The Troubling Case of Soviet Subs in Sweden

By and large the Soviet Union has been on a good behavior kick since Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power three years ago.

One major arms-control agreement has been negotiated and others may be on the way. Threats have given way to smiles in Soviet diplomacy. Moscow seems willing to cut its losses and get out of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, some puzzling cross currents simply do not square with the new good-guy Soviet image.

One of the most intriguing is the persistence under Gorbachev of flagrant violations of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet submarines.

Sweden, after all, is a devout neutral whose modest armed forces pose no conceivable threat to the Soviet Union.

Why should the Soviets make the Swedes look silly--and risk the credibility of the global Soviet charm offensive in the process--by repeatedly sending Soviet subs into close-in Swedish waters?

According to knowledgeable Nordic sources, mini-subs have actually landed Soviet frogmen on Swedish territory.

Soviet defectors have said that, in the event of a war in Europe, the Soviets would land saboteurs and assassins assigned to eliminate political leaders and key military personnel in enemy countries.

This may or may not apply to Sweden. But the Swedes are said to have taken the precaution of moving certain military pilots into new quarters at secret locations.

What is it all about?

The answers, as offered by U.S. and Scandinavian experts who attended a conference on Nordic security at UCLA’s Center for International and Strategic Affairs, are not reassuring.

Swedish neutrality has deep historical roots; the country hasn’t fought a war in over 170 years.

In the post-war era of East-West rivalry, the Swedes have strived to keep the Soviets convinced that they will not be a party to anybody’s aggressive designs against the Soviet Union, but will defend themselves if the need arises.

This policy has come under strain as a result of the repeated incursions by Soviet submarines. Beginning in the late 1970s, at least eight or nine such intrusions have occurred each year.

The Soviets were caught red-handed in October, 1981, when a Whiskey-class sub ran aground near Sweden’s highly sensitive Karls Krona naval base. A “navigation error,” Moscow blandly explained. A year later six Soviet submarines were spotted in a fiord near Stockholm.

According to the Swedish defense staff, 15 intrusions by “unidentified” foreign submarines, mini-subs or frogmen occurred between July and September of 1987.

Various theories have been offered, including the idea that the Soviets are just using Sweden to practice commando operations. But Western defense experts have a different explanation.

According to these analysts, Soviet planners see Sweden as a handy route for an attack on Norway in case of war. The Soviets also are seen as determined to preempt the possibility of Swedish arms or territory being used against them.

The training of submarine-born Soviet “Spetsnaz” commandos to cripple Swedish defenses before mobilization could occur fits neatly with this analysis.

The Swedish response to the Soviet violations has, in the opinion of foreign and domestic critics, been 180 degrees wrong.

In 1981 the Swedish governments finally protested the Whiskey submarine incident and, when the incursions continued, downgraded diplomatic relations for awhile.

But soon it was business as usual. Since 1983 Swedish officials have not even been willing to identify the intruders as Soviet.

And, while Sweden has long been quick to mind other people’s business within the United Nations and at various international security conferences, it has made minimal use of these forums to confront or embarrass the Soviets on the submarine issue.

Meanwhile, except for the incident in 1981, Sweden has not destroyed or captured a single “unidentified” submarine.

Swedish military men complain that funds made available recently for anti-submarine warfare are nowhere near adequate. In addition, the rules of engagement under which the Swedish navy operates are said to be overly restrictive.

There is a widespread impression that Sweden’s political leaders are just as happy to have the intruders go uncaught. They hope the problem somehow will go away.

However, the effect has been to demonstrate that Sweden lacks the national will to confront the problem, and to signal that the incursions can be continued with little military or political risks.

Sverker Astrom, a veteran Swedish diplomat, surprisingly hinted at UCLA that the United States, as the ultimate guarantor of European security, should take the lead in pressuring the Soviets to stop violating Swedish sovereignty.

It’s hard to see why Americans should be expected to take the defense of Swedish neutrality more seriously than the Swedes themselves as long as the Soviets continue to treat a small, inoffensive country like Sweden with such contempt. However, Smiling Mike Gorbachev’s peace offensive will remain suspect.