Summit Shift Could Signal More Gorbachev Surprises

Despite his apparent success in helping to set a December date for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting where a missile agreement can be signed, the picture of the Soviet foreign minister coming to Washington, virtually hat in hand, to accept summit conditions that his boss rejected just one week earlier is both startling and unnerving.

It is startling because Eduard A. Shevardnadze came without even a plausible cover story for the flip-flop. And it is unnerving--even “frightening,” according to Stanford Prof. Condoleezza Rice--because it raises the possibility of yet another surprise from Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev before or during the summit meeting itself that could cause another collapse with dangerous consequences.

Gorbachev’s behavior last week in rejecting the scenario now accepted was “reckless almost to the point of irresponsibility,” said William Hyland, a National Security Council staffer under President Richard M. Nixon. “One wonders whether he is reckless, incompetent or both.”

In substance, too, the Soviets appeared to make concessions. Friday’s communique suggested some compromise on space defenses by both sides, but the Soviets appeared to give somewhat more by accepting the prospect of a strategic arms agreement next year, in language that did not tie it to curbs on anti-ballistic missile defenses, such as the Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative.

Nonetheless, the most dramatic aspect of the Shevardnadze visit was the trip itself. In sending the minister, Moscow appeared “almost desperate for a summit,” according to Jeremy Azrael, a specialist on Soviet affairs at the RAND Corp.

“They seem almost in a panic. If Gorbachev had wanted to do an about-face from last week, he could have sent Dobrynin (former Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin, now a senior Gorbachev aide) or done it with a message, not send Shevardnadze flying here almost with hat in hand,” Azrael said.

“They seem to be almost flaunting the fact that they don’t have their act together over there,” he added. “Why so urgent? Why so frantic? Gorbachev must have Soviet audiences to whom this kind of behavior compounds all their suspicions about his other (reform) programs.”

Political Difficulties

Azrael speculated that political difficulties in Moscow--”factional and personal competition,” as he put it--were responsible for “this summit dance we’ve been seeing. It is one expression of a very charged political atmosphere in the Kremlin,” in which opposition to Gorbachev and his policies is becoming more visible and strident.

Shevardnadze, in a press conference at the Soviet Embassy, denied that there was any disunity in the Kremlin. “There was certainly no split before my departure. I don’t know what happened in these last two days,” he quipped.

Hyland, speaking in a MacNeil-Lehrer Hour televised interview, appeared to blame Gorbachev personally rather than the circumstances. He expressed concern that Gorbachev might come but, at the last minute, insist again on restraining SDI, as he did at the Reykjavik, Iceland, summit with Reagan last year and again in Moscow with Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

If that happened, the summit would “blow up,” said Hyland, now editor of the journal Foreign Affairs, in what would be “an incredibly dangerous moment.”

As a result of events last week, the Soviets “look extremely weak right now,” said Prof. Rice, another Soviet expert. “Reagan seems to be pushing them around pretty good. I think Gorbachev decided to make one last stab at getting curbs on SDI (when he turned Shultz away last week). He took a gamble, goofed and looks dumb now.

“But they seem really desperate for the summit and for agreements, for some international success now. Gorbachev is not just impetuous; to me, his behavior has been frightening.”

Show of Pique

In almost a show of pique, the Kremlin will not allow Gorbachev to be trotted around the United States as the White House wished, to shopping malls and the Reagan ranch in Santa Barbara.

“A two- or three-day trip for business-like negotiations is quite enough time,” Shevardnadze said at his press conference. “He has a very busy schedule.”

Shevardnadze, who was far less ebullient than he was last month on his previous visit here, also indicated that the Soviets are already nervous about the Senate ratification process for the intermediate-range missile agreement, as well as the prospective agreement on strategic weapons cutting 50% from long-range offensive arsenals.

“We asked several times (about ratification prospects),” he said, “because we have had bitter experiences with previous treaties.” The second strategic arms limitation treaty was signed in 1979 but never ratified by the Senate because President Jimmy Carter withdrew it after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Two nuclear test limitation treaties were also never approved.

“No one in the Administration can fully guarantee the treaties will be ratified,” Shevardnadze added. “But it looks . . . quite possible they will be ratified. Of course, things may change.”

The White House counts at most 20 to 25 votes against the intermediate-range treaty in the Senate, leaving a comfortable cushion above the two-thirds majority needed for ratification. The private Arms Control Assn., which strongly supports arms agreements, agrees with that assessment.

Jack Mendelsohn, deputy association director, said 12 to 15 conservative Republicans would vote against the treaty, plus five to 10 Democrats, including conservative Southerners. The conservatives generally do not trust the Soviets to comply with any agreement.

Concerns in NATO

On the other hand, some liberal Democrats and some GOP presidential candidates fear that the agreement will raise concerns within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States will not provide a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe. In turn, this could lead to “denuclearizing” the Continent, leaving the Soviets with a superior conventional, non-nuclear force.

Reagan, asked about opposition from the Republican presidential hopefuls, said there was “a great deal of misunderstanding” on the issue. Shultz said opponents will become “enthusiastic supporters” when they understand the terms.

As now envisioned, the Soviets would give up four to five times more warheads than the United States has in Europe. But, to a large degree, the treaty will depend on its verification provisions--some not yet hammered out with the Soviets--to win the necessary support in Congress.

In the communique, the two sides went beyond setting the date for the summit for the signing of the intermediate-range missile agreement to deal with the far more significant negotiations on strategic weapons.

At the summit, it said, the leaders would “consider thoroughly” the issues of 50% reductions in offensive arms and “the observance of and non-withdrawal from the (1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty for an agreed period.” The Soviets want that period to last 10 years; the Administration has proposed that it end in 1994.

In this careful wording, the Soviets dropped their previous demand for “strict observance” of the treaty “as signed and ratified.” The Administration objects to this language as implying a narrow interpretation, which would limit work on the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as “Star Wars.”