Soviets Show Naval, Political Skills in Gulf

One of the most arresting sights in the latest Persian Gulf crisis presented itself shortly after the supertanker Bridgeton hit a mine while under escort by American warships.

The Bridgeton, a re-registered Kuwaiti tanker now flying the American flag, was able to continue despite the damage, but the American warships took up what many saw as a humiliating position astern of the much larger tanker. It was feared that more mines might be encountered, and the warships had no mine-hunting or mine-sweeping capability.

Then, on the last few miles of the voyage to Kuwait, the Bridgeton, with the U.S. warships in its wake, passed a Soviet convoy steaming in the other direction. Not only were the Soviet warships out in front, but they were minesweepers.

Last month’s incident has helped alter many perceptions of the Soviet role in the gulf. Once widely perceived here as the clumsy, heavy-handed oafs of international politics, the Russians are earning renewed respect and increasing influence in the region with a display of diplomatic skill and military subtlety.

“I don’t know if you can call them sophisticated at this stage, but the Russians have certainly looked suave lately,” a Western diplomat in the region said the other day.

Another observed, “American intelligence should be asking how the Soviets knew to deploy minesweepers well before it occurred to the folks back in Washington.”

Without a whisper of protest from any government in the region, the Soviets have established what amounts to a permanent military presence in the gulf region, a Russian goal since the time of the czars.

Role Not Questioned

As a diplomat representing one of the regional powers put it: “The Russians have achieved a position they would have only dreamed of six months ago. They have legitimized their position in the gulf. Nobody questions their presence.”

The Soviets also have expanded their diplomatic relations with Arab regimes. They established ties with Kuwait in the 1960s and more recently have recognized Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Contacts with the staunchly anti-Communist Saudi Arabian government are also increasing.

The diplomacy seems to have blunted Arab criticism of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to the point that, in the words of one diplomat, “the view seems to be that they (the Soviets) want to get out of Afghanistan but just can’t find a way out.”

The Soviets have seemed to be courting both sides in the Iran-Iraq War, maintaining lines of communication with both Baghdad and Tehran despite the hostility between the two.

Moscow is Iraq’s principal supplier of arms, yet on Tuesday a deputy Soviet foreign minister, Yuli M. Vorontsov, was warmly welcomed in Tehran. Iran radio quoted Vorontsov as saying the Soviet Union is willing to study “important long-term projects” with Iran in the fields of energy, steel and industry. It said that Iranian officials will go to Moscow for follow-up talks.

Repercussions Continue

In contrast, the Reagan Administration’s efforts to improve relations with Iran culminated in the Iran- contra affair, which continues to have repercussions in the Middle East.

The Iranians have criticized Soviet policy--Moscow’s decision to lease three oil tankers to Kuwait, for example--but the fallout from this decision appears to have been less severe than from comparable moves by the United States.

According to Western diplomats, the Soviets first sent warships to the gulf on a permanent basis last autumn, after Iranian gunboats started halting Soviet cargo vessels carrying arms to Iraq by way of the Kuwaiti port of Shwaiba. The Soviets sent three minesweepers, a destroyer and a supply ship from its port at Aden in South Yemen. No one protested.

When Kuwait approached the major powers about putting its ships under the flags of other countries, a move that would afford them naval protection from Iran, the Soviets were the first to respond. Soviet law prevents any foreign company from owning a Soviet-flag ship, so Moscow agreed to lease the Kuwaitis three tankers.

U.S. Offer Followed

The United States followed with an offer to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers in the United States. The Reagan Administration cited the Soviet role as part of its rationale for increasing U.S. involvement in the gulf.

“As a strategy, if the U.S. Administration had hoped to preclude the Soviet presence in the gulf, then by definition it has failed,” a diplomat in the region said.

Ironically, the first ship to hit a mine in the gulf this year--there have been five--was the Marshal Chuikov, a Soviet tanker that was struck about 35 miles off Kuwait on May 18. The ship was repaired in Dubai and has since returned to service.

Perhaps more alarming from the Soviet point of view, on May 9 Iranian gunboats fired rockets and machine guns at the Soviet tanker Ivan Koroteyev.

Different Approaches

The two incidents illustrate the difference in approach between the Soviet Union and the United States, a distinction that according to many Western and Arab analysts accounts for greater Soviet flexibility in the region.

The Soviets have not publicized their escort operation. They have made no public charges against Iran and have not threatened publicly to take any retaliatory action. After the May 9 attack on the Soviet freighter, Vorontsov paid a hasty visit to Tehran. What he said has not been made public, but the attacks promptly ceased.

“The Soviets are keeping a low profile in the gulf, while getting political mileage out of American failures and mistakes,” a diplomat said. “Now, if the United States attacks the Iranian mainland in retaliation, the Soviets will exploit it as they did the American attack against Libya”--a reference to the U.S. air attack on Libya last year in retaliation for the Libyan-supported terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque in which an American serviceman was killed.