If Nicaragua’s Neighbors Have Faith, So Should We

The peace agreement reached in Guatemala by the five Central American countries represents in effect a decision by those governments to co-exist with each other. That in turn underscores the key question that has been at the heart of policy debate in this country all along: Do U.S. interests require that the Sandinista regime be removed from power?

The Reagan Administration has never accepted the notion of co-existence. It organized and sponsored the contras to try to force the Sandinistas to surrender or self-destruct. Until now it has premised the acceptability of any peace settlement on a prompt change of regime in Managua. It has tried to use the contras as both a bargaining chip and an enforcement sanction--as an instrument of pressure to force a negotiated agreement mandating political change while insisting on the consummation of that change as a precondition for withdrawing the pressure.

The plan endorsed by the five Central American presidents does not lend itself to that concept. In effect, it promises political survival to the Sandinistas if they stop running the country as a totalitarian state. Indeed, if the Sandinistas were to carry out the political changes that they agreed to in Guatemala, one could envisage the evolution of a kind of hybrid Mexican system with room for opposition activity and political mobility.

The Central American agreement is not, strictly speaking, a “plan.” It is a framework. It establishes only principles and goals to guide the conclusion of concrete, implementing agreements. How one assesses that framework depends on one’s basic assumptions about the Sandinistas. Those who assume that the Sandinistas are irredeemably and irreversibly committed to a Leninist regime have no logical alternative but to advocate forceable removal. The Central American countries clearly have made different assumptions--not in assuming any greater benignity on the part of the Sandinistas, but in positing the likelihood of moderation by external forces and circumstances, and in not conceding the inevitability of the direst predictions.

The problem, of course, is that none of these assumptions can really be tested except by the leap of faith implicit in negotiating a peace settlement. The Sandinistas’ promise to open their system if the insurgent war against them is stopped can be honestly tested only if they are placedin precisely that situation--that is, if the United States stops aid to the contras and stops insisting on political change as a pre-condition for doing so.

There is deep disagreement within the Reagan Administration over how the United States should respond to the Central American agreement. Obviously the Administration cannot reject the initiative without isolating itself, but it is not happy with the costs and risks that it foresees as being part of the bargain. That is why some are doggedly casting about for insurance. Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole suggests that Congress vote a renewal of military aid for the contras but hold it in abeyance like a sword of Damocles. Vice President George Bush suggests that the Administration should keep pressing the Reagan-Wright proposal, although it is hard to see how it could do that short of an ultimatum. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger says that the contras must be maintained in fighting readiness.

The unspoken assumption in these approaches is that the contras are the only instrument available to us to protect and advance our interests. In fact, the contras may be the poorest instrument. Renewing their support cannot promise to achieve any of the purposes for which such aid has been advocated. It can promise only to renew a protracted war of attrition whose course and duration we can neither predict nor control.

The Guatemala agreement clearly cannot succeed over U.S. opposition or without U.S. cooperation. The time has come, therefore, for the United States to take that leap of faith. We ought to enter direct negotiations with the Sandinista government. That would be the best way to satisfy ourselves about our concerns--about amnesty and treatment of the contras, about security matters, Soviet/Cuban military links and so on. We should consult and offer to cooperate with the Contadora nations in the task that the Guatemala agreement entrusts to them of dealing with levels of demilitarization, verification and the like. We should offer material and technical resources to assist the various verification and follow-up commissions.

There is no convincing reason why the United States should not enter energetically and imaginatively the task of helping put the necessary follow-up agreements in place. To stand back now, passively or grudgingly, to see whether the whole thing falls of its own weight would truly be to create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But what of the risks? If the Sandinista regime breaches agreements after receiving guarantees of its security and survival, it will have demonstrated its challenge to the peace and stability of the region. But the consequences would be far from uncontrollable. Actions and sanctions against Nicaragua by the United States and the other Latin American countries would have the broad international support and legal and moral foundation that the contra strategy lacks.

The United States really has only three broad choices now. We can join the Central American and Contadora nations in accepting the Nicaraguan situation as a historical fact that cannot be undone at an acceptable cost, and go on from there to help construct policies and agreements to protect our and their interests. Or we can adopt a static kind of isolation and containment strategy as we have done with Cuba for 30 years. Or we can openly intervene and overthrow the regime. Continuance of the contra strategy would be the worst of all worlds, locking Nicaragua into an indefinite civil war with no certain outcome, but with very predictable costs in blood and suffering.