Hanoi Again Makes Aid the Missing Link

The Reagan Administration’s cautious six-year effort to create a new relationship with Vietnam has run into a familiar roadblock: Hanoi’s demand for economic assistance as a price for cooperation on resolving the fate of American servicemen missing in action in Indochina, the sensitive political issue that has dogged normalization efforts since 1976.

Why have the Vietnamese again adopted a hard line, thereby precluding movement toward diplomatic relations, something they are supposed to eagerly want? Hanoi’s stonewalling is disturbing but hardly surprising to those who have watched the U.S.-Vietnam mating dance.

The Administration has made satisfactory resolution of the MIA issue the “highest national priority,” in effect a precondition to normalization. A second condition is withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and a political settlement. Although MIAs are a “humanitarian issue,” and theoretically unlinked to other issues, Vietnam--with no prospect of U.S. economic assistance--has consistently granted only enough cooperation to keep a dialogue going.

To provide an incentive, the Administration last August made an unprecedented gesture. An agreement to encourage privately sponsored humanitarian aid was reached in Hanoi by special presidential envoy Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the first time, the United States explicitly recognized Vietnam’s own “humanitarian concerns.”

But on Jan. 19, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach announced that while Vietnam would accept private aid, “there must be at least some assistance from the (U.S.) government.” Vietnam could not help Americans account for their missing men without reciprocal action from the U.S. government. Privately channeled aid, he made clear, was not enough.

Vietnam has thus slid close to the adamant position it held during negotiations with the Carter Administration, a position that blocked diplomatic relations 10 years ago and has contributed to Vietnam’s isolation.

In 1977 the United States agreed to let Vietnam enter the United Nations and offered to lift the trade embargo (in place since 1954 against the Hanoi government) once relations were established. On aid, the United States was firm: “No trading dollars for bones.” The MIA/POW issue would be resolved unconditionally without linkage to aid. In a gross political misjudgment, Hanoi clung to its aid demand, citing President Richard M. Nixon’s letter indicating $4.7 billion in reconstruction monies if the 1973 Paris peace accords were honored. The United States replied that when the North crushed the South militarily in 1975, the accords were rendered null and void.

By mid-1978, Hanoi agreed to treat MIA/POWs as a humanitarian issue and dropped overt claim to “reparations.” But Vietnam was about to sign a defense treaty with the Soviets, then invade Cambodia; the United States was normalizing relations with China. The moment for rapprochement had passed.

The shadow of linkage has lingered. U.S. actions “to heal the wounds of war” are mentioned over the first cup of tea when congressional delegations visit Hanoi. But the Vietnamese--until now--have refrained publicly from making aid a condition of cooperation on MIAs. The Vessey agreement portended a fresh atmosphere.

Thach is a pragmatic negotiator who knows U.S. law prohibits official assistance to Vietnam and that Congress has no desire to change it. Few congressmen seeking reelection are eager to aid a country that humiliated the United States.

Internal Vietnamese politics are partly responsible for this shift. Thach’s tactics may have come under fire from the party leadership. Lately the Vietnamese have grumbled that the Vessey agreement (initially on prosthetics help) is insufficient and is moving slowly. There may be resentment among party cadres and veterans against “helping” the United States.

Normalizing relations with the United States has important advantages for Vietnam: trade, access to technology and investment, and better external relations generally. Yet normalization may no longer be the high priority it was in 1977. While still isolated and severely depressed economically, Hanoi has found ways to do limited business with the non-communist world.

Finally, the former Cambodian head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Hanoi’s surrogate government in Phnom Penh are pursuing a political settlement that would include withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. If the bloody Cambodia impasse is eventually resolved, the second obstacle to normalization will have been removed.

No one ever accused Hanoi of impatience--or acting without political motivation. Unless there is something to be gained, the Vietnamese leaders will not choose to soothe American anxieties. If Cambodia is settled, progress on MIAs can come quickly, then normalization. Minimal cooperation on MIAs may continue, but the American people will probably have to wait for the “fullest possible accounting,” which the Reagan Administration--but not Hanoi--has set as top priority.