Central American Presidents Show Real Grit in Quest for Peace

It is now 73 days since the presidents of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador agreed to a set of steps for peace in Central America. The agreement caught Washington and much of the world by surprise--as has the energy and grit with which the Central American presidents have been making good on their commitments.

Peace will still elude the region on Nov. 7, the deadline for some major provisions of the agreement. Yet sufficient progress will have been made, not only to assure the effort a longer life but to infuse it with a certain robustness. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize last week to the plan’s originator, Costa Rica President Oscar Arias Sanchez, is less a recognition of what has been accomplished than a benediction on what is underway.

If signing the Guatemala accord expressed the Central American yearning for peace, the follow-up activities of the respective presidents reflect the limitations of their power. Each party must take initiative to show good will, but none can go too far--with so much at stake--without reciprocal acts. The United States, though not a signatory, could greatly ease the process, but Central Americans are learning that they can proceed without us. This was evident when El Salvador President Jose Napoleon Duarte visited the White House on Wednesday and strongly defended the accord while also stressing friendship for the United States.

Though agreement to the Arias plan was unexpected, it was no accident. It expressed a confluence of events and trends building for many months. First and foremost, the five presidents came to a shared sense of the toll that the Central American conflicts were taking on the entire region. While the burdens of war had fallen most heavily on Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, they weighed as well on Costa Rica and Honduras, which have reluctantly given sanctuary both to refugees and anti-Sandinista rebels. Since 1981, per capita income in the region had dropped by 26% and, with continuing violence, prospects seemed bleak.

Second, for differing reasons, the presidents of Nicaragua and El Salvador were ready to pursue peace. Daniel Ortega was selected to stand for the Nicaraguan presidency as the compromise candidate--acceptable to other Sandinista factions because he was so unprepossessing. But over the past three years, he and his fellow “moderates” have established their ascendancy. A relaxation of tension is in their interest as well as their country’s.

Meanwhile, Duarte’s political star had fallen in El Salvador. In pursuing peace, Duarte could appeal to his people’s war-weariness and show a measure of independence from the United States. And the Arias plan--by calling for an end to foreign support for insurgent groups and dialogue with unarmed opposition--legitimized the Ortega and Duarte governments and discredited the rebel causes.

Third, never enthusiastic about the U.S.-backed contras, the presidents of countries neighboring Nicaragua had become convinced that the U.S. policy toward the Sandinistas was moribund. Most Central Americans believed the contras could not defeat the Sandinistas. And now, power ebbing away, President Reagan seems incapable of sustaining congressional support for the contras.

Finally, the Guatemala agreement signifies Central American independence. Since agreeing on the Arias plan, the Central American presidents have taken steps to implement provisions in advance of the deadline. For example, all the signatories have decided to set up commissions on national reconciliation. In the cases of both El Salvador and Guatemala, historic meetings have been held between the governments and armed insurgents.

In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have named their toughest critic, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, to head the reconciliation commission, approved the reopening of the newspaper La Prensa and Radio Catolica and permitted the assembly of peaceful opponents. They have also repatriated a key rebel group of Miskito Indians, promoted the previously existing amnesty program and unilaterally declared cease-fire zones in three embattled provinces. Even more promising, Ortega and the commandantes have crisscrossed the country to explain the agreement and campaign for peace. The Sandinistas appear to have gone too far to be engaging simply in propaganda ploys.

If the progress toward peace still falls short of the mark set for Nov. 7, the United States must bear much responsibility. Reagan has offered halfhearted praise for the Guatemala agreement, but also denounced it as “fatally flawed.” In fact, the agreement’s underlying weakness for the Administration is precisely the foundation for peace. The Central Americans will accept the existence of the Sandinista regime in return for Sandinista guarantees about its behavior at home and in the region.

By now the U.S. Administration’s opposition is clear on three basic points:

First, the Central American presidents have gone a long way toward spelling out the criteria and procedures for democratization, but they also set limits on the changes to be expected. Their agreement, for example, mandates “free, pluralistic, and honest elections,” while recognizing that they will be held according to the schedules of “present political constitutions.” By contrast, Reagan has declared democracy to be the “bottom line”--the point on which there is “no compromise.”

Three weeks ago, a White House spokesman suggested that accelerating the Nicaraguan presidential election, scheduled for 1990, might be required for U.S. support of the accord. It is one thing for the Administration to take democratization provisions seriously. It is quite another to use them to oust the Sandinistas. Central Americans realize that Nicaraguan politics, even under the agreement, will take years to become fully democratic.

Second, the agreement is unequivocal in calling for an end to support for insurrectional movements. This applies to any U.S. aid to the contras that is not for returning them to normal life. Central Americans see stopping contra aid as necessary for any real political opening but Reagan refuses to give up the contra bargaining chip, insisting it be retained to guarantee Sandinista compliance.

Third, the agreement gives little attention to measures related to security and arms limitations. In his recent speech to the Organization of American States, Reagan correctly stated that the accord “does not address U.S. security concerns in the region.” What he ignored was the expectation among Central Americans that the United States would negotiate security concerns directly with the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s neighbors view the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban advisers, reduction of Communist Bloc military assistance and limitation of the size and sophistication of Sandinista armed forces as important to advancing the peace process. But they want U.S. help.

The Sandinistas might yet renege on some key promises; they may feel too threatened by political openings and civil liberties they committed to. We may never know, since the Reagan Administration seems unwilling to put the Arias plan to the test. Until the Administration is ready to consider acceptance of the Sandinista regime’s continued existence, there will be nothing to negotiate about with Managua and there will be incentives for the Sandinistas not to comply with the agreement.

A majority in Congress, however, backs the Arias plan. Members cannot compel Reagan to do so--certainly not between now and Nov. 7. But by rebuffing his requests for more contra aid they can at least keep him from dealing a body blow to the peace process.

It is possible that momentum for peace is already sufficiently great and interests sufficiently real that the process will go forward. The word is being circulated by Central Americans to look not to Nov. 7 but to Dec. 5 as the next critical date. That is when the International Commission for Verification and Follow-up will make its initial assessment of compliance. Meanwhile, the Central American presidents, led by their Nobel Prize laureate, must use moral suasion on the U.S. Administration to continue their struggle for peace.