Mideast Peace: Does Shultz Stand a Chance?

The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza is now in its fourth month and has claimed more than 150 lives, thousands of injured, maimed, imprisoned or expelled. Israel’s early promise to restore order and tranquility in the occupied areas turned out, as all other promises of colonial powers, to be false.

The causes of the uprising and the determination of the Palestinians to be free and sovereign in their land are too profound to be crushed by bullets and beatings from Israeli soldiers. Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s second visit to the region--yet another attempt to bring peace with justice to Arab and Jew--underscores the seriousness with which the Reagan Administration, even in its waning months, views both the uprising and the explosive relations between Israel and adjacent states.

In his earlier visit, Shultz presented Israel and the Arab countries involved with a complex plan premised on two U.N. Security Council resolutions (242 and 338) that both sides accept, theoretically, as a basis for resolving their 40-year conflict. But the secretary’s plan also calls for direct negotiations among those countries, under appropriate international auspices, so they can forge an end to the strife on the basis of trading land for peace.

Shultz’s plan, similar to the earlier Reagan initiative of 1982, tries to address the core of the conflict--namely, the question of Palestine. The plan calls for “Palestinian participation” in the process, but does not offer a means to that end. It also envisages greater Palestinian “control over their political and economic affairs,” but does not categorically accept or reject the idea that such control may be transformed into independence and sovereignty for the West Bank and Gaza.

The State Department has been encouraged by the fact that neither the Arab countries nor Israel has rejected the Shultz plan thus far. Shultz’s invitation to me and Edward W. Said, both of us Palestinian-American professors and members of the Palestine National Council, to exchange views on the peace initiative suggested a potential for greater clarity on issues of Palestinian participation in the peacemaking process.

Clearly, persistence in holding on to assumptions that have proved wrong cannot advance the peace effort. All previous efforts, including the Camp David agreements and the Reagan initiative of 1982, have failed because they rejected Palestinian self-determination and tried to bypass the legitimately designated representative of the Palestinian people--the Palestine Liberation Organization. The previous insistance by the United States on its singular role as peace broker to the exclusion of all other powers and the United Nations heightened some Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese apprehensions about possibilities of an unfavorable hidden agenda. Shultz will have to satisfy all parties to the conflict to get agreement to a comprehensive peace plan that would meet their needs and aspirations and be perceived as fair. Is that feasible?

There are essentially three principal issues to be negotiated in good faith among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict: land, people and political sovereignty. If Israel were to abide faithfully by Resolution 242, it would have to withdraw from territories occupied in 1967 and thereafter--the Golan Heights and the West Bank, plus Arab Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Since Lebanon is part of the process, Israel’s exit from southern Lebanon is equally compelling.

Shultz has considerable assets in his discussions with all parties. The United States is Israel’s principal benefactor and in important ways underwrites Israel’s continuing occupation of Arab lands. The Arab states are anxious to smooth their relations with the United States by removing issues of contention. It might appear that Shultz will be able to exercise pressure on all parties, especially since all profess a strong desire to avoid the continuing strife and reach an accord that would benefit Arab and Jew in the Middle East.

Shultz’s success depends entirely on his willingness to face head-on the issue of Palestinian independence and to negotiate with the Palestinians’ accepted representatives. Success with them would contribute immeasurably to his success with the other Arab states.

Shultz’s current effort comes at a time when it is abundantly clear that neither party to the conflict can impose a settlement by force. Solutions consistent with self-determination, peace, justice and equality for Arab and Jew in the Middle East are possible. Shultz has sufficient assets to transform the current relationship of conflict between Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jew to a relationship of mutual acceptance, equality and peace. The secretary of state need not fail in his peacemaking efforts.