THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: Plausible Deniability . . . Is Not Any Printed Doctrine or Dogma, Simply a Concept

Following are excerpts from testimony Wednesday by Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, President Reagan’s former national security adviser, before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair:

Defining Deniability

(Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia asks Poindexter to clarify his use of the term “plausible deniability,” which Poindexter has testified he was trying to provide Reagan with respect to the diversion to Nicaragua’s contras of profits from the Iran arms sales.)

Question: Everybody I’ve talked to in the intelligence community and around town where that term has been used tells me that the definition of that term is that, when you set up plausible deniability for someone, the President or someone else, what that means is that they know the facts in question, but they can deny the knowledge, and that the denial is believable. Now, would you tell us whether that is your definition or whether you have some other definition in mind?

Answer: First of all, senator, I believe if you go back and look at my testimony on May the 2nd when this issue first came up (in private hearings), I used the term “deniability,” that I wanted to provide the President deniability and insulate him from the decision. Since that testimony, the terminology has been raised in these hearings of plausible deniability, and I have gone along with that definition. Since this is not any sort of printed doctrine or dogma, it simply is a concept. I think it’s open to interpretation. And my interpretation of it is simply and very straightforwardly that the ability of the President to deny knowing anything about it and be very truthful in that process. He didn’t know anything about it.

Q: That’s what Ollie (Lt. Col. Oliver L. North) called absolute deniability. If you don’t know, it’s not only plausible, it just didn’t happen. Is that what you mean, then?

A: Absolute deniability would be a more accurate description.

(Nunn asks about the finding that Reagan signed on Dec. 5, 1985, approving a swap of arms for hostages. Poindexter later destroyed the finding because he thought it would be “politically embarrassing.”)

Q: The question I have is, why . . . did that finding ever go to the President to begin with? Wasn’t it your job to keep that kind of incomplete finding, which you have testified was inconsistent with the objective (in dealings with Iran), from being read and signed by the President of the United States?

A: It was and I believe in my earlier testimony of--or possibly in one of the depositions--indicated that I had some regret that I let him sign it.

Q: Well, you do have--the morning headlines are not correct then, you do have some regrets?

A: Of course I do, senator.

(Richard Beckler, Poindexter’s attorney, intervenes.)

Beckler: Mr. Senator, you know, we’re not going by the morning headlines, here, fortunately. We’re going by what the American public feel about this, not by the headlines.

Q: Thank you Mr. Beckler. Admiral--

A: I thought I answered--

Q: So do you have regrets about that.

A: Yes, as I’ve testified, I think that I acted under pressure when I should have had the finding fully staffed. I didn’t, and the President signed it. But also I think it is important to note that from a forward-looking standpoint, nothing was done under that particular finding. It was an acknowledgment that after the fact that the President had approved the Hawk (missile) transfers in November. It did not shed any light on his prior approval that may or may not have taken place in Geneva.

Iran or Iraq?

(Nunn asks Poindexter why he sent a memo to Reagan suggesting that the Israeli position on the Iran-Iraq war--that Iran was in danger of losing the war--was correct, in contrast to what others in the U.S. government believed.)

Q: . . . Everything I recall about that period of time indicates that that position, though it may have very well been the Israeli position, was not the United States government position. That is, we did not believe the Iranian position was deteriorating vis-a-vis Iraq in that war. Do you have a different recollection of that?

A: I do. We were always concerned about the ability of the Iranians to hold on for a protracted period of time.

Q: The Iranians? I thought it was the Iraqis we were--

A: No, no.

Q: We were--

A: There were differences of opinion on this issue--

Q: So you agree with the Israeli position?

A: Yes, I think we did agree with that at that time.

Q: When you say “we,” who do you mean?

A: I think members of the (National Security Council) staff and I think (CIA) Director (William J.) Casey felt that way.

Q: Why in the world did we have a roving ambassador going all over the world trying to stop the flow of arms into Iran and calling it Operation Staunch with the State Department people going all over trying to prevent that if we thought the Iranian position was the one that was deteriorating?

A: Senator, we were trying to bring an end to the war. We wanted to help bring about the end of the war by limiting the flow of arms into Iran and, frankly, Iraq. We were not interested in providing or encouraging others to provide unlimited support to Iraq. We wanted to lower the intensity of the conflict.

Q: Well, we’ll have to ask Secretary (of State George P.) Shultz about that when he appears, and Secretary (of Defense Caspar W.) Weinberger, because that statement, although I certainly acknowledge it was the Israeli view, it was contrary to everything I was hearing back then. I have been under the impression for (the) last at least two or three years that we’ve (been) concerned about precisely the opposite, that the Iraqi position was going to deteriorate over the long haul.

