Aide Says North Asked Meese to Delay His Probe

Former White House aide Oliver L. North asked Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III to delay his investigation of the Iran- contra affair for at least 24 hours last November, and then used the rest of that day to shred documents in his office, an assistant to North has told congressional investigators.

Marine Lt. Col. Robert Earle, who worked for North on the National Security Council staff, said North told him on Nov. 21 that Meese was sending Justice Department investigators to examine NSC files on the Reagan Administration’s secret arms sales to Iran.

According to Earle’s testimony, given in private to Congress’ Iran-contra committees last May but released only Thursday, North said he asked Meese: “Can I have or will I have 24 or 48 hours?”

“And he told me that the attorney general had said something like . . . he didn’t know whether he could have that much time,” Earle said.

Meese’s men did not arrive at North’s office until the next day--by which time North, Earle and secretary Fawn Hall had shredded or discarded stacks of sensitive documents, Earle said.

“It was . . . a little unclear to me what exactly to look for, so I erred on the side of destruction,” he said.

Meese’s failure to immediately seize documents and safeguard evidence in his initial inquiry of the arms sale operation has been the focus of sharp criticism from Congress as it has conducted its investigation this summer.

North, though acknowledging the shredding, and Meese both have testified that they did not recall the conversation Earle described. Meese said the delay in starting his investigation was intended merely to allow North “to get those documents together.”

“The only reason that I told them (at the NSC) that we would have our people there the next morning (was) so that they could go through these things in an expeditious fashion,” Meese told the committee last month.

Earle said North began pulling sensitive documents out of his files as soon as he returned from meeting Meese in the West Wing of the White House. At the time, bombarded by questions from Congress and the press about the recently disclosed arms sales, top Administration officials had given conflicting accounts of the operation and Reagan ordered Meese to determine what had happened.

“I asked what was going on,” Earle said, “and he (North) said something . . . to the effect that it’s time for North to be the scapegoat. ‘Ollie has been designated the scapegoat,’ or something like that.”

In their shredding, North and his aides attempted to destroy any documents showing that proceeds from the arms sales had been diverted to benefit the Nicaraguan rebels--the most explosive aspect of the operation. One key memorandum that they missed, which was discovered by Meese’s investigators, turned the arms sales from a controversy into a scandal.

Earle testified that North told him as early as April, 1986, that some of the profits from the Iranian arms deals were going to support the contras during a period when Congress had prohibited U.S. aid to the contras.

Earle said he and North worked together on a price list for a later weapons sale that showed two columns: one with the official Defense Department price for Hawk anti-aircraft missile parts, and a second with the price that Iran was to pay.

“The ratio between the two columns, the difference, was a factor of 3.7,” he said. “The higher price was 3.7 times higher.”

In the transaction that resulted, a shipment of Hawk parts and TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran last October, the Tehran government paid $7 million to a private company controlled by North and retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord, and the company reimbursed the U.S. government a little more than $2 million--producing a gross profit of almost $5 million.

Earle’s account of North’s paper work on the excess funds appeared to support North’s contention that he wrote more than one memo to be forwarded to President Reagan outlining the diversion.

North testified he wrote at least five such memos and shredded all but one of his copies; National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter testified he remembered only one memo, the one that later was discovered by investigators. Poindexter said he did not tell Reagan of the diversion.

Earle said North briefed Poindexter “routinely, on everything and anything, either by secure phone call or cross note or memo, or going over to see him personally.”

North also told him some time in mid-1986, Earle said, that CIA Director William J. Casey knew about the diversion of funds several months before the diversion was publicly revealed. North told Congress that Casey learned of the diversion in February, 1986; Casey denied knowing of the diversion before it became public, both in testimony before Congress and in an interview with Meese, before he died last May.

Contacts With Casey

Earle also testified he was surprised at North’s frequent contacts with much higher officials, including Casey. “That would strike me as unusual if there were a week that they didn’t have at least one contact,” Earle said.

At one point in May, 1986, Earle said, North was so worried about the contras’ financial state that he considered sending the rebels $2 million that Texas millionaire H. Ross Perot was offering as ransom money to free American hostages in Lebanon. But the plan was never carried out, Earle said.

Earle also said North described his interrogation by Meese last Nov. 23, after the Justice Department investigators had discovered the one surviving diversion memo.

Meese showed North the memo, he said, and North admitted he had sent profits from Iran to the contras. At that point, North told him: “There was a sigh from the assembled people.”

At the end of the interrogation, North pointed out that he had not been read his rights against self-incrimination, Earle said--an indication that North knew he faced possible criminal sanctions for his conduct.