Salvage Work in Southern Africa

The continuing talks between the United States and South Africa and the United States and Angola regarding the future of Angola are timely and appropriate, although no one has been surprised that little if any progress has been acknowledged. Nevertheless, these contacts, like internal developments in South Africa, are important tests of Pretoria’s long-term intentions.

For seven years President Reagan has indicated that his greatest interest in Africa is in having Cuban troops removed from Angola. South Africa has made clear time and again that its priority is to maintain the domestic status quo while clinging to neighboring Namibia and doing everything in its power to keep the adjacent neighbors weak and dependent. Reagan’s preoccupation with Cubans has given South Africa a perfect excuse for keeping Namibia.

The price of stubbornness has been rising, however. South Africa’s direct military engagement as an ally of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA guerrilla forces in Angola has rescued Savimbi from defeat, but has done so at the cost of increasing casualties. Now South African forces find themselves in a stalemate with Angolan troops defending Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The deliberate destabilization of such nearby nations as Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well as Angola has further isolated South Africa from the international community. At the same time, there has been almost universal censure of South Africa’s latest internal repressive steps denying political activity for citizen groups, unions and the churches.

Perhaps the South African government does not care what the world thinks. There is little doubt that its police power, even in the face of spreading resistance, is equal to the task of repressing the black majority and maintaining the white hegemony in the short term. It is equally clear, however, that this growing alienation from the world, and world standards, is eroding the quality of life for the white minority even as it strengthens the determination of the majority to end apartheid and gain the political rights of civilized nations.

Right or wrong, the settlement of the war in Angola is now a precondition for Namibian independence. And Angola cannot be settled by South Africa alone. U.S. negotiators have been bringing home to Angola the role that it must play, spelling out a shorter timetable and clearer conditions for the withdrawal of Cuban forces, and accepting negotiations with the UNITA rebels--whose influence, even if dependent on South African troops, cannot be denied. Washington needs to assure Angola on the security issue--first by ending its ill-considered program of arms aid for the guerrilla forces, and then by seeing to it that South Africa at last lives up to its commitment to end military adventures in Angola.

Then there will be no further excuse for South Africa to maintain its colonial hold on Namibia. It can be held to its promise to implement the U.N. plan for Namibian independence.

For President Reagan, in his final months, the realization of independence for Namibia, the last African colony, and the stabilization of relations among the Southern African nations could redeem some of the failures of his bankrupt constructive-engagement policy for South Africa. They are steps that could make easier the vast internal adjustments of ending apartheid in South Africa.