(Nunn asks Poindexter if he thought Casey had seen memos from North that outlined the diversion of funds to the contras and starts to ask what Casey might have done with that information.)

Q: Now, do you know whether Director Casey ever met with the President on--privately?

A: He did infrequently. But I think it’s very wrong, senator, to draw any conclusion from this.

Q: I’m not drawing any conclusion. I’m just asking questions.

A: Well, I see the direction you’re going, though.

Q: Well, if you can already see it, then I’ll skip the next question and you can just give me the answer.

A: I don’t believe that Director Casey ever talked about this issue with the President.

Discrepancies

Rep. Michael DeWine (R-Ohio) asks Poindexter how he accounts for the discrepancies between the testimony of former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, who said North did not report to him on his activities, and that of North, who said he did.)

A: I can’t account for different recollections. I have testified accurately, truthfully, based on my best recollections. You know, at the time when you are involved in . . . an enormous amount of activity of a global nature, you don’t set down and analyze everything that’s said or every piece of paper with the fine-tooth approach that this committee is taking. Hindsight is always very good. Obviously, different people have different recollections of events at the time, and I don’t really care to speculate on those recollections.

(DeWine asks about McFarlane’s testimony that he told the NSC that he believed the Boland amendment applied to the NSC and North’s testimony and Poindexter’s testimony that they never heard McFarlane say that.)

Q: How do you account, then, for Mr. McFarlane’s lack of candor with this committee about that?

A: I’m not--I don’t care to characterize it as lack of candor. . . .

Q: How would you characterize it?

A: His recollection of events is different from mine.

Congress’ Role

(Republican Sen. Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire, a supporter of the contras, asks Poindexter what his position would be if an anti-contra President was elected. How would pro-contra forces in Congress act to curtail such a President’s policies?)

A: I think that I have great trust and faith and confidence in the American people to do the right thing. I don’t believe, as I have said numerous times, they want to know all the details, but I just don’t see the American people voting for a candidate that takes the kind of positions that you’re describing.

I think the American people, and one of the good things, I guess I will have to admit, that comes out of these hearings is an opportunity for the American people to hear about the problems that we face around the world, this dangerous world that we live in, and I think the message is getting through. They’re beginning to understand the problem.

I know the President’s always felt, I always felt that, if we can ever get the true information to the American people about what was happening in Nicaragua, they would support the President’s policy, but it has been one heck of a time getting that information out. Maybe we should have worked harder. I know there are some members of this committee that think we should have taken a much (harder) line from the beginning, but I think that the American people and certainly the sample (of telegrams) that I have received, indicates they understand very clearly. They’re getting the message. They don’t want a communist government in the mainland in America.

Q: . . . That is not an answer. You are saying what all of us hope for. We all hope that the American people will always exercise judgment that coincides with our own, because we all think, of course, that our judgment is correct. My question to you is, if the American people, as they have in our history, elect a President with policies which might not have been clear to them at the time the President was elected. . . . I want to know how you square that with your statement, or whether or not you don’t agree with me that under those circumstances, (congressmen) have to use their judgment, their beliefs in country, their mandate from their electorate to oppose a President’s policy? . . .

A: Well, I have to say, which is consistent with my testimony, and it’s what I truly believe, that under the conditions you describe, if the American people indeed vote for such a candidate, then I think we ought to let that candidate try that policy. Now that doesn’t abrogate or any way change the responsibility you (in Congress) have over controlling appropriations, ratifying treaties and requesting consultations so that your views can be heard. But I don’t think that what I consider to be underhanded tactics should be used to undermine that particular President, if the people have, if that’s what their choice was.

Q: Well, I thank you for your answer. I will tell you that it’s one piece of your advice that I would guarantee you probably won’t be heeded around here. Under those circumstances, I dare say that people feel quite differently about the constitutional role here. And that, to some extent, is what this, a lot of this, is all about. As I said, I don’t want to discuss the Boland amendment (which forbade U.S. aid to the contras), if it applied or didn’t apply, but it just seems to me that we’ve got to have more good-faith dealing around this town or else a lot that ought to happen won’t happen. And I firmly believe that every member of Congress has the right, the obligation, indeed the duty to strongly oppose any presidential initiative that he believes is not in the national security of this country. We all take the same oath, admiral, everybody. And I thank you for your answer.