Kuwait, Drawn Unwillingly Into Middle East Conflicts, Holds Tight to a Hard Line

The hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airways passenger jet and the killing of Kuwaiti military and security officers on board is another reminder that this small Persian Gulf state has become an unwilling player in the conflicts of the gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The hijacking and hostage-taking is related partly to Kuwait’s domestic politics and foreign policies. But it stems also from spillover effects of the internal politics of Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war, and clan and family loyalties that link prisoners in Kuwaiti jails to factions competing for supremacy in Lebanon.

From the day they took over the plane (April 5) the hijackers sought the release of 17 prisoners held in Kuwaiti jails for eight simultaneous car bombings in December, 1983. The bombings left several persons dead and 87 injured. Only one or two of the perpetrators were Kuwaitis. Some were Lebanese. The majority were Iraqis and believed to be members of Al Dawaa, an Iraqi Shia Muslim opposition group with ties to Iran that has been fighting the government of Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein. The bombings targeted Kuwaiti as well as American and French facilities, presumably because of the support of all three countries for Iraq in its war with Iran.

Powerful family loyalties explain several attempts to secure the prisoners’ release. In December, 1984, hijackers forced a Kuwaiti Airways passenger plane to land at Tehran airport, where they demanded freedom for the prisoners. Iranian commandos finally overpowered the hijackers, but not before two American passengers had been killed.

Hijackers of a TWA flight to Beirut in 1985 also listed the release of the prisoners in Kuwait as one of their demands. And members of Hezbollah, or Party of God, the shadowy Lebanese Shia umbrella organization holding a number of French and American hostages, have repeatedly made the release of the prisoners a condition for freeing their hostages. One of the men in prison in Kuwait is the brother-in-law of Imad Maghniyya, a leader of Hezbollah’s armed contingents and the man thought to be the mastermind behind these hijacking attempts.

These Hezbollah elements have been especially exercised to secure the release of the three Lebanese Shias in Kuwaiti jails; and PLO mediators trying to resolve the crisis have reportedly been in contact not only with the hijackers but also with their backers in Beirut.

Since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war Kuwait has tried to steer a difficult course between its two powerful neighbors. Either an Iraqi or an Iranian victory would pose threats to Kuwait. Iraq could always renew dormant claims to Kuwaiti territory; an Iranian victory could stir up Islamic and Shia sentiment in Kuwait, where there is a large Shia minority, and destabilize the entire region.

Kuwait, nevertheless, has thrown its diplomatic and material support behind Iraq. It has done so because it regards Iran as the greater threat, because of Iraq’s geographical proximity and out of a need to display Arab solidarity. It has joined Saudi Arabia and other gulf states in providing Iraq with financial assistance and it has allowed its ports and overland routes to be used to move Iraqi imports.

Iran retaliated early in the war by hitting economic facilities in Kuwait. In 1985-86, Tehran’s relations with Kuwait, and with Saudi Arabia, too, improved markedly. But when Iraq resumed the tanker war last year, there was a sharp deterioration in relations and Iran repeatedly attacked Kuwaiti shipping to induce Kuwait to end its assistance to Iraq.

None of this has deterred Kuwait. It has clamped down hard on what it regards as attempts at internal subversion. It has made life more difficult for Shia emigre workers in Kuwait, a policy that fuels Shia resentment. At recent conferences of Arab and gulf states, Kuwait has played an unusually active role in urging a firm diplomatic stand against Iran.

Moreover, having traditionally avoided identification with American military strategy in the gulf, Kuwait last summer sought protection behind an American military shield. It arranged for the United States to re-register Kuwaiti tankers. Thus Kuwait played an instrumental role in bringing about a sharp increase in the American naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This has provided Kuwait with the military protection it needs, but makes it vulnerable to propaganda attacks from Iran and Arab radicals, allegedly for serving American ends.

The latest hijacking affair is significant also for what it tells us about the politics of Iran and Syria, the two “radical” states of the Middle East. Having initially allowed the hijacked plane to land in Iran, the Iranians quickly sent the hijackers on their way. This lack of revolutionary zeal could lose Iran support among Shia radicals in Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon. But the Tehran government clearly has no desire once again to be tarred with the terrorist brush. Syria, in control of Beirut airport, not only refused the hijackers permission to land, it even threatened to shoot them down if they attempted to do so.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, too, has been trying to earn points by helping negotiate with the hijackers. Israelis opposed to concessions to the Palestinians, however, will point to the hijacking as further proof that Arab radicals cannot be trusted. Yet the uprising on the West Bank, propelled by indigenous grievances, will not go away, and any diversion of world attention from the West Bank will be short-lived.

For Kuwait this has also been a particularly difficult time. In the past the lives of hostages of other countries have generally been on the line when the demand was pressed for the release of the prisoners in Kuwait. Other governments had to do the negotiating and make the hard decisions. This time it was Kuwaitis who were being cruelly tortured and killed by the hostage-takers, confronting Kuwait with a tough test of its announced policy of not yielding to hijackers, hostage-takers and terrorists.