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Gorbachev Cut Down to Size? : No. 2 Man Claims Command of Party Secretariat

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<i> Alex Alexiev is a Los Angeles-based Soviet affairs analyst</i>

Three weeks ago, Moscow television ran a play by the well-known Soviet publicist Fyodor Burlatski that immediately became a political event. It detailed the conflict between a bright and energetic provincial Communist Party leader impatient to implement reforms and a gruff official in charge of ideology who, while not opposed to reform, advocated a cautious and conservative approach.

The politically attuned Soviet viewers could not fail to see the fictional account as mirroring the widely rumored discord at the very top of the Soviet party between General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev and the No. 2 man, Yegor K. Ligachev. To make sure that his message was not missed, Burlatski, a fervent supporter of Gorbachev, had the ideologue use phrases taken almost verbatim from Ligachev’s speeches.

The play, a barely disguised plea for support of Gorbachev, ended inconclusively, with neither man able to prevail. But a few days ago, Ligachev provided a real-life sequel that borders on a sensation. In an interview with Michel Tatu, foreign editor of the influential Paris daily Le Monde and a renowned Sovietologist, Ligachev asserted that the Politburo had “instructed him to chair the Secretariat of the party and to organize its work.”

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It is the Secretariat, and not the Politburo, which runs the day-to-day affairs of the Soviet Communist Party. To the extent that the chairmanship has always been the prerogative of the general secretary, as well as the source of much of his power, Legachev’s statement would, if true, mean that there has been a significant weakening of Gorbachev’s control. Or, to put it simply, a general secretary who does not control the Secretariat is not in complete control.

Although Ligachev stated that Gorbachev is consulted and kept fully informed of his actions, and that there are no political differences between the two, such a bifurcation of political power would be truly unprecedented in the Soviet Union. People other than the party boss have often run the Secretariat in his absence, but they were invariably trusted lieutenants and not perceived adversaries, as in this case. Further, such substitution has always been a temporary expedient and not, as Ligachev now seems to be implying, a permanent arrangement.

That Gorbachev should be cut down to size by his own party at a time when his international reputation is soaring seems preposterous. Yet recent events in the Soviet Union have cast a cloud on his domestic standing. Gorbachev’s problem seems to be that in his reformist zeal, he has already stepped on too many entrenched party toes without being able to deliver much on his promise. Opposition to his methods, if not his objectives, crystallized in October. The first evidence was a unusual out-of-turn Central Committee plenum that resulted in significant backtracking from expected positions in his speech honoring the October Revolution. Next came the political lynching--orchestrated by Ligachev--of Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev’s protege and ardent champion of glasnost and perestroika . Yeltsin’s only real sin was his impatience with the pace of reform and party deadwood. Several days later, a Pravda article titled “Democratization and Discipline” seemed to indirectly criticize Gorbachev and stressed, time and again, the primacy of discipline over glasnost and democratization. Even innocuous events, such as the censoring of Gorbachev’s remark to an American interviewer that he discussed politics with his wife, acquire a new meaning in the light of Ligachev’s comments.

The logical explanation of Ligachev’s bold assertions is that Gorbachev has been forced to share power with him. Domestically this would signal a slowing down of reform and a reining in of some of the powerful liberalization impulses unleashed by glasnost . Coming only days before the summit, Ligachev’s remarks have undercut Gorbachev’s prestige in such a way that Ligachev would surely be fired if he didn’t have the clout to back them up. If he is not, the man President Reagan will face across the table on Tuesday has lost much stature since their last meeting.

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