shambles; (It’s) a No-Win War

Following are excerpts from testimony Monday by Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, Reagan’s former national security adviser, before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair:

The Strategic Opening

(Rep. Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.) questions Poindexter about how serious the Reagan Administration really was about its stated larger goal of improving relations with Iran, noting that no efforts toward this end were made before American hostages were taken by pro-Iranian groups.)

QUESTION: Without the existence of American hostages and the desire to have them released, no such undertakings as these would ever be made to the Iranians, isn’t that true?

ANSWER: I don’t think that I would make such a statement.

Q: Well, let me put it another way then. Would you--could you conceive of the United States authorizing the sale of Hawk missiles and Hawk missile parts and TOW missiles in substantial numbers in order just to begin a geopolitical dialogue with the Iranians?

A: That’s a hypothetical question.

Q: You answered a hypothetical question last Friday in these terms.

A: Well, sometimes maybe I don’t want to answer a hypothetical question.

Q: So you don’t prefer to answer this one?

A: No, let me give you an answer. The problem that we have tried to discuss earlier in these hearings was that Iran is in a very strategic location that is critical to the security of the free world. It is important that we simply--that we not simply ignore Iran and the coming succession to power in that country. It’s important that we have a better understanding through intelligence as to what’s happening in the country, what people are thinking, what their hopes and desires are for the future. I think there’s a recognition amongst many Iranian officials that things can’t go on the way they’ve been going on. The economy is in a shambles; they’re in a no-win war that Iraq started, and they’re grasping for help. And whether or not there had been hostages in Lebanon . . . we might very likely have decided that we needed to open up a channel into the Iranian government. In fact, the NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) that was the draft that was prepared by the NSC (National Security Council) staff in early 1985 was specifically oriented toward the strategic objectives on Iran before there was any connection whatsoever with the hostages.

(Foley asks more about the NSDD, a document prepared in advance of possible executive action, and is told that it was made shortly before former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane met in July, 1985, with Israelis who recommended selling arms to Iran.)

Q: But it was four years into the Administration before these--suddenly decided that there was a need to open up a channel to Iran?

A: That isn’t true, Mr. Foley.

Q: Was there an earlier draft, or earlier discussions prior to--

A: There were many, many earlier discussions within the NSC staff, with (late CIA) Director (William J.) Casey and other Cabinet-level officials about the problem, that we didn’t know what was happening in Iran, Iran was important to the United States and it was high time we figured out a way. And there were a lot of efforts that are not directly related to this hearing that were made.

Q: But it was not until the hostages were taken and the proposal that Iran needed arms made it possible to suggest that the sale of arms to Iran might facilitate the release of hostages and the broader purpose you’ve described.

(Poindexter confers with his lawyer, Richard Beckler, then asks to have the question repeated, then responds.)

A: I don’t think that’s an accurate and fair description of our thinking or our objectives. As I have testified before, many times now, the problem was that we saw a strategic problem with Iran; an opportunity presented itself to us to open up a channel into the Iranian government. The problem, though, in any sort of endeavor like this, especially after the animosity and damaging relationship that the United States has had with Iran, certainly not due to actions we’ve taken, but actions that the Iranian government has taken, (is that) there is a lack of confidence on both sides to begin such a dialogue.

The confidence-building measure that the United States thought would be effective, and also we believed that the Iranians thought it would be effective, was to sell them a small quantity of defensive, essentially defensive arms. The confidence-building measure on their part was to put pressure on the Hezbollah, the Shiite (Shia) fundamentalist group in Lebanon that actually had the hostages, the Iranian government was to put pressure on those groups to release the hostages. That would have been their good-faith step.

Q: Our good-faith step was the sale of arms; their good-faith step was the release of hostages?

A: That’s correct--no, putting, putting pressure on the Hezbollah for them to release the hostages.

(After Poindexter acknowledges that the plan did not work, Foley asks Poindexter if he would make the same arrangements again).

A: If it had not been exposed, the next step was to bring in officials within the State Department in ... actual discussions with the Iranians, and who knows where it would have led. As I testified the other day, I think there is still a possibility.

Q: The problem was in the exposure, not in the policy?

A: That is correct.

Honor Code

(Sen. Paul S. Trible Jr. (R-Va.) criticizes Poindexter for the Administration’s failure to be candid with Congress on its Iran arms operation and support for the Nicaraguan contras.)

Q: One of the most troubling aspects, I think, of the testimony thus far has been the kind of unapologetic embrace of untruth. We’ve seen the withholding of information, evasion, false and misleading statements, made to virtually everyone: to the President, to key members of the Administration, to Congress, to the American people. Now, in a free society, that doesn’t work. . . . Now let me read to you, if I may, from the Handbook of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy. This is the section that deals with the Honor Code. And it says, in Section 1303, Standards of Conduct, Section 4: “Midshipmen must bear in mind that dishonest nature of making oral or written statements or reports which may be regarded as evasive or misleading. Any person in the naval service who utilizes such evasive means to obtain any desired end will not and cannot command the respect of his seniors, peers, or subordinates.” Now my question is this. At the Academy, the young men and women that we train to be our future officers are told that truth is absolute. If the conduct--evasion, which you’ve talked about, that’s mentioned in these regulations--is wrong for midshipmen, isn’t it also wrong for officers?

A: Senator, I think that’s a very unfair thing to say. And I object to it. I have always lived by the honor concept. I still live that way today. One of the things you also learn at the Naval Academy is the ability to exercise independent judgment, that are in the best interests of the United States. My whole time as national security adviser, I worked very hard to do the best that I could to protect the national security of the United States. I--I don’t have any regrets for anything that I did. I think the actions that I took were in the long-term interests of the country, and I’m not going to change my mind. And I’m not going to be apologetic about it.

Doesn’t React Strongly

(Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.) asks Poindexter how he could be certain that Reagan would have approved of the diversion of Iran arms sales proceeds to the Nicaraguan contras, as Poindexter has contended.)

Q: . . . How did you feel when on March 17 the President said at his press conference that . . . he would have strongly objected had the question of the diversion of funds been raised to him for his approval. In fact, I’ll quote him directly at his press conference. He was asked: “Could you possibly have forgotten if you were asked about the diversion of funds?” And the President answered: “Oh, no, you would have heard me without opening the door to the office if I’d ever been told that at any time.” How did you--how do you react--how did you feel about it when you heard the commander in chief giving the implication that he would have so strongly disapproved that you would have heard all the way through the closed door?

A: I--I don’t react strongly to things like that. I accepted that as what the President felt.

(Later, Boren asks Poindexter about the lessons to be learned from the Iran-contra scandal.)

Q: . . . As we’re thinking about our constitutional system, and the heart and soul of it, wouldn’t you say that in the future, controversial decisions should be brought to the President of the United States so that he, as the person elected by the American people, can make those decisions for himself?

A: It certainly would make it easier on the people involved to do that. I don’t know. The future obviously is going to be very complex.

Q: But Adm . Poindexter, it isn’t a matter of making it easier for the people involved. It’s a question that in this republic, with the democratic principles we have, the Constitution says that the President is the commander in chief. It doesn’t say the national security adviser; it doesn’t say any bureaucrat appointed by the President. It says the President. It’s because he’s elected by the people. So doesn’t it trouble you, as we’re talking about--we’re talking not even about whether it’s inconvenient; we’re talking about the preservation of constitutional government.

A: But senator, the difference between the way you think about it and the way I think about it--you know, I frankly don’t think in the whole scheme of things it’s that important a decision. It obviously is a controversial one. The thing that’s made it important in your eyes, in my mind, is the overreaction of the media to it, and members of Congress have to react to the media.