We’re Far From a Summit Worth Celebrating

The United States and the Soviet Union are approaching the strangest summit meeting in the history of these superpower negotiations. For years American administrations have attempted to keep expectations for a summit low. This is the first time that one has succeeded. No one expects anything but a ceremonial farewell for President Reagan.

Yet, paradoxically, there is a very high expectation that a qualitative improvement in Soviet-American relations is taking place and that it is becoming irreversible. Republicans talk about Mikhail S. Gorbachev in retreat, needing good relations with the United States for his perestroika. They see the summit as evidence that the policies of the Reagan Administration have brought peace as well as prosperity.

Liberals believe that Reagan’s acceptance of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, his repeated visits with Gorbachev and his muting of the “evil empire” theme have essentially legitimized detente for conservatives. They think that this has set the stage for real negotiated progress in the next Administration.

Without doubt, something fundamental has occurred in the Soviet Union’s relations with the outside world. The communist revolution established an iron curtain against Western market forces and Western ideas. Now that the Soviet leadership recognizes that such a wall meant total protectionism for Soviet manufacturers and total disaster for Soviet economic competitiveness, the iron curtain is being dismantled. This is bound to affect Soviet-American relations for the good.

Nevertheless, euphoria over the state of Soviet-American relations is likely to lead to severe disappointment. Even the summit meeting should not be automatically chalked up as a simple ceremonial success. The Reykjavik summit was scheduled just before the 1986 congressional elections, and the Reagan Administration was so confident that Gorbachev needed a success that it flew off to Iceland unprepared. The disastrous trap that it walked into was a major factor in the unexpectedly large Democratic Senate victory that year.

On the surface the Administration is following the same path today, making the peace side of its peace-and-prosperity election campaign dependent on Gorbachev’s good will. It is hard to believe that the Administration would risk another Reykjavik. Yet, given repeated policy dilemmas like Panama, one realizes that the Administration’s foreign-policy team is quite capable of any height of foolishness.

Let us assume, however, that the May 29 summit meeting is largely ceremonial and goes reasonably well. Certainly one faction within the Soviet foreign-policy Establishment seems to have sold itself on the notion that it is important to get Reagan committed to detente and that George Bush should be supported because a Republican President can make deals that a Democratic President would fear.

It is possible that Gorbachev has bought this argument. If so, the field of Soviet-American relations is still strewn with mines for the next Administration, whether Republican or Democratic.

First, the judgments about Gorbachev are not a sound basis for policy. Instead of thinking realistically about international relations, we are retaining the old dichotomy between pure good and pure evil and shifting Gorbachev into the former category. Gorbachev is being treated as the greatest reformer in Soviet history, leading a heroic and lonely battle against overwhelming odds.

The trouble is that this is nonsense. At best Gorbachev will move the Soviet Union into a kind of relatively mild and open dictatorship. When his first arrests make that clear, what will the conservative--and public--reaction be?

The INF treaty has not legitimized arms control for the conservatives. It is an agreement without military significance, and it was reached by putting forward proposals that were so unreasonable that they surely would be rejected. They were not, and now conservatives will say that the treaty proves that if we stand tough with unreasonable demands the Soviets will cave in. Any real compromises by the next Administration will be denounced as craven weakness. And if George Bush locks himself into the Reagan renunciation of the 1972 anti-ballistic-missile treaty, he will face real conservative opposition if he is elected and then tries to reverse himself.

Similarly in Afghanistan we are in for a rough time unless the communist government falls as soon as Soviet troop withdrawal ends. We have officially signed a guarantee of non-interference (which means no supplying of the rebels) while publicly saying that we will continue our supply effort. Either the Soviets or the American conservatives are certain to say that they are being betrayed, depending on what the next Administration does.

And, finally, at a time when the Soviet Union is absolutely determined to reintegrate its economy into the world economy, the United States has not even begun to face up to the issues of technology transfer, economic relations of our allies with the Soviet Union, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, credit controls and so forth. We are desperately hoping that Soviet economic reform will not be serious and will not force us to make hard decisions, but that is wishful thinking.

As Arthur Schlesinger has pointed out, there has been a 30-year cycle in American politics. Calvin Coolidge in 1925, Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955 and Ronald Reagan in 1985 reflected a mood of self-satisfaction. The Progressive movement of the 1900s, the New Deal of the 1930s and the civil- rights movement of the 1960s were times of transformation.

In the 1990s the cycle will almost surely reassert itself. This time the issue will probably be the relationship of America with the world--the abandonment of the obsession with communism replaced with a focus on economic power. The politics of this period of transformation will be no less intense and emotional than the politics of the 1900s, ‘30s and ‘60s. Soviet-American relations will be at the center of the crossfire.