S. Africa Blacks Grow Cool to Sanctions, Divestitures

While the anti-apartheid lobby in the United States is campaigning for tougher economic measures against South Africa, blacks here have put the sanctions and divestiture campaigns on ice. It is not that the country’s blacks no longer support these campaigns, but only that activists are now asking themselves if sanctions and divestiture can bring about the change that they wanted.

These doubts have emerged as a result of the campaigns during the last three years. Township attitudes on sanctions are at such a low mark that Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s statement on sanctions while in the United States recently received merely a passing glance and comment from township residents. To most political observers in the country the message is clear--let the sanctions campaign produce results or scrap it in favor of a campaign that does produce results. In fact, military wings of the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress continue to represent what is seen as the only course that can bring about change.

Each strike by the ANC’s military wing Umkhonto We Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) or the PAC’s Azanian Peoples Liberation Army is greeted with excitement. Township residents are desperate for change, and the sanctions campaign, dependent on the conscience of business, is becoming an irrelevance.

What is the reason for this change in attitudes, when just about two years ago township organizations were calling for sanctions? These organizations argued that sanctions were the most viable means to bring about peaceful change. They argued that sanctions would affect everybody, black and white, and that whites would be forced to pressure their government for change as the campaign began to bite. What has made people tire of the sanctions campaign and place faith instead in armed struggle? Strategists have pointed out that the combined forces of the ANC and PAC military wings are no match for South Africa’s military might.

The major reason is that there is a lot of disillusionment about sanctions. While many blacks were prepared to accept the suffering brought about by this campaign because it was their contribution to the liberation struggle, they found that the way in which companies divested protected the interests of white South Africa. Companies that pulled out sold their interests to South African companies, claiming that they did this to protect the jobs of a loyal work force or did not want to cause more hardship in the black community.

Activists have pointed out that these companies did not pull out but entered franchise agreements with white South African companies. In this way they protected their profits, which continue to flow into their coffers. Taxes were still being paid to the P. W. Botha government--which is what anti-apartheid groups were against in the first place because these taxes buttressed apartheid.

Despite the fact that foreign firms were asked to leave by local anti-government organizations, there is no denying that many of them, if not most, made better employers than South African companies.

These foreign companies had introduced affirmative-action programs for their work forces. The Sullivan code, whatever its limitations, had a touch of humanity and concern about it. When South Africans took over these foreign companies, old racial animosities between black and white came to the fore. The new owners made it clear that they would not tolerate “communists and agitators” in their companies.

The sanctions campaign caused unemployment for both black and white. Coupled with the recession in the country at the time, the situation was bleak. But white industry and the government rallied to the plight of white workers, and there were more unemployment programs for them than for blacks. Also, because whites received better salaries than blacks did, their unemployment benefits were better. All in all, the white worker received more attention when vacancies occurred, while many blacks were told to “go to Tutu” when applying for jobs.

Without doubt the South African government and industrialists outmaneuvered the sanctions lobby. White workers were protected while blacks were exposed and forced to feel the pinch, which made them turn on activists in anger. In addition, many activists were detained, organizations banned and leaders forced to go underground. This robbed the black community of leadership. The leadership left was weak and could not shoulder the responsibilities of the sanctions campaign.

Unions and community organizations that previously advocated sanctions have gone silent, not because they no longer support the campaign but because white South Africa’s response to this campaign brought about unexpected results. Rather than the sanctions inflicting suffering on all, white South Africa was protected by the government.

Should anti-apartheid organizations come up with a better sanctions campaign, it had better consider new laws that don’t allow companies divesting to simply shift ownership to white South Africans.

The desperation in the black community is alarming. Desperation could in the long run undermine the intentions of the sanctions campaign--peaceful change in South Africa.