Reagan Can’t Have Changed His Spots : Nicaragua Has Every Reason to Be Skeptical of Peace Plan

No one can predict what consequences, if any, the White House’s new Central American peace plan will actually have. Too many elements of the proposal are imprecise and incomplete, perhaps not even thought out by the plan’s architects. But because it seems to represent at least an ostensible change in priorities and strategy, the new approach seems worthy of serious scrutiny. This is certainly what every Central American high official, together with every diplomat from the Contadora countries, is doing at this time. It is also, without doubt, what the Sandinistas are engaged in.

The Sandinistas have reason to be skeptical. On too many previous occasions the Reagan Administration has made use of a similar tactic to squeeze more money for the contras from Congress. First an apparently innovative negotiating plan is put forth--including, in fine print, aspects known to be unacceptable to the Sandinistas. Then, once Managua objects to the American plan for those very reasons, the Administration goes back to Congress arguing that it must support the contras in view of the Sandinistas’ intransigence. Ronald Reagan’s track record in this regard does not exactly inspire trust.

Nor does the Administration’s timing inspire confidence. The new proposal was announced on the eve of the Central American summit meeting in Guatemala City, at which the region’s five presidents were to discuss and negotiate a text drawn from three previously existing proposals: the Contadora documents, the Arias plan (named after the president of Costa Rica) and a last-minute alternative from Honduras--the timing of which had already awakened suspicions of U.S. double-dealing. Whatever else may be said about President Reagan’s new plan, it neutralizes the Guatemala meeting, which must now either discuss a series of obsolete peace proposals or one proposal with which it is barely familiar and for which it is totally unprepared.

But, beyond wariness with regard to U.S. motives, the Sandinistas--together with many Latin American governments--have other valid reasons for balking at this latest American diplomatic initiative. To begin with, as a matter of principle, no nation can easily agree to subject its domestic political matters--elections, civil liberties, the lifting of a state of emergency--to the dictates of another. For Nicaragua to acknowledge that its internal affairs are a valid subject of negotiation with another government, and specifically with one that is openly arming and financing its overthrow, is a risk and a humiliation that the Sandinistas will probably and rightly refuse to accept.

In addition, most of the Reagan proposals’ specific provisions, while not offensive in the abstract, are likely to become so once their details are spelled out. Consider the proposal for a cease-fire. It is reasonable for a cease-fire to be implemented once U.S. aid to the contras has stopped, and in the context of their general disarming. It is something else to expect the Sandinistas to negotiate a cease-fire with the contras who are still under arms and are still receiving American “humanitarian” aid (the difference between humanitarian and military aid has never been persuasively spelled out).

Similarly, the details regarding the timetable and structure of elections and the conditions under which the contras would lay down their arms are all matters in which the negotiations could easily get bogged down. It is not hard to see them as potential pretexts that the Administration could use to break off the process and pressure Congress for renewed aid for the contras. But few in Congress are either able or willing to examine the details of the negotiations and to see whether the Administration is bargaining in good faith or not.

Last, and most important, there seems little reason to believe that Reagan has had a sudden change of mind. The only motive that could lead him to compromise, and only for a while, is Congress’ reluctance to hand over more money to the contras. No one can realistically hope that Reagan has given up on his dream of seeing the Sandinistas leave Managua for good.

All in all, there is not much in the proposal for the Sandinistas to get excited about. Unless, of course, they have learned Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s lesson, and feel strong enough to apply it. The lesson is a simple one: With an Administration as divided as this one, the best tactic is to always say yes to every new proposal. Since no proposal is fully supported by the entire Administration, and since Reagan does not impose a common position on everyone, the bureaucratic enemies of any given new policy will shoot it down if the United States’ adversaries do not.

The best way to deal with the United States, from this perspective, is to say yes , and then wait for someone in the Administration to say no. It is one thing, however, for the Soviet Union to accept the risk that this stratagem requires and quite another for tiny Nicaragua to do so. Nonetheless, the Sandinistas just might prefer to let American conservatives, the contras and Oliver North’s other friends fight this out with Congress, the State Department and the White House chief of staff. The commandantes in Managua might decide, after all, to sit this one out.