INF: Ignoring History, or Making It? : Before Arms Ratification, Senate Needs Assurances

It now seems likely that the United States and the Soviet Union will sign the first arms agreement in more than nine years.

If the Senate ratifies this proposed treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, it will be the first signed and ratified arms-control agreement between the superpowers in more than 15 years.

Before they complete an agreement, U.S. negotiators should assure themselves--and the Senate--that they have not made the terrible error of ignoring history. In the case of agreements regarding nuclear weapons, we can ill afford to repeat the mistakes of the past.

If the negotiation and ratification of the proposed INF agreement (or any future arms-control proposals) are to succeed where past agreements have failed, those who negotiate for the United States, and those of us who must ratify, should be guided by fundamental principles.

Any new agreement should include specific enforcement provisions and safeguards against cheating.

History proves that declarations of intent are inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Although President Jimmy Carter warned the Soviets that their violation of SALT II by encryption of telemetry would cause the United States to withdraw from the accord altogether, the Soviets proceeded undeterred.

To be credible and effective in discouraging violations, a treaty must contain clear penalties for cheating.

Enforcement provisions must be included explicitly in the text of a treaty, placed there either by negotiation or by unilateral reservations attached to the instrument of ratification by the Senate. It is essential that the Soviets clearly understand the penalty that they will pay for violation before the agreement is ratified, rather than after it has been violated.

We must also be prepared to take whatever unilateral steps are required to defend against threats posed by violations. For example, tactical or strategic ballistic missile defenses like those included in the Strategic Defense Initiative should be deployed as a safeguard against cheating on this INF or some future strategic ballistic missile accord.

Any new agreement should be verifiable by means that do not require us to suffer Soviet violations in silence.

The Soviet Union is so vast a land mass that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve perfection in verification. Still, with a well-designed verification scheme that includes satellite monitoring and on-site inspection, we can narrow the uncertainty to tolerable levels.

What we should not do is make deals that are dependent on verification through means so sensitive that we dare not go public with the information for fear of compromising an intelligence capability.

Thus we should obtain the maximum degree of verification possible using non-classified means. We can then hold the Soviets accountable to impose whatever sanctions are appropriate to the violation, up to and including a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty and the initiation or resumption of activity banned by the treaty. We must resolve to do so, or the United States ought not to enter into agreements.

Any agreement should itself be precise, clear and unambiguous.

An agreement that is ambiguous on its face is a disaster waiting to happen, a virtual invitation to exploitation and cheating by the Soviets.

In 1972 the Senate was given assurances by the Nixon Administration that the vague and ambiguous SALT I treaty’s language on “heavy ICBMs” would prohibit a significant increase in the size of the Soviet SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missile. Later the Soviets upgraded the SS-11, transforming it into the much larger SS-17 and SS-19, claiming that they were not “heavy” ICBMs. The United States sheepishly acquiesced to the very difficult Soviet interpretation, conceding that the treaty itself was vague on what precisely was meant by “heavy.”

It should be obvious by now that ambiguities in language are not accidents. Where the Soviets insist on vagueness in drafting, it is to disguise the fact that a disagreement clearly exists in substance.

Any new agreement should bring benefit that does not depend on any contingency other than performance of its own terms.

The Senate should not settle for an arms agreement whose primary justification is that it will lead to a “good agreement.” Henceforth, every arms agreement should stand on its own feet and offer significant benefit or value without reference to, or dependence on, some future performance or event.

The embarrassing fact is that Gerard C. Smith, the chief negotiator for the anti-ballistic-missile treaty, cautioned the American public in 1972 that limitations on anti-ballistic-missile defenses would be in the national interest only if reductions in offensive forces were achieved within five years. Fifteen years later we are still waiting for offensive reductions, and Ambassador Smith is now desperately and unconvincingly trying to rationalize why strategic defenses of America remain inconsistent with our national interests.