Contradictions Seen in Washington’s Panama Policy : U.S. Stalled: Noriega Won’t Get on Plane

At first it seemed like a familiar plot: Reagan Administration pressure brings about removal of corrupt Third World dictator.

But Gen. Manuel A. Noriega, the Panamanian strongman, has refused to follow the script. Unlike former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos or Haitian President-for-Life Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier, Noriega refuses to get on the plane, to fade into exile.

Now, as President Reagan, his senior policy advisers and Congress return to Washington after the Easter holiday, they find themselves searching for a new final act.

The Reagan Administration has repeatedly proclaimed the importance of getting Noriega out of Panama. But there is no indication yet that it has resolved the fundamental contradictions and dilemmas involved in its Panama policy.

On the one hand, the economic sanctions it has already imposed seem to be more effective in destabilizing Panama as a whole than they are in toppling Noriega. And on the other hand, the Administration remains extremely reluctant to use force, which probably would get rid of Noriega but would risk American lives and an anti-American backlash in Latin America.

What other policy options the Reagan Administration might have are vague at best, however.

Noriega has rebuffed U.S. efforts to negotiate directly some settlement that would include his departure from Panama. And State Department officials acknowledge that they have failed to win public support from other Latin American nations for a broader diplomatic effort aimed at ousting Noriega.

“We’re dealing with Latin America, and the Latin Americans will never rush to endorse the United States,” one State Department official said. He said that other Latin American countries have been “responsive behind the scenes” to U.S. actions against Noriega.

The Reagan Administration seems to have made a short-term decision to wait--at least for a few days--to give the sanctions more time to work and to see whether the opposition to Noriega can hold together.

“Noriega will leave,” the State Department official said. “It’s just a question of time.”

On March 25, a student asked Reagan during an appearance at a Virginia high school whether he intended to use force against Noriega. “We’re not going to be the big colossus of the north,” the President replied.

But since then, as the economic sanctions have failed to dislodge Noriega and as Panamanian opposition forces have faltered, the United States has made the preparations that would in fact enable it to play the colossus role.

About 1,300 U.S. troops were flown to Panama last week in what was described as a defensive security measure. Another 800 Marines arrived later in the week for what the Pentagon said was a three-week stint of jungle training.

Some observers have wondered whether it is possible that these troops, and some of the 10,000 soldiers of the U.S. Southern Command already stationed in Panama, will be used in a military intervention against Noriega--and some American conservatives are beginning to advocate the use of force.

“It seems to me that it’s coming down to that,” said Michael G. Wilson, a Latin American policy analyst with the Heritage Foundation. “We should let Noriega realize that if he makes any wrong move toward U.S. citizens, U.S. bases or the canal, or even against the Panamanian opposition, we would be willing to consider a surgical strike against him. . . .

“It’s either something like that or we end up with another Cuba or Nicaragua on our hands,” Wilson said. He predicted that any U.S. move would cause the Panamanian military to crumble and that, as a result, “it will not take a lot of bloodshed.”

Those arguments are vehemently disputed by others who follow Latin American policy, however.

“The Panamanian Defense Forces (is) a well-trained force, trained by the United States and prepared to defend the canal. If we try to use force, there could be a lot of casualties,” said Peter Hakim of Inter-American Dialogue, a group that advocates peaceful settlements of Latin American problems.

Even among conservatives, there is a reluctance to use force against Noriega.

“A couple of things should be present before (the use of force) is considered,” California Rep. Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-Ventura), ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs, said last week. “First, that we had good information and that we were sure it would work. And second, that intervention would not only be supported by backers of (President Eric A.) Delvalle (who is now in hiding) but also by the majority of the Panamanian Defense Forces.”

Meanwhile, the debate in the Administration over Panama has been marked by extraordinarily public bickering between the State Department and the Pentagon.

The State Department has favored tougher action against Noriega. The Pentagon, however, is far more hesitant to take actions that could jeopardize American lives, U.S. military facilities in Panama and the Panama Canal.

The United States last Friday announced what is likely to be the last and the most drastic in the series of economic sanctions aimed at undermining Noriega’s control of Panama. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Reagan barred any payments of funds by American companies or individuals to the Noriega regime or to any of its agencies.

The action cuts off tax payments from American companies. U.S. officials hope that as a result, Noriega will find it hard, if not impossible, to meet his military payroll and as a result, his support within the military will erode.