Soviets Might Give Reagan More Than Congress on SDI

President Reagan is caught up in two negotiations over the future of his “Star Wars” strategic defense system. On one side he is bargaining with Congress, on the other with the Soviet Union. The Soviets are likely to give him the better deal, not just on the Strategic Defense Initiative but also on major arms reductions and the kind of summit meeting the President wants.

Congress is apprehensive that the Administration will find a way to squeak out of the restrictions of the anti-ballistic missile treaty by artful use of the Sofaer, or “broad,” interpretation. In the view of Abraham Sofaer, legal adviser to the State Department, and other Administration lawyers, certain experiments could be carried out in space even though they violate the plain language and traditional interpretation of the treaty. And so Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Carl Levin (D-Mich.) have taken the tack of attaching a rider to defense appropriations legislation. It would prohibit the use of any government money to pay for experiments of the kind the Administration wants to perform, some of them as soon as the end of this fiscal year: realistic tests of space-based interceptors, lasers of high power, particle-beam weapon prototypes--the guts of exotic missile defenses.

The Soviets, for their part, have offered to talk about specifics, with the implicit understanding that some experiments in space, even though they might well come close to demonstrating the capability to shoot down strategic missiles or their warheads, might still fall into the category of permitted “research.” The Soviets note, as any honest reader of the ABM treaty must, that it permits research on all kinds of advanced defensive projects, but that it forbids “development and testing.” Definitions of “ABM capability” and “tested in an ABM mode” that trigger the prohibitions in the treaty are clear for conventional interceptor missiles and radars. But they are, in fact, open to serious discussion and argument when futuristic weapons such as particle beams and lasers enter the picture.

There are definitional ambiguities in the ABM treaty; ambiguities exist in all legal documents, sometimes by accident and sometimes by design. The negotiating record of the ABM treaty shows that both sides understood that highly specific limitations could not be written to cover technologies then in their infancy. Instead, a prohibition on development, testing and deployment of all forms of space-based ABM systems or “components” was included. Left open was the definition of “components” based on exotic technology. When, for example does a space-based laser become accountable? When it has the power to destroy a missile at 100 miles, at 1,000 miles, at 100 feet? It is no longer possible or desirable to prohibit all laser experimentation in space, nor is it desirable to prohibit testing of particle accelerators beyond the atmosphere, even though lasers and particle beams have the potential to become weapons.

The Nunn-Levin restrictions on testing of SDI in space, combined with planned budget cuts aimed straight at SDI testing, are apt to be very broad in their effect, erring on the side of exquisite compliance with the treaty. They will severely restrict all testing of high-powered lasers based in space or lasers whose beams can be directed towards the heavens if, once in space, the beam strikes a relay mirror. With Nunn-Levin inserted in a must-sign, veto-proof bill, even SDI research that might be acceptable under the treaty will come to a stop. The Administration cannot want this outcome.

The Soviets, however, propose a set of quantitative limits on space defense research. They will suggest, for example, limits on laser size, chosen to be lower in power than needed for true missile defense capability and, it is hoped, sufficiently verifiable that any attempt to exceed the limits will trigger early warning alarms. In effect, the Soviets will permit President Reagan to move the letter of the ABM treaty from their present very restrictive view of space-based testing at least a little way toward a broader and less literal interpretation. If Reagan doesn’t see this as a good deal, Congress will hand him a worse one in an all-or-nothing contest over Sofaer’s broad interpretation.

As long as the President is negotiating quantitative limits with the Soviets, he has a chance to use concessions in that arena to extract Soviet concessions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Alternatively, some U.S. “give” in START might result in some American “take” in the SDI arena. Even agreement to begin talking about clarifying the real ambiguities in the ABM treaty might have been enough to give the President a Thanksgiving summit with turkey dinner at the Santa Barbara ranch.

But the moment Nunn-Levin becomes law, the Soviets will have no reason to be flexible elsewhere in order to achieve a portion of their aims with regard to ABM treaty clarification. Nunn-Levin will, in effect, hand them their going-in position.

As a supporter of the ABM treaty, I should not object to Congress placing the tightest possible constraints on a program that is designed, ultimately, to do away with that agreement. But I see no wisdom in President Reagan’s obstinate refusal to negotiate with either of his adversaries. Such refusal is likely to result in his losing to both, and losing negotiating capital that could be used to achieve a START treaty and a summit meeting of great potential benefit to the United States.