U.S. Gulf Policy Is Sunk : Even Our Erstwhile Friend, Iraq, Plays the Spoiler

American policy in the Persian Gulf has hit a dead end. The risky and costly strategy that we have pursued over the past year enjoyed some success, but it now appears to have run out of steam. The situation in the Iran-Iraq War today is worse than when we entered the gulf, and our military forces are hostage to circumstances over which we have no control. The weakness of the U.S. position has been dramatized in the past few weeks by Iraq’s decision to distance itself from us, thereby reducing our influence.

Vernon Walters, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, traveled to Baghdad last month, presumably to urge Iraq to be more cooperative in negotiating a cease-fire and to try to persuade Iraq to change its policy on the use of chemical weapons. What he got was a dose of cold water.

President Saddam Hussein refused to meet with Walters. Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz publicly refused to accept the U.N. secretary general’s compromise cease-fire proposal. And Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan pointedly restated the Iraqi position on the use of chemical weapons: “We say that in defending our territories we will use all types of weapons. Those who oppose this can do whatever they like . . . . We reject any move by the international community to ask us not to use certain weapons.”

This diplomatic slap in the face was followed three weeks later by the publication of a lengthy attack on U.S. policy by the editor of the Iraqi News Agency, who observed coolly, “We have no permanent friend unless this friend maintains stands that do not harm our interests.” Four days later the Iraqi foreign minister suddenly canceled a scheduled meeting with Secretary of State George P. Shultz on the pretext that a mid-level State Department official had met the previous week with a Kurdish opposition figure who was visiting Washington.

Since the beginning of March, Iraq has vastly escalated the “war of the cities” by firing nearly 200 missiles into Tehran and other Iranian cities. It has pursued a scorched-earth policy against its own rebellious Kurdish population. When Iran attacked the Kurdish village of Halabjah, Iraq dropped chemical bombs on the town, killing up to 2,000 Iraqi citizens. Iraq has lately escalated the tanker war after a long period of relative quiet, and has launched four new ground offensives--successfully retaking the Faw Peninsula, the oil-rich Majnoon Islands, the town of Shalamcheh and portions of Kurdistan. Iraq senses correctly that it has the upper hand in this war, and its leaders are in no mood to make even the slightest concessions or to heed criticism.

For more than a year, U.S. policy has proceeded on the assumption that there was a good guy and a bad guy in the gulf war. Iraq’s cynical policy shift of the past few weeks should put an end to such delusions. Unfortunately, it also underscores the aimlessness of present U.S. policy.

Whether we like it or not, we have become an undeclared belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War. Our forces in the gulf are hostage to the actions of two vicious regimes, and we have no significant influence over either. Because of our support for Iraq, we let pass the moment when adept diplomacy might have ended the fighting. Now Iraq is backing away from us, and the diplomatic track seems to be closed as both sides gear up for new military offensives.

Iran is in turmoil. Evidence of policy disarray has been growing for several months, lending credibility to reports that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s health is failing. The recent parliamentary elections strengthened the hand of the Islamic radicals, who are seeking to transform fundamental economic and social structures. Iran was humiliated by Iraq’s recent successes on the battlefield. That has prompted Iran to undertake a thorough reorganization of its military forces and to begin planning for a new series of military operations against Iraq.

In this dismal situation there are no easy prescriptions. Certainly we must give up any illusions that our support will earn us the friendship of either Iran or Iraq. We must also try to rid ourselves of the specter of the Iran-Contra affair, which has haunted our gulf policy for the past year. We must begin to fashion a position that is genuinely neutral and independent, looking to our own interests rather than placing ourselves at the mercy of any regional party.