THE MOSCOW SUMMIT : May Well Point the Way for Small East Bloc Countries : ‘Finlandization’: No Longer a Dirty Word

Almost 30 years ago, “Finlandization” was the scornful term coined to describe this tiny country’s strategy of tailoring its policies to accommodate the feelings of its menacing neighbor to the East.

In the tense atmosphere of the early Cold War, when communism seemed poised to overwhelm democratic values, Finland’s approach was derided as supine surrender.

But today, “Finlandization” is no longer taken as an insult in this prosperous nation. Quite the opposite: The word has come to mean a way of gaining a remarkable degree of political independence for a country living, as a U.S. diplomat once indelicately phrased it, “in the armpit of the Soviet Union.”

Lessons for Others?

In fact, some U.S. strategic analysts--and reportedly some Soviet officials as well--have begun to ask whether the lessons of Finland’s success can somehow be applied to the Communist satellites of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, if the Cold War continues to wane.

What is suggested is that Finland may point the way for these small East Bloc countries, long yoked to Moscow, to achieve greater freedom and prosperity without risking a direct break with the Soviets.

The aim, as one U.S. academic put it, would be to meet the “legitimate security interests” of the Soviet Union on its western borders but without Moscow’s political domination.

And this idea might at long last be acceptable, to the present leaders in the Kremlin at least, because--as Soviet officials have reportedly told the Finns--it would free Moscow to pursue its program of domestic renewal without the economic burden of unreliable allies.

A New Appreciation

Illustrating this new appreciation of what Finland has achieved and might contribute to the future, President Reagan on Friday spoke warmly of its “internationally recognized position of neutrality” and noted that Finland considers itself “tied to Western values of freedom, democracy and human rights.”

Reagan did not always view Finnish ways kindly, however. During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Reagan was concerned that the idea of East-West detente would seduce Western Europe into believing it could coexist with the Soviet Union without maintaining a strong military alliance. For example, he warned, if North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries lost access to Mideast oil, they would “literally have to be like Finland and accept Finlandization by Russia.”

But this week, in an interview with the newspaper Helsinki Sanomat that coincided with his visit here en route to the Moscow summit, Reagan said, “Finland is a country that has learned to live in close proximity to the Soviet Union. Finnish leaders have a unique perspective on that country. . . .”

Reflecting the continued sensitivity of its dealings with the Soviets, officials are not willing to advise other small countries publicly on how to manage their relations with Moscow.

‘Not Exportable’

“Our experience is not exportable,” declared Dr. Alpo Rusi, counselor of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, adding that it is unique to Finland, for geographic as well as other reasons.

And indeed, the Soviets face a far more modest military threat from Northern Europe than from the NATO forces of Central Europe. Behind the Finns are the Swedes, who pose no real threat to Moscow--but behind the Poles and Czechs are the Germans, who have twice invaded Russia in this century and today have the most powerful conventional military forces facing Central Europe.

The Soviets thus could afford to be less harsh on the Finns. But that cannot explain the entire reason why, in an important respect, Finland has been allowed by the Soviets to be the only nation to conform closely to the Yalta Pact of 1945, which was to guarantee democratic elections for such countries.

And while much in the Finnish-Soviet experience is the product of unique factors, Finland’s postwar history comprises a record that Soviet satellites can study attentively, particularly in the climate of opportunity created by glasnost , Gorbachev’s policy of openness.

Realism and Restraint

For one thing, as its leaders acknowledge, its overriding tenets in dealing with Moscow have been realism and restraint, much as the overriding Finnish security concern is its superpower neighbor, which has 50 times its population.

In its famed Winter War against the Soviets in 1939-40, the Soviets lost 10 times more men than did Finland. “We joke that one Finn is equal to 10 Russians,” said one Finnish general, “and then we say, ‘But what about the 11th Russian?’ ”

The Finns, having fought World War II on the German side, were very careful immediately afterward not to antagonize the Soviets further. They paid a heavy price, in land and repatriations. But they quickly resettled 400,000 displaced relatives from Karelia, a region ceded to Moscow in the postwar settlement, and met their reparations payments on time--perhaps the only country in the world to have done so.

Refused U.S. Aid

More significantly, the Finns refused to accept U.S. Marshall Plan aid, intended to rebuild Europe to resist communism, in order to avoid Soviet suspicions that it was joining an anti-Soviet alliance, as Max Jacobsen, the noted Finnish statesman and historian, has written.

Two Finnish politicians who emerged after the war, Urho Kekkonen and J. K. Paasakivi, were instrumental in Finland’s success, largely because they had been jailed or exiled by the Germans. They were able to persuade Stalin in 1948 to accept a Finland that promised to “repel aggression” aimed at the Soviet Union by any third country if it passed through Finnish territory.

This satisfied what Finns considered the “legitimate security interests” of the Soviet Union. At the same time, “free and unfettered elections,” as provided in the Yalta accord, were permitted by Moscow, unlike anywhere else along the Soviet frontier.

Stalin, at the time, had his hands full elsewhere. He had just taken over Czechoslovakia and was threatening West Berlin, while Yugoslavia was breaking away. So as with Finland’s fortunate geographic position, the international climate probably helped it to emerge from the postwar period as a government “friendly” to--but not dominated by--Moscow.

Gains Guarded Carefully

In the ensuing decades, the Finns continued to walk very carefully to preserve their gains.

Soviet ambassadors here at times acted more like governors-general than diplomats, openly favoring the Communist Party, which had a good chance of winning power at the voting booth after the war. Only in 1979 did Moscow begin to send career diplomats rather than party functionaries to run its embassy here. The Finnish Communists, meanwhile, had splintered into near insignificance.

In addition, a considerable degree of self-censorship was practiced by the Finns, including their media, over the decades. As recently as 1974, a Finnish publisher refused to release the book “Gulag Archipelago” by Alexander Solzhenitsyn for fear it would antagonize Moscow, according to Olli Kivinen, foreign editor of the Sanomat.

Maneuvers Proposed

Moscow’s last overt attempt to bring pressure on Finland occurred in 1978, when the Soviet Defense Minister, Dmitri F. Ustinov, startled the Finns by proposing joint military maneuvers. His idea was rejected and never revived, according to Jacobsen in the book “Finland: Myth and Reality,” and the specific aim of Ustinov’s proposal remains unclear.

Moscow also did not conceal its preference in the 1982 elections to succeed President Kekkonen. But the leftist candidate they preferred was beaten by Social Democratic candidate, Mauno Koivisto, and he has been reelected since then. Moscow attempted no further interference, according to Jacobsen.

The Finns still do not go wholly their own way, of course. They have announced, for example, that they--like the more traditional neutralist countries of Sweden and Switzerland--will not join the European Economic Community, although it would be in their economic interest to do so.

But Helsinki has come a far way from the days when, if Moscow sneezed, the Finns caught cold. And although Finland has yet to receive any specific benefit from the emergence of Kremlin leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, his withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, together with his statements on the rights of all nations to chart their own course, has moved Finland even further away from the postwar days when it fought against becoming another Soviet satellite.