A Trojan Horse in Panama? : Stronger Democracy, Not Noriega’s Ouster, Will Secure Canal

The agility, courage and intelligence displayed by the Reagan Administration in supporting nascent democracy in El Salvador and the Philippines seems to have come unglued in the handling of Panama. In the first two cases an Administration not known for the subtleness of its understanding of Third World politics took advantage of the existence of strong, reformist opposition leaders to fashion workable transitions from authoritarian rule. The outcome of a more stable and democratic Panama, not Gen. Manuel A. Noriega’s departure, is the United States’ primary interest. Heavy-handed U.S. actions that smack of “big-stick” diplomacy could produce a sadder conclusion and undermine future Presidents’ willingness to take the risks of reform and democracy in similar situations.

Given the influence of former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick on President Reagan and her preferential option for the authoritarians in the Third World, many were surprised when the Administration took the risks involved in backing the Filipino people’s challenge to Ferdinand Marcos under the banner of Corazon Aquino. Perhaps, as one analyst quipped, this required no more brilliance than that displayed by someone leaping off the tracks as a freight train approaches. But many Administrations before this one had stood steadfast as the locomotive of social change came barreling down on them.

The rewards of risk-taking in the interest of democracy had been bestowed on a reluctant Reagan Administration by an assertive Congress over El Salvador policy. As secretary of state, Alexander Haig longed to “go to the source” and make anti-terrorism rather than human rights the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. But the need for congressional support induced the Administration to adopt as its own some of the congressional concerns for human rights, democracy and reform in El Salvador. While the consensus that developed did not end El Salvador’s fratricidal war, it did prevent the guerrilla victory that seemed imminent.

The United States’ heightened interest in Panama is burdened by a credibility gap that it has been unable to overcome. The Panamanians remember, if the North Americans do not, that then-candidate Reagan led the fight against the Panama Canal treaties that had been negotiated by the Carter Administration. They remember, too, that conservatives as impeccably right-wing as William F. Buckley could see the wisdom in returning sovereignty over the canal to Panama when Reagan could not. The popular classes in Panama also know that conservatives like Reagan had denounced the late Omar Torrijos as a “tin-horn dictator” when he alone among recent Panamanian leaders had addressed the needs of the poor.

The bizarre marriage of convenience between liberals Edward M. Kennedy and John Kerry and conservatives Alphonse D’Amato and Jesse Helms may increase Senate collegiality, but it does little to allay the fears of some Panamanians that Washington’s campaign to remove Noriega is a Trojan horse designed to revise the canal treaties. These fears are given weight by D’Amato’s statement that the United States should not eschew military intervention in defense of “its interests” in the Panama Canal.

The United States’ stirring support for “constitutional” President Eric Arturo Delvalle also rings hollow for many. It was Secretary of State George P. Shultz who rushed to endorse the election of Nicolas Ardito Barletta in 1984 amid charges of fraud by Christian Democratic opposition leader Ricardo Arias Calderon. A year later Noriega forced Barletta out for defying him in pressing for an investigation of the killing of the general’s nemesis, Hugo Spadafora. That made the politically weak vice president, Delvalle, the head of government, and Noriega was more powerful than ever.

Noriega’s longstanding ties to the U.S. intelligence network (going back, according to Vice President George Bush, to at least 1966) lead many to wonder whether it is the general’s venality or the United States’ decreasing ability to control him that has led to the drumbeat of calls for his departure.

The United States still has the time to close this credibility gap concerning its real intentions in Panama. It should renounce any unilateral military intervention in Panama, and state unequivocally that the constitutional crisis in Panama will have no effect on the United States’ commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Panama Canal treaties of 1977. And it should encourage Delvalle to call for new elections open to all political parties once domestic peace has been restored in Panama. This would not only strengthen the ambivalent support of opposition groups for Delvalle’s stand against Noriega; it also would reassure all Panamanians that their next president will not have a “Made in the U.S.A.” label. Finally, middle-class and business opposition leaders must reach out more effectively to Panama’s popular classes and demonstrate with words and deeds that their commitment to democracy is also a commitment to social justice for the poor majority of their country.

As is the case with Haiti, there is more at stake in Panama than its immediate fate. The United States may be faced in coming years with other transitions from authoritarian rule in Chile, Paraguay, South Korea and elsewhere. If successful outcomes in these difficult situations are to be achieved, the United States must demonstrate far more intelligence and subtlety in its policy than has been seen thus far in Panama.