Warning Flag Is Up for Aquino : She Must Act Decisively, Sack Advisers, Shore Up Military

It’s typhoon season in the Philippines, but last Friday’s signal that “the red flag is up” was a reference not to an impending tropical storm but to military rebels staging a coup with their blue-and-red Philippine flag arm patches reversed.

The near-successful coup, however, will not be the last if the past is any guide to the future, and the next attempt may well succeed. Since coming to power in February, 1986, Corazon Aquino has faced a series of challenges from her military. Each attempt was fought with greater intensity, more blood and over the same issues.

The military rebels argue that they only want effective military and civilian leadership to guide the country in its fight against a growing communist insurgency. After all, they’re the ones who are being killed. The civilians see the challenge as only a blatant grab for power.

Who is right is almost impossible to tell. Personalities, not substance, are the issue in every Philippine political crisis. Hopefully after rearranging the names behind the titles, effective leaders may emerge. The search in Manila, now as in the past, is for acceptable political sacrifices to make way for new names.

Past sacrifices have obviously not been enough to avert additional crises. A general malaise evident in the Philippines a year ago is even more apparent today, despite economic growth rates approaching 5%.

The government seems directionless, lacking in vision, while at the same time the old days of bombastic politicians and pervasive corruption--including Aquino’s family but not herself--have returned.

Aquino appears increasingly isolated and irrelevant to the process of government, meeting infrequently with the press and learning about policy decisions by her cabinet from the newspapers.

She has the type of government that she wanted early on, deferring major policy decisions like land reform to the Congress elected last May and refusing to establish her own political party.

Even a queen cannot always stay aloof from politics, and Corazon Aquino is instead a president. If she doesn’t lead, someone else will. However, her presidential assistants--Joker Arroyo and Teddy (Boy) Locsin, who appear largely responsible for the overall management of the government--are perceived as incompetent. They also make little effort to hide their contempt for the military.

Will sacrificing Arroyo and Locsin and perhaps even Gen. Fidel Ramos--who is also not greatly loved within military circles, where his leadership is viewed as weak and vacillating--stem the tide of discontent? New leaders may not prevent another coup attempt, but not having them will ensure it. The depth of mutual animosity is just too great.

The military’s game plan may be aimed not at removing Aquino but at supplanting the palace’s power, making her a figurehead. Still, the military cannot rule without the support of the business community and a mass base among the people. This it does not yet have, but clearly the support is developing as the government appears rudderless.

The attempted coup on Friday demonstrated the scope of support for the rebels’ cause as well as the palace’s ineptness at crisis management--for example, delaying Aquino’s television statement until late afternoon, leaving the nation confused. In fact, the coup may have been a trial run at the real thing, revealing weaknesses in the government’s capability and helping to solidify rebel ranks. They now know who will support them in a future effort.

Ironically, the military leadership is now more unified than before--unified both in its displeasure with the government and in its commitment to maintain the integrity of the ranks. In spite of press hoopla about the military for the first time having killed its own, casualties were relatively light--19 soldiers killed, 61 wounded.

Aquino faces three paradoxes. First, if she doesn’t use her power as president to lead the country, she will lose it. But if she uses it and makes the wrong decisions, she also will lose. Thus the importance of sure-footed advisers who can gain the confidence of the military and the nation.

Second, although former President Ferdinand E. Marcos weakened the military to prevent it from challenging his rule, Aquino must strengthen it in order to survive.

Finally, a strengthened military may actually encourage the communist insurgency to grow as the struggle intensifies. Despite the military’s complaints about the government, the military itself does not seem to have any better program to confront the insurgency except through brute force.

Beyond leadership, the issue is also resources. The government’s financial cupboard is bare. Efforts to strain more for the military with benefit and pay increases would only rob another vital part of government. The communist insurgency forces the government to do a little for everyone without enough for anybody. No one is left happy, and the communists fill the vacuum.

The last thing that President Reagan probably wanted to deal with in his last year in office is another crisis in the Philippines. But with negotiations on U.S. bases beginning next year in a climate of deteriorating political stability over access and compensation to air and naval facilities, the United States should immediately dust off old proposals for a major economic aid program for the Philippines before the situation is beyond redemption. As one general said, there is “no reason for the hay if the horse is already dead.